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ABSTRACT
The politics of economic realignment, Ireland 1948-1964
This dissertation analyses the transformation of Irish economic policy formulation 
from the formation of the first inter-party government in 1948 to the breakdown of 
Ireland’s application to join the EEC in 1963 and its immediate consequences. Based 
on extensive research in departmental files, and the personal papers of politicians and 
other policy players, and interviews with officials, businessmen and others who were 
active during the period, the study has a dual approach. It offers a historical analysis 
of the route Irish policy makers took in moving economic policy from a protectionist 
framework to one in which interdependence with other economies was assumed. The 
study also discusses the influence of trade unions, employers’ groups and farmers’ 
organisations on policy and on each other and charts shifts in their thinking on key 
issues of economic management. It is argued that their dealings with government 
during this period marked the inception of a corporatist style approach to national 
policy making.
This thesis argues that changes in thinking at both a governmental and a non­
governmental level led Ireland to adopt an interdependent approach to economic 
policy making. While some policy makers were reluctant to accept any form of multi­
lateral trading arrangements which would alter protected industry and the country’s 
privileged access to British markets, the severe economic crisis that affected Ireland 
throughout the 1950s led to the adoption of fresh economic thinking both within and 
outside the civil service.
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Introduction
The decision of the Irish government to seek membership of the European Economic 
Community [EEC] in 1961 marked the climax of a transformation in Irish economic 
policy formulation. From 1948 when the first inter-party government took office, 
successive governments were plagued by a series of balance of payments crises and 
a general economic malaise which by the time Fianna Fail regained office in 1957 had 
reached epidemic proportions. It had become painfully obvious within the policy 
making arena that protectionism, in place since 1932, and the country’s over reliance 
on the British market offered no real future for Irish agriculture or industry. Yet this 
view was not unanimous within or outside the government and civil service. Some 
policy makers were reluctant to accept any form of multi-lateral trading arrangements 
which would weaken protected industry and the country’s privileged access to British 
markets. However, by the end of the 1950s this had become very much a minority 
view associated mainly with the Department of Industry and Commerce and sections 
of a number of interest groups, most notably parts of the trade union movement and 
segments of the protected industrial sector.
Much has been written about the Irish economy in this period from both political and 
historical perspectives. While some commentators have written straightforward 
historical accounts of the process of the Irish economy from protectionism to free 
trade, others have written more polemical accounts and in many cases have come to 
the material with predefined ideological notions. This study is a historical account of
changes in public policy and uses various archive sources to augment secondary
material and interviews with prominent players in the period. Thus it is a political
study of a historical change in public policy. Joseph Lee in the preface to his
monumental study of modem Ireland warned of the dangers of the massive expansion
of archival material available to researchers:
The avalanche of archival material, only a small fraction of which has 
been excavated, not only threatens to obscure perspective beneath 
mounds of detail, but also to lull the historian, starved for so long of 
any archival sustenance, into complacency concerning the enduring 
quality of his necessarily provisional conclusions.1
While much of this thesis is archivally based I have attempted as far as possible to 
follow Lee’s dictum and place the arguments contained within it on a wider base. 
This is something that others working in the area have not aspired to. Brian Girvin 
for instance in his influential study of politics and economics in independent Ireland 
offers little analysis of the role of interest groups in the policy process.2 While he 
does shed some light on the relationship between trade unions and government in the 
period, as do Paul Bew and Henry Patterson in their work on Sean Lemass, none of 
these authors expand their analysis to include other economic players.3 On the other 
hand those writers who have examined the role of economic actors within the policy 
process such as Niamh Hardiman and John Gibbons do so from the perspective of the 
relevant participative interest group and for the most part avoid any engagement with 
government archives.4
Thus this thesis has two objectives. It aims to chart the route Irish policy makers took 
in moving economic policy from a protectionist framework to one in which 
interdependence with other economies was assumed. It also analyses why Irish policy
makers chose to pursue one set of policy objectives over others. In particular it 
illustrates why the government decided to opt for entry to the EEC rather than the 
European Free Trade Area [EFTA] and it charts the Irish negotiations to join both 
organisations.
The thesis also examines the role and functions of economic interest groups and their 
relations with the government as it moved from protectionism to economic 
interdependence during the period. Girvin, Hardiman and Charles MacCarthy have 
looked at the role of the trade unions in relation to the development of the economy 
and pay bargaining in the period. Basil Chubb has gathered together a collection of 
essays which traces the development of the Federated Union of Employers [FUE], 
while the farmers organisations have been the subject of a number of key articles.5 
Yet none of these studies offer a satisfactory framework for analysing the influence 
that these groups had on government policy and on each other. Trade unionists, 
industrialists and farmers all had a recognisable input into the economic policy 
process. Within a decade of their formation in 1955 the National Farmers Association 
[NFA] had received formal open acknowledgement that in future the government 
would welcome regular and full discussions and consultation with them in the 
formulation of agricultural policy both broad and specific. Furthermore, throughout 
the period the government kept both the unions and the representatives of Irish 
industry fully informed on economic developments and were urging both by the early 
1960s to become participative planners with the government in its new approach to 
economic thinking.6 This they did through bodies such as the Committee on 
Industrial Organisation [CIO] and the National Industrial Economic Council [NIEC].
There is a substantial and growing literature on corporatism in Ireland. Panitch in 
1980 described corporatism as a ’political structure ... which integrates organised 
socio-economic producer groups through a system of representation and co-operative 
mutual interaction at the leadership level and mobilisation and social control at the 
mass level’.7 The increased role of interest groups, particularly the farmers, unions 
and employers, in policy formulation coupled with the more active part played by the 
state in the running of the economy has led some commentators to express the view 
that a form of decision making known as neo-corporatism emerged in post-war 
Ireland.8 Yet much of the debate on corporatism in Ireland concentrates on the mid 
1960s onwards and analyses its contribution in terms of pay bargaining and 
centralised agreements. This thesis argues that what emerged out of economic policy 
making of this period was a conscious state directed decision to involve the main 
economic players in policy formulation for the first time in the history of the state. 
Within the constraints of the time the government decided that such an overt form of 
co-operation was intrinsic to the well-being of the country’s economy. By the early 
1960s a political structure was in place which did indeed integrate socio-economic 
producer groups into the policy making system and it is within that framework that 
the term corporatist is used in this thesis. Lee first touched on the corporatist ideas 
of Lemass in 1979 when he declared that Lemass ’presided over the establishment of 
new procedures for economic and social decision making. Under his aegis Ireland 
began to shuffle towards a version of the corporate state’.9 By 1960 Lemass in 
conjunction with the secretary of the Department of Finance, T.K. Whitaker, had 
actively embraced the concept of interaction with economic interest groups. Lemass’s 
corporate state would come to include the civil service, private enterprise, the trade
unions and farmers in a bid to improve Ireland’s development. This was not 
corporatism in a conscious ideological sense but a distinct response to changing 
economic conditions both in Ireland and further afield. A recent study has concluded 
that ’the Irish state certainly held the initiative - with ministers, civil servants and 
consulting academics propagating the gospel of ’modern capitalism’ and proposing a 
host of administrative reforms’.10 This was certainly the case and this thesis argues, 
through a historical analysis, that the bringing on board of these economic interest 
groups was the result of strenuous demands by these actors and a realisation that they 
could play a fundamental role within the economy. It is not the objective of the thesis 
to analyse how this corporatism developed in the post 1964 era but rather to gain an 
insight into how a decision was reached to include economic interest groups in the 
first place in economic decision making.
By 1964, after the British application for EEC membership had been vetoed leading 
to the lapse of the Irish application and the CIO reports on the state of Irish industry 
had been issued, the government resolved to prepare the Irish economy for a second 
application. It concluded that economic interest groups had to be a part of the 
planning process. It is the task of this thesis to see how both decisions were reached. 
In a study such as this there is a certain amount of overlap as the same events are 
analysed from different perspectives. The response of various interest groups to 
particular occurrences are thus analysed in different chapters. The chapters 
themselves, however, knit together into a coherent body. Chapter one covers the 
years from 1948 through to the mid-1950s. It traces the evolution of two distinct sets 
of financial thinking, within government and administrative circles and sets the scene
for the remainder of the thesis. Chapter two provides an analysis of the political and 
administrative discussions on economic policy between 1954 and 1963. The question 
of abandoning protectionism and introducing tariff cuts was one which dominated the 
economic body politic at this time. Thus this chapter traces the changes in financial 
thinking over the period. The place of industry in the process of policy making is also 
described in this chapter. Chapter three concentrates on the evolution of trade union 
thinking and influence on the economic policy process. Trade union thinking in this 
period was initially dominated by the question of pay bargaining, but by the mid 
1950s the unions became more overtly conscious of the European issue and framed 
policy with that in mind. Chapter four focuses on state-farmer relations in the period. 
Accession to the EEC was very much on the farmers’ agenda from the mid 1950s on, 
and this chapter analyses this question from both the angle of the government and the 
main farmers’ organisation, the NFA. Chapters five and six trace the Fianna Fail 
governments’ negotiations to join a European trading bloc from 1957 on, which was 
the culmination of the change in financial thinking and strategy from 1948. Chapter 
five is an analysis of the Irish government’s negotiations to join EFTA, while the 
sixth and final chapter analyses the decision to apply for membership of the EEC. 
These two chapters argue that the decision to seek entry to a trading bloc was not 
premeditated by the government, it was part of an evolutionary strategy to promote 
export led growth, a strategy that needed the input of various interest groups as well 
as the government. The Catholic Church is dealt with intermittently throughout the 
thesis. The Church had no direct input into the policy arena but individual bishops 
and clergy did make the occasional foray into the debate by commenting in journals 
such as Christus Rex and Studies.
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The analysis of Irish economic policy making in this period has been largely set 
within ideological frameworks. In many instances authors have structured their 
approaches in polemical terms. John Kurt Jacobsen, for example, in his 1994 study 
on the causes and consequences of economic policy choices in Ireland, places his 
argument firmly within dependency theory, noting that Ireland as a former colony and 
small economically dependent nation with durable democratic institutions, shares 
many of the economic problems of the third world and the political structures of the 
first world. As Brian Girvin points out, however, a much stronger claim can be made 
for comparing Ireland with states in western Europe.11 Jacobsen’s use of dependency 
theory ultimately sees him assert the primacy of economics, with the result that the 
political process and its importance are relegated to a distant second in his analysis.
Girvin’s own book, Between Two Worlds characterises Ireland as a semi-peripheral 
state, similar to some mediterranean countries, neither first world nor third world; 
one which has achieved some development, but is neither a mature industrial nation 
nor a conspicuously poor one. For Girvin, however, it is politics and the social 
rivalries which it represents, rather than economics, which remains the primary 
influence on Irish policy making during this period. Similarly J. J. Lee emphasises the 
importance of politics in public affairs in his major work on Ireland. He does argue, 
however, that Irish politics must be understood within the broad context of economic, 
social, administrative, cultural and intellectual history. In Lee’s analysis, he maintains 
that economic policy since 1922 ’has revolved around the search for that elusive 
factor, enterprise. Paddy Hogan sought it in agriculture. Sean Lemass sought it in 
industry. Neither found enough of it’.12 Lee’s framework is basically to be found
in the argument that the dearth of enterprise in Ireland and the subsequent failure of 
Irish economic policy is due partly to an absence of an adequate performance ethic 
in society. At no time was this more true than the period that this thesis covers. 
Businessmen and industrialists of the period had no great entrepreneurial spirit. 
Protectionism was so complete up to the late 1950s that it served to exacerbate the 
enterprise problem, in that once industrialists were able to serve a market, they were 
secure in that market and had no real impetus to expand.
In a work published over a decade ago, Bew and Patterson argue that at issue in the 
economic development of Ireland in this period was not modernity versus tradition 
’but rather two different forms of capitalist development’.13 One associated with 
Whitaker’s Economic Development was liberal in its hostility to all impediments to 
the free working out of market forces. The other, embodied by Lemass, was 
concerned with pursuing economic policies suitable for the construction of a 
hegemonic relationship to the working class. Bew and Patterson qualify their 
argument by contending that the latter strategy was still committed to the maintenance 
of the existing social and economic framework. They continue that such a design was 
bound to run into major problems given Ireland’s position in the international political 
economy, small, weak and dependency capitalist. However, they neglect the fact that 
planning and the setting of targets, which the plan had to meet, was an intrinsic part 
of Economic Development. Moreover, Whitaker knew well that Lemass, as the 
driving economic force behind the Fianna Fail government of 1957-61, was an 
archetypal statist. This thesis will show that the differences between Lemass and 
Whitaker were more imaginary than real in their shared attempt to improve Irish
economic performance in the period.
Denis O’Hearn in an important article written in 1990 makes much the same point as 
Bew and Patterson. Maintaining that the popular story of Economic Development is 
a myth, O’Heam argues that the options of expansionary state actors were 
constrained by both a dominant local class and by external capital. He states that the 
eventual route that politicians and civil servants took in opening up the Irish economy 
was ’hardly planned’ as these actors had little idea of the direction in which they were 
going, noting that their options were restricted by capital which coalesced against 
certain policies which threatened its prerogative as a class. Ultimately O’Hearn’s 
framework is Marxist in its interpretation, claiming that events took place in an 
environment that was shaped by class struggle with domestic capital losing out to 
international capital over the period.14 While O’Heam does show that there were 
fundamental differences between industrialists on how best to face the challenge of 
free trade, the evidence of this thesis suggests that all economic interest groups had 
seen, to various degrees, that export-led industrialisation was inevitable in the Ireland 
of the 1960s. This had indeed been a long and often tortuous process, but by the time 
of the failure of the first application to join the EEC, economic actors, whether state, 
political or interest group realised that Ireland’s economic future could not prosper 
in economic isolation. They were active partners with government in pursuing an 
aggressive agenda of economic growth.
Some current commentators of Irish economic policy have looked to the period under 
review in this thesis, and have concluded that state intervention and the planning
process initiated by Economic Development has led to Ireland’s current economic 
malaise. Jacobsen, for instance hints at this when he notes: ’the solutions of the 1950s 
became ... the problems of the 1990s’.15 More overtly Cathal Guiomard trenchantly 
takes Lemass to task for being a statist, and simply dismisses his policies in the light 
of current events, although he offers no analysis of what alternative policies Lemass 
could have taken and why he should have pursued them.16 Not only is this 
unhistorical, it is also a case of reading history backwards. Economic policy failures 
of the current era cannot simply be traced back to the past unless one can offer 
historical evidence as reasons for a change in strategy at the time. This Guiomard 
singularly fails to do. It would seem that he is attempting to use Lemass, among 
others, as a scapegoat for not pursuing the ideological devices he puts forward for 
rescuing the Irish economy out of its current weakness.
In essence this thesis, by arguing that the government’s interaction with economic 
interest groups marks the beginning of corporatist type arrangements in the 
formulation of economic policy, can be placed within a similar framework as the 
works of Lee and Girvin in that it stresses the political over the economic. It was the 
government not the market which brought these groups into the policy making arena 
and it was the government in both its political and administrative forms which gave 
the lead in promoting new economic strategies. By pointing out explicitly to the 
various economic actors in the Irish body politic these new approaches, the 
government was able to set out a concrete agenda for the development of the Irish 
economy by the early 1960s. Export-led industrialisation and economic co-operation 
with Europe were at the heart of these new methods. It is the task of this thesis to
trace these developments. The reader will find a comprehensive note to sources at the 
end of the thesis documenting the sources used in the study.
■I
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Chapter One 
Financial ideology and the political economy of Ireland 1948-1953
Economic policy and the first inter-party government
When the first inter-party government assumed office in February 1948, the Irish
economy contained many structural weaknesses. There were major deficiencies in
social and infrastructural facilities. Savings, which had been relatively high during the
war because of the shortage of consumer goods, had declined considerably. In 1947,
total savings amounted to only four and a half per cent of gross national product and
personal savings in the same year were virtually zero. Manufacturing industry
accounted for less than twenty per cent of total employment and much of this owed
its existence to the protectionist policies of the 1930s. Furthermore most industry had
not yet launched into export markets.1 Adding to this problem was the fact that there
was comparatively little overt tradition of entrepreneurship and that prospective
capitalists faced considerable difficulties in raising capital. As Domhnall McCullough,
now Chairman of James Crean, who began his business career in the 1940s in
Clondalkin paper mills, has commented:
There just was not many businessmen with the entrepreneurial drive 
who were willing to take a chance. Capital was difficult enough to 
raise but people did not just think of going into industry to make a big 
profit. Protectionism was so complete, with no danger from outside 
that if you had a market, you had it tied up completely. Yet there just 
was not many big businessmen with the get up and go mentality. By 
the 1950s industry was still being promoted on the basis of the old 
Sinn Fein policy that we had to be independent and we could only be 
independent if we had our own industries and it was more that than 
any thought of being able to develop large companies that we have 
now. This applied to politicians as well as businessmen.2
In essence very few of the firms created since independence could survive without the
protectionism that had brought them into existence. They were relatively small, 
unsophisticated and based on local markets. Within this protected sphere ’profitability 
and wages were high, inefficiencies endemic’.3 Ireland did, however, have important 
assets from a developmental viewpoint, most notably a large supply of labour and a 
sizable accumulation of external reserves which had been built up during the war. In 
these circumstances, argue Kennedy and Dowling, there existed a case for an 
expansionary fiscal policy and a direct state contribution to raise the investment rate. 
This was not how Finance saw the situation.
A week before John A. Costello was appointed Taoiseach, J.J. McElligott, the
imposing secretary of Finance, wrote to the outgoing Minister for Finance Frank
Aiken outlining the bleak economic situation:
The position regarding state debt and capital outlay gives ground for 
anxiety. The state debt already large and for the greater part non 
productive is undergoing rapid increase. The heavy new commitments
which are being constantly added will necessitate a further rise in
taxation which has already reached an intolerable height. The resultant 
budgetary difficulties are accentuated by the charging of an unduly low 
rate of interest to such capital works as are productive. Our serious 
balance of payments position is bound to be worsened as a result of 
heavy imports for state capital projects which do nothing to raise our 
alarmingly low export capacity.4
For Finance this capital expenditure entailed not only an immediate but also a
continuing outlay on hard currency imports. Capital commitments were being
undertaken at a rate greatly in excess of the current savings of the community and 
were thus a strong reinforcement of inflationary pressures. McElligott argued that 
through their effect on domestic purchasing power these commitments aggravated 
Ireland’s tendency as a nation to spend beyond its means and that the situation would
2
be a lot worse but for the existence of sterling assets upon which the country was 
drawing to meet its excessive expenditure on imports of consumer goods. Domestic 
production, which to the Finance mind was the ultimate measure of the country’s 
capacity to consume and to undertake capital investment, was below its 1939 level 
both in agriculture and industry as a whole including building, and the ’prospects for 
improvement are, to say the least, not encouraging’.5 McElligott undoubtedly 
reiterated this advice when Patrick McGilligan assumed the ministry a week later.
Yet the new government did not quite see the financial position in the same light.
Lord Glenavy, Governor of the Bank of Ireland, and a member of the board of the
Central Bank, and James Dillon, Minister for Agriculture, communicated regularly
throughout the first inter-party government’s period in office and their correspondence
is illuminating on different views on the state of the economy. Although Dillon was
something of a maverick within the government, he had definitive views on the way
economic policy should proceed and argued trenchantly both within Cabinet and
outside on the course policy should take. One letter on the Central Bank report of
1948 by Dillon shows how the government viewed the situation. The Bank had
implicitly presumed, according to Dillon, that the government was both ’ignorant and
incompetent’ but to Dillon the ’boot was on the other foot’:
the net surplus of external assets cannot be much less than twice as 
great as they were in 1939. Our national debt is trivial compared with 
that of any other nation in the world. We are almost alone outside of 
the United States in meeting our requirements from our own purse. We 
have virtually no damage to capital assets to restore. In fact we are in 
a state of disgusting affluence and our principal danger is that instead 
of spending wisely we may either squander our resources or scrooge 
like gather our seedy rags around us and count our wretched chattels 
as deflationary poverty gradually settles in gloom around us.6
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Dillon disliked both options and claimed that the government would not have either, 
but he argued that if he had to choose between the two he would ’rather go down 
with my flags flying and the band playing rather than to sink in dismal dereliction so 
dear to the hearts of the Central Bank’ ?
In response, however, Glenavy argued that it was a delusion that the Second World
War had brought the country affluence. Net sterling assets were nominally twice as
great as in 1939 but since prices had doubled ’they are worth no more than in 1939,
a time when representations were being made to the government that they had fallen
to an undesirably low level’. Monetary authorities, he insisted, ’are bound to indicate
pitfalls, the primrose path needs no pilot’.8 The question of sterling assets was a
particularly thorny one. Patrick Lynch, who was appointed personal advisor on
economic issues to Costello on the recommendation of McElligott, was one critic of
the Central Bank’s policy on the issue:
here we were building up a great quantity of sterling assets, a much 
bigger quantity than the banks needed at a time when the value of 
sterling was progressively decreasing. There was a very strong case 
therefore for the repatriation of sterling assets to counteract the chronic 
underinvestment in Ireland. There was immense scope for very useful 
investment and I was using Keynesian arguments to support my own 
arguments for investment in the Irish economy which had been so 
underdeveloped because of the conditions left by the war.9
Clann na Poblachta were also severely critical, with their acerbic leader Sean 
MacBride, who had a very vivid interest in economic policy, most outspoken. At a 
meeting to the Cork City branch of Clann na Poblachta in September 1949 he 
declared that
if even a fraction of the money which had been poured down the drain
of sterling assets and thus irretrievably lost had been utilised at home, 
the economic life of this country could have been transformed. The 
fundamental problem of the Irish economy is one of underdevelopment 
and under-employment due to chronic under-investment at home. We 
are the only country in the world that exports both people and money 
to create wealth somewhere else.10
In essence MacBride wanted to break the link with sterling and move away from the 
fixed parity relationship. The Central Bank and Finance took the view that, 
notwithstanding the fact that the British economy and sterling were facing great 
dangers and uncertainties, parity between the Irish currency and sterling should be 
maintained and the country should stick to the practice of keeping the bulk of its 
external assets in Britain. Economic dispute between the Central Bank and Finance 
on one hand and some members of the government on the other became more 
pronounced when the government were forced to follow the British line and devalue 
against the dollar by 30.5 per cent in September 1949, thus enabling the Irish pound 
to continue to be exchangeable freely with the pound sterling.11
For MacBride the inextricable link with sterling was the ultimate cause of the morass
the country and the economy found itself in, In March 1950 he declared that
in national economics we have behaved like misers who have kept 
their money in the bank instead of utilising it to develop our own 
business. Every available statistic establishes that the country suffers 
from gross chronic underinvestment, while at the same time we boast 
of having 400 million in sterling assets. More fantastic still, over 50 
million of the sterling assets are held by the Central Bank and bring in 
an income of slightly over one per cent.12
Finance’s attitude toward devaluation can be seen in a memorandum penned after the 
inter-party government had lost power, where they countered MacBride’s views by 
claiming that if parity was abandoned there were three alternatives to be considered:
namely that the Irish pound would remain at par, which entailed no change; that it
would appreciate, of which there was no prospect as increasing deficits in the balance
of payments and the higher wage structure in Ireland indicated that the pound was
already overvalued in relation to sterling and any enlargement of the programme of
public works would weaken it further; or it would devalue, which in the
circumstances was the only real alternative:
it would be a grave error to look upon this as a solution to our 
economic and financial problems. Leaving aside the practical and 
political objections to abandoning the parity relationship and the 
repercussions in public confidence in our currency, a depreciation 
which nobody would be convinced was final, would have serious 
effects on the cost of living particularly at a time when import prices 
were still rising. Nothing less than a 25 per cent reduction in the 
external value of our currency would have even the appearance of 
finality and seeing that imports enter so largely into domestic 
consumption, the effect of raising import prices by 33 1/3 per cent 
would obviously be very great.13
For Finance the temporary stimulus to exports normally associated with depreciation 
would misfire in this case because Ireland’s export surplus derived from a stagnant 
agricultural output and was therefore incapable of immediate expansion. Finance 
further argued that nothing more than a short term curtailment of imports could be 
expected because of the pressure for increased money incomes ’to compensate for the 
rise in the cost of living that would be exerted by the trade unions and all classes of 
the working population. Depreciation of the currency is evidently an evil to be 
shunned’.14
The whole thrust of financial thinking as pursued by the Central Bank and Finance 
has been defended by Sean Cromien, a former secretary of Finance, who worked in 
the economic forecasting branch between 1952 and 1960. Cromien has argued that
to some extent the conservative policies pursued were justified as the institutions were
creatures of their times. Keynesianism had not yet a grip on Irish financial thinking
and it is questionable as to what success it might have had, had it been implemented:
we had to watch very carefully what we were doing. We were part of 
the sterling area and no substantial foreign exchange was earned other 
than sterling. We had to use that to gain foreign dollars from the dollar 
pool through the British sterling area. That limited our freedom very 
much to do things. We had to show the British that we were keeping 
our economy under control, that we were not extravagant spenders ...
Thus the effort was on maintaining external reserves. There was a 
feeling that you did not get involved with foreign borrowing, a feeling 
that you were quite constrained by what people were prepared to save 
at home. You watched what they were saving, watched their level of 
consumption and watched the level of foreign reserves. So in a sense 
while it was very conservative, it probably was understandable in the 
conditions of the time.15
This policy undoubtedly had some success as by 1949 personal savings had risen to 
7.1 per cent of personal disposable income from virtually nothing in 1947. 
Furthermore the balance of payments deficit fell from £30 million in 1947 to £9.7 
million in 1949 and unemployment was down to 8.3 per cent by the end of 1949 
compared to 9.6 per cent in the first quarter of 1947.16
Financial ideology
Ultimately it was economic ideology which determined the different solutions offered 
to solve Ireland’s economic problems. In the late 1940s two distinct coalitions had 
emerged from within the Irish bureaucracy. One based, as we have seen, around the 
mandarins of Finance and the Central Bank promoted deflation as the standard answer 
to any economic problem. This deflationist faction feared both inflation and the 
establishment of new bureaucratic bodies that would be outside their control. The 
ideological basis of this influence lay in the contention that the country’s problems
could only be solved by reducing the role of government spending in favour of 
monetary or credit instruments. The second group consisted of a number of influential 
politicians and outside interests, but also contained an administrative base within 
Industry and Commerce. In essence they wanted to encourage export-oriented 
investments and state direction of industry in order to make it more efficient.17 The 
latter was not at all achieved. The deflationists opposed both options: the first would 
have inflationary consequences while the second would unjustly extend government 
control over private enterprise. Private enterprise was the bedrock on which 
practically all policy makers, politicians and other interest groups believed that the 
Irish economy lay. Even in the dark days of 1957, Gerard Sweetman, Minister for 
Finance in the second inter-party government, echoed the predominant economic view 
when telling the Fine Gael ard-fheis: ’it is quite useless to talk of a long term 
economic plan in a free private enterprise economy’.18
Yet some of the earliest proposals from the expansionary coalition did involve direct 
administrative control of industry. Some politicians began to identify protected Irish 
capital as a major problem in the post-war economy. In the political sphere the decade 
after the end of the Second World War was one in which Sean Lemass initiated many 
proposals for the overhaul of the Irish economy. In 1945 an elaborate and ambitious 
set of proposal to generate full employment after the war were announced. The 
Industrial Relations Act of 1946, which established, inter alia, the Labour Court, was 
a further attempt to co-ordinate the economy and its various interest groups.19 
Moreover, Lemass was also proposing a drastic shakeup of trade policy, a change 
which would have increased state involvement in the exporting sector of the economy.
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A final measure, undoubtedly the most radical, was the introduction of the Control 
of Prices and Promotion of Industrial Efficiency Bill of 1947, which if implemented 
would have given the government unprecedented control over the running of the 
economy. This attempt to create an industrial efficiency bureau, to combat excess 
profit taking and restrictive trade practices has subsequently been seen by T.K. 
Whitaker as proof positive that Lemass, the original progenitor of protectionism, had 
seen that protectionism had served its purposes in the Irish economy and that now the 
country would be better served by the government playing a more active role with the 
ultimate aim being to open the doors to free trade.20 In all of these cases Lemass 
was defeated by the more conservative forces in society. The industrial efficiency 
proposals, in particular, drew a hostile reaction.
Lemass’s proposals envisaged a new administrative bureau. This was to have 
unprecedented powers to ensure reasonable standards of efficiency which, according 
to Industry and Commerce, were lacking in ’those industries which enjoy the benefits 
of tariff or quota instruments on imports’. At first the bureau was to be a ’friendly 
advisor’ with some price control powers. But for those companies which did not 
respond adequately, a court of inquiry would be set up to subpoena documents on 
quality, price, methods of management, labour recruitment and training, materials 
used, marketing, overhead charges, capital structure and other such matters. If such 
businesses did not then comply with the bureau’s directives, the state would be 
empowered to stop the distribution of profits, fix prices, fix maximum profit limits, 
confiscate excess profits, and for some most seriously of all, remove protection.21 
Tadhg O’Cearbhaill, who at this time was private secretary to Lemass, said that the
bill had two aims:
one for consumers, to keep the price of goods to the consumer down, 
but also to keep control of industrial raw materials, to keep costs to 
industry down. That was the proposal. It didn’t develop as it was 
strongly opposed politically, both within Fianna Fail and the opposition 
and also by Irish manufacturers. The Federation of Irish Manufactures 
were very hostile to it.22
McElligott responded to the proposal by arguing trenchantly that the public interest
did not require such a drastic degree of supervision and control of industry.23 Even
more significantly, Irish industry was atypically united in its opposition. A
conference called by the Federation of Irish Manufacturers [FIM] was attended by 57
industrial associations and concluded rather dramatically that ’until this country has
declared for a Communist form of government, the Bill should be withdrawn’.24
They also demanded a meeting with the new Taoiseach to discuss what they
considered to be the general belief among ministers as well as the general public that
manufacturers made excess profits at the expense of the general public. Colm Barnes,
who was in the textile business with Glen Abbey at the time, recalled the
horror with which businessmen viewed this rather draconian bill. What 
was the point in setting up in business and trying to foster an 
enterprise culture if at the slightest sign of bother the government was 
going to come in and practically seize your company?.25
At this stage Irish society was still very conservative and not surprisingly Lemass’s 
innovative proposals were not pursued by the first inter-party government, even 
though it included the Labour party who had originally agreed with the bill. It is 
questionable, however, if Fianna Fail would have implemented this bill had they been 
returned to power, such was the opposition of organised interests, including the trade 
unions.
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The trade union movement had divided into two congresses after 1945, when the 
Congress of Irish Unions [CIU] broke from the Irish Trade Union Congress [ITUC] 
over allegations that the ITUC was controlled by British unions. The allegation was 
unfounded. In reality the split was personality driven, For twenty years it had been 
obvious that the main underlying tension in the movement and the conflict arising 
from it arose primarily from the hostility of William O’Brien to James Larkin and his 
determination to destroy the Workers Union of Ireland.26 Their differences went far 
beyond ideology or the role of unions in society. Donal Nevin has spoken of his 
belief that O’Brien ’put the union cause back many years by this needless internal 
feuding which in reality had little to do with bettering workers or the movement and 
more to do with egotism’ ,27
In many respects trade union difficulties in this period stemmed from when the 1941 
Trade Union Act, which envisaged the co-ordination of trade unionism and provided 
for the licensing of bodies to carry on negotiations, was declared unconstitutional by 
the Supreme Court. Described by Ronan Keane as ’an imaginative and far sighted 
piece of legislation’,28 it was struck down as an infringement of the constitutional 
rights of the citizen.29 The trade unions saw this finding as ’turning the constitutional 
guarantee to form associations and unions on its head’.30 There certainly appeared 
to originate from the courts a marked dislike of those corporate constraints which 
trade unions tended to exercise. R.F.V. Heuston remarked in an article in the Irish 
Jurist that the Irish courts tended to be stricter in the matter of certain statutory 
definitions than the English courts, and furthermore there was a great readiness to 
employ the injunction in industrial disputes.31 The interventionist role advocated for
the Labour Court was itself undermined by trade union opposition. The 1946 act did,
however, bring the trade unions into the mainstream and made them a part of the
’social furniture’.32 There was also a sense of achievement at the setting up of the
court, with the writer James Plunket speaking of it as a symbol of
the victory of trade unionism in its fight for a respected and influential 
place in the social and economic life of modern Ireland. Here was the 
beginning of a new stage in Labour relations, with its machinery for 
direct negotiations and conciliation representing new privileges for 
trade unionism, but also putting on its shoulders new 
responsibilities.33
Yet while it had these new responsibilities the greatest problem for the union
movement was the existence of two Congresses. Both employers and government had
to meet with both Congresses together and, as Donal Nevin points out, they ’were not
slow to play one off another to the detriment of workers. Lemass was not too
bothered by two Congresses as it kept the Labour party and the labour movement as
a whole weak’.34 While this may indeed have been the case, he suffered politically
in the Fianna Fail government of 1951-54 when he found himself sidelined by Sean
MacEntee’s performance as Minister for Finance. As Brian Girvin points out:
in a political environment where Lemass was clearly the architect of 
the government’s industrial strategy, his failure to co-opt and integrate 
a unified Congress into his support weakened him within Fianna Fail.
His close identification with the labour wing of the party had secured 
him the advantages in the past, which now worked to his 
disadvantage.35
The consequences of this were grave. Despite the existence of an expansionist 
coalition within the administrative regime, conservative economic policy prevailed for 
most of the period after the 1948 general election. Wage levels remained depressed 
for a considerable time while unemployment and emigration rose sharply. The point
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can be made that alternative industrial and economic strategies would have received 
a better hearing if Congress had been united and if Lemass could have used his 
influence by reflecting this relationship within government. Lemass had been able to 
defeat the conservative elements within the party on the issue of cooperation with the 
Labour party after the 1943 general election. After the 1948 election, however, he 
was unable to prevent conservative economic dominance within Fianna Fail and was 
effectively marginalised by MacEntee.36 At a time when Irish politics in general was 
moving in a conservative direction, the trade union movement was unable to present 
a united common front to the state or the employers.
Another proposal for government control of industry was combined with a package 
of industrial incentives. The creation of the Industrial Development Authority [IDA] 
in 1949 had the support of important sectors of the business community. In the 
original proposal the IDA was to have two functions. Primarily it was to initiate 
schemes to establish new industries and to investigate the necessity of revising tariffs, 
quotas and other protective measures. It also had powers to subpoena witnesses and 
documents relating to Irish industry. The original content was, however, modified to 
exclude provisions for IDA control of industry.37 Lemass was critical of the setting 
up of the IDA, fearing that it would usurp the traditional role of Industry and 
Commerce. As Brian Farrell points out, some of Lemass’s objections sprang from the 
fact that the new agency consisted of former officials of Industry and Commerce 
doing the same tasks for the IDA as they had done for the department.38 Bew and 
Patterson speculate that Lemass’s opposition to the formation of the IDA was ’bowing 
both to party and industrialists’ pressure’. While this may indeed be true to an extent
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it seems more likely that he thought that the IDA would supersede Industry and
Commerce in attempting to develop the country’s industrial sector. His antipathy to
the IDA can thus be seen in these terms. Tadhg O’Cearbhaill also maintains that
Lemass’s great fear was that Industry and Commerce would have been downgraded
by the time Lemass returned to office.39 He had, however, recognised that
increasing exports alone could be an effective stimulus for the economy. The IDA
echoed his view and maintained that the expansion of manufacturing exports should
be the clear focus of any export policy. It proposed that an organisation to promote
exports should be established to achieve national coordination of industrial exports.
The IDA recognised the difficulties which existed:
we hold the definite view that there is no likelihood of any appreciable 
increase in industrial exports on the basis of the individual efforts of 
manufacturers. Our manufacturers as a whole have very limited 
knowledge or experience of export trade and apart from their 
reluctance to enter into an unknown and highly competitive field, the 
share of any particular manufacturer in export trade would be 
relatively so small that it could not bear the expense of an adequately 
staffed and operated export department.40
Industrial exports, the IDA added, would not be generated unless financial 
inducements were forthcoming. Finance, however, were dismayed at the prospect of 
public finance or tax concessions being made available to exporters. There was, they 
claimed,
an air of unreality about this interim report of the IDA. It does not 
seem to come to grips with the problem at all. If, however, the 
government agree to the proposals, there is not the slightest doubt that 
the manufacturers will receive the IDA with open arms. Why shouldn’t 
they? The state will be doing for them something which they should 
do themselves.41
Finance was worried about the creation of the IDA on two accounts: primarily that
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industrial incentives would be inflationary, and secondly that the creation of a new 
bureaucratic agency with resources to attract capital was ’a dangerous machine for the 
exercise of corruption’.42 Patrick McGilligan, Minister for Finance in the first inter­
party government, also had doubts about the scheme:
The Board should not be envisaged as a board of master mind planners 
- to divert and plan the industrial development of the country - but 
rather as a Board of fact finders and advisors to the community and to 
the Government on the activities of private enterprise. They are there 
to search out possibilities of industrial development, to collect facts 
and statistics and to bring them to the notice of entrepreneurs in some 
fair and suitable manner. It should definitely not be within their scope 
or function to themselves run or plan industry or any branch 
thereof.43
Colm Barnes maintains that large sections of Irish capital joined Finance in its 
opposition to the investigative powers of the IDA, but not to the creation of the board 
itself. He agreed with McGilligan’s views that the board should not be made up of 
a gang of ’crack-pot socialist planners’, ’but as long as manufacturing men were 
involved, we thought it would be alright’.44 Their complaints had a marked input on 
the final makeup and powers of the IDA. Its first board of directors included 
representatives of the FIM and the FUE as well as prominent company directors. All 
these were, however, expansionist in viewpoint.45 The President of the FIM publicly 
welcomed the formation of the IDA and expressed pleasure at the level of 
consultation between the FIM and government ministers and departments.46 Schemes 
to promote exports had been proposed since 1946 but met with indifference from 
protected capital and the outright opposition of Finance. Lemass had attempted to 
introduce a bill to assist industries engaged in foreign trade, and a new Foreign Trade 
Corporation was to oversee an exporters’ insurance scheme and provide grants to 
exporters for factory premises and training. This scheme was eventually withdrawn
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because of opposition from Finance and the British government which wanted Ireland 
to reduce its dollar trade. The establishment of the Dollar Export Advisory 
Committee in 1950 was an attempt to devise policy initiatives to achieve meaningful 
growth in manufacturing enterprise and stimulate exports. This, however, was a 
response to the general economic turmoil which resulted from a shortage of dollars 
in Europe.47 The development of Coras Trachtala Teoranta [CTT] as a promotional 
agency for Irish exports did not meet the recommendations of the IDA as it was 
basically an advisory body and did not have the finance or the power to induce 
industrialists to export.48
Yet without government intervention it was unlikely that many manufacturers would 
develop an export trade. Many of those who were involved in industry at the time 
have commented on a perception within industry generally that it would not survive 
free trade, and thus they were satisfied to produce for the home market only. There 
was, according to the industrialists interviewed for this study, great security in Irish 
manufacturing industry because it had a captive market and high tariff walls that kept 
out imports with the result being that most Irish industries were not geared to 
international competition.49 The success of import substituting and the continuing 
expansion of the protected sector in the late 1940s and early 1950s indicated that 
further possibilities for internal growth remained available. Daniel Morrissey, 
Minister for Industry and Commerce in the first inter-party government, drew 
attention in the Dail to the high level of imports in 1950, estimating that £60 million 
of such imports could be replaced by Irish products and 45,000 new jobs created. He 
also claimed that there was still considerable scope for further industrial development
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within the protected economy.50 There is no real evidence that such possibilities for
industrial expansion did indeed exist. Industrialists did not view their businesses in
such a manner. While they accepted the need for a strong industrial arm for what was
essentially an agricultural country, the main aim of such industrialists, it seems, was
to provide employment and make a reasonable profit. Most businessmen of the time
did not even know how to go about attempting to export. Few companies had staff
able to communicate in a foreign language. The idea that Irish industry could compete
with foreign companies was not even entertained and there was little sense of
entrepreneurship.51 It is reasonable to assume that if industrialists could make an
ample profit without providing employment that they would indeed do that, but what
is striking is that making profit was not considered the harbinger of industrial
success.52 Lemass had pinpointed the problems of industrialists. In a letter to a Cork
industrialist, William Dwyer, who had stood previously as an unsuccessful Dail
candidate for Cumann na nGaedheal, and with whom Lemass carried on an
intermittent exchange, he berated the lack of entrepreneurial drive:
the extent to which industrial development is to be brought, must be 
decided by national policy and not by the interests of individual 
industrialists. It has always been a handicap to our industrial progress 
that the best of our industrial leaders show a tendency to exhaust then- 
initial impetus and to slow down and stop when they have reached a 
stage of development which gives them maximum security with the 
minimum of additional effort ... The function of Government as I see 
it is to keep on pushing development to the limits of practicability 
whether individual industrialists like it or not.53
While Lemass may have felt that the inter-party government failed to push industrial 
developments to the limits he wished to see in place, as his most recent biographer 
Michael O’Sullivan suggests, he himself cannot escape the charge that most of his 
immediate post 1948 industrial suggestions were opposed by those very same
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industrialists. Lemass did make strenuous efforts to give Irish industry a 
fundamentally strong basis and had Joseph McCullough, for instance, in his capacity 
as a member of the National Economic Advisory Group of Cumann Na n-Innealtoiri 
carry out a confidential report for him on the idea of overseas contracting. As 
McCullough later pointed out, ’Irish people had been contracting all over the world 
since after the First World War, so I set out to examine could we do that here’.54 
The IDA, however, clearly had some way to go if it hoped to persuade Irish industry 
to develop an export-led ideology. One of its main problems was that it lacked any 
power to grant incentives for the attraction of foreign industries to the country and 
thus its establishment should be seen not as a complete break with previous industrial 
policy in that it was not an alternative approach but a method of supplementing the 
framework already in existence.55
There was to an extent a consensual approach to the validity of protection. Tadhg 
O’Cearbhaill has commented on how there was a scaling down of the number of new 
tariffs after the war, with no new quotas introduced and this being an agreed political 
object:
Yet while both governments were trying to use protection only as a 
last resort, industrial policy was originally designed to replace imports.
A local development group that went into Industry and Commerce 
were handed the import statistics and prepared reports on what we 
could make here. The view was taken that a secure home base, 
protected if necessary, was the best basis for developing exports. If the 
government were expecting an industry to develop exports, that 
industry was entitled to have its own market secure. Teams from 
Industry and Commerce, employers and unions went off to the United 
States to study methods there. This was to encourage industry to 
become more efficient, not by compulsion, but it was visualised that 
protection had to be scaled down.56
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This led to some innovative IDA schemes being put into operation. A 1951 grants 
scheme for new industrial investments in underdeveloped areas provided 
infrastructural development by the state, land and buildings to new industry, grants 
for the full cost of new factories, 50 per cent grants for the cost of new machinery 
and equipment, training grants, exemptions from local charges, and reduced 
electricity rates. The scheme was managed by a new grants authority, An Foras 
Tionscal, which was loosely tied to the Department of Industry and Commerce, but 
was semi-independent like the IDA.57 In 1956, the grants provisions were extended 
throughout the country. The Finance Acts of 1956, 1957 and 1958 granted export- 
profits tax relief of 50 and later 100 per cent.58 The deflationists in the public policy 
arena again were very much opposed to such a scheme. The Department of Finance 
argued that ’in view of the present and prospective condition of the Irish exchequer, 
it is merely common sense to refrain from taking on new commitments either of a 
capital or a current nature’.59
Marshall Aid
The government also clashed with the Central Bank and Finance over Marshall aid. 
Both Joseph Brennan, the Governor of the Central Bank, and McElligott argued 
against accepting any form of aid unless it was given in grant form. Dollars, they 
argued, could not be repaid as Ireland earned too few of them. Subsequently some 
of this aid was converted into the form of a grant, but a debt of £128 million, to be 
repaid in instalments, was accumulated. Alan Mil ward suggests that Ireland was 
awarded no grants in its first year because of its neutrality during the war, with
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Washington showing little ’sympathy’ for the government’s position.60 While this
may be the case there is evidence that the inter-party government at this stage had a
certain commitment to Europe. At the original Marshall Aid conference which ran
from July to September 1949, Ireland’s representative, secretary of the Department
of External Affairs Frederick Boland made an important speech saying Ireland would
sign the treaty no matter what the government was able to negotiate for itself. As
Boland later commented: ’we didn’t look to get anything free out of the thing but our
interest was that Europe should be prosperous, because without a prosperous Europe,
we couldn’t be prosperous ourselves’.61 MacBride also considered himself to be
somewhat of a Europhile, which contrasted greatly with his anglophobia, and had
taken a keen personal interest in the course of European integration and welcomed to
Dublin various groups supporting that particular aim. He sent a delegation to the
Congress on European Union, held in The Hague in May 1948, and was very
supportive of the setting up of the Council of Europe in 1949.62 Under government
legislation Marshall aid became available for investment in Irish government as well
as in sterling securities. The Central Bank in its 1948-49 report, however, drew
attention to the inflationary possibilities of releasing Irish monetary securities on to
the home market.63 Finance who had no real ideas on what to do with Marshall aid
except to reduce the national debt basically opposed the idea on the grounds that
politicians would squander the money on inflationary expenditure. As Patrick Lynch
has pointed out of McElligott:
while he was extremely able and great credit is due to him for the 
benefits he conferred on the country, he was very cynical. He 
distrusted politicians and believed that their sole aim was to impose a 
bigger role in public spending for taxpayers’ money. He saw the role 
of Finance as to reduce expenditure and while he was successful in 
this, his thinking was unduly influenced by Whitehall. In those years,
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Merrion Street was like a small Whitehall. It believed that financial 
policy should travel absolutely in line with British thinking.64
Sean Cromien has also talked of Brennan’s and McElligott’s fear that politicians of 
both main parties were extravagant spenders: ’both of them were non political and 
that is why they took offence when politicians disagreed with them. Brennan was 
particularly bad. There was a saying about him that when he used go to visit the 
Minister for Finance "gloom followed as he walked along the corridor". He was 
known to be gloomy and had no vision at all. In essence he stayed on too long’.65 
Cromien recalls both Brennan and McElligott as being very wary of Marshall aid and 
appalled at the idea that it eventually came in a loan form: ’both found the idea of 
Americans trawling through the civil service and demanding masses of documents 
detailing how we were going to spend Marshall aid as abhorrent’.66 Marshall aid, 
though it did fall well short of what the government hoped for, eventually was to 
account for about 50 per cent of total state investment during the inter-party 
administration, but as Lee points out ’the bonanza also brutally exposed the 
continuing inability of Irish governments to devise a coherent long-term programme 
of public expenditure’.67 Ireland’s participation in the European Recovery 
Programme with the aim of securing access to additional capital resources was 
dependent on the government submitting a claim for aid. Prepared by External 
Affairs, with Boland at the helm, rather than Finance, it was to be the basis of the 
government’s economic programme which hoped both to expand domestic demand 
and provide capacity for output growth. It was within this European context that the 
government intended using Marshall aid. Boland’s direct input into what can be 
described as the formal economic policy process can be seen as the beginning of a
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more innovative involvement in economic policy by External Affairs. This was to be 
continued, most noticeably by Con Cremin in the late 1950s and early 1960s when 
Ireland looked to Europe to broaden her economic horizons.
Roy Foster has declared that the effect of Ireland’s application for Marshall aid 
’implied readiness to engage in economic co-operation in Europe’.68 While to an 
extent this is true in the political sense, there was no one in Finance who saw the 
application in these terms. T.K. Whitaker, then climbing the ladder in Finance, put 
forward the prevalent view in Finance at the time on the whole thrust of the European 
Recovery Programme: ’no one who took part in preparing the Recovery Programme 
(and that includes myself) ever looked on it as a development programme, but rather 
as an exercise that had to be undertaken to persuade the Americans to give us 
Marshall Aid’.69 Sean Cromien has also made this point in much the same terms to 
the author.70 While this may indeed be the case and Whitaker now maintains that 
Marshall aid was useful71, he continued to question its validity in 1949 when he 
wrote a scathing attack on expansionary policy focusing on the dangers of using 
Marshall aid to fund new spending programmes. Insisting that the level of public debt 
was a direct result of excessive social expenditures, Whitaker asserted that taxation 
was too high and a disincentive to private enterprise and claimed that infrastructural 
and industrial expenditures were too high.72 Whitaker has since recalled that 
’Marshall aid was not the beginning of planning in any systematic sense but the 
pursuit of an indigenous experience to get the right result’.73 The implication was 
that Marshall aid should be used to ease the public debt and not for an increase in 
socially productive spending. George Duncan, professor of economics at Trinity, and
of the same classical school of economics as Brennan and McElligott, succinctly
summed up the taxation problem facing the country in a lecture to Dublin chamber
of commerce in May 1950:
concealed taxation is found in every state, but in a small and highly 
protected state like ours it is of much greater relative significance. 
Secondly average income here is lower than in many neighbouring 
countries, some 117 per head as compared with 200 per head in the 
United Kingdom and a given percentage extraction is more painful at 
the lower level. Also a large part of that income accruing in kind to 
farmers is not amenable to taxation and the burden falling on the rest 
is correspondingly increased.74
Thus for Whitaker and his colleagues in Finance, it seemed sensible that Marshall aid 
be used to ease public spending and reform the taxation system rather than simply 
being a spending tool for the authorities. In any event while there was nothing 
’strikingly original’ in External Affairs’ submission, they did make limited and 
cautious proposals for industrial development but placed excessive emphasis on land 
afforestation and electricity development, two matters close to the heart of MacBride 
and Clann na Poblachta.75
Yet the bulk of Marshall Aid was spent on long term undertakings and provided 
Fianna Fail with a stick to beat the spending ogre of the inter-party government. 
Sean MacEntee in particular enjoyed attacking the inter-party government over 
Marshall aid. Back in government he lost no time in assailing his predecessor, Patrick 
McGilligan, for not being able to get a grant and having to settle for a loan, and for 
having spent the aid recklessly and not in Irish interests. This attack on the inter­
party government’s use of Marshall Aid was part of a by-election campaign in South- 
Galway.76 Fine Gael replied immediately to the accusations. Their response, penned
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by Michael Hayes, appeared under T.F. O’Higgins name in the Irish Press and was
a resolute vindication of their use of Marshall aid and is useful as such in showing
what the government hoped that such aid would do for their economic policy. Hayes
asked how was it possible that the inter-party government could have done two
contrary things, namely spent their money recklessly and at the same time build up
their external assets:
The Minister instead returns to the old and well worn accusation that 
everyone in this country who is an opponent of Fianna Fail, acts not 
as an Irishman but as an agent of Britain. Mister McGilligan, of 
course, cannot have got dollars from America and sold them to the 
Bank of England for their use, that is an impossible transaction and 
exists only in Mister MacEntee’s mind. ... Marshall aid was used and 
used wisely for purely Irish purposes. The beneficial effects of its uses 
are still in evidence both in the agricultural and industrial parts of our 
economy.77
McGilligan, he declared, had accomplished reforms in agriculture and industry with 
Marshall aid that otherwise would have taken a generation to complete, asserting that 
the increase in external assets of the Central Bank was additional and convincing 
evidence of the ’frugal, sound and competent manner in which Marshall aid funds 
were administered by McGilligan and his colleagues’.78 Eamon de Valera, leader of 
Fianna Fail, had indeed praised the introduction of Marshall aid and Hayes berated 
MacEntee for attempting to suggest that there was something anti-Irish in accepting 
Marshall aid in the first place.79
It does seem somewhat contradictory for Hayes to be praising the fact that the Central 
Bank’s external assets increased during the period of Marshall Aid when most of the 
important government actors were assailing that very policy. Hayes was, however, 
writing with the benefit of hindsight. Fianna Fail in 1953 were pursuing a
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deflationary economic policy and to some extent this policy had become consensual 
between Fianna Fail and Fine Gael in the early 1950s. After the inter-party 
government lost power McGilligan, in poor health, did not actively oppose Fianna 
Fail’s economic stance between 1951 and 1954. Thus Fine Gael reverted to a more 
conservative mode in economic matters in opposition, putting forward no real 
resistance to the deflationary policies pursued by Fianna Fail. As The Leader 
commenting on the infamous 1952 budget maintained: ’It is known that some 
opposition leaders feel that Mr. MacEntee’s action in regard to subsidies was, if 
anything, overdue and that the Minister could have gone even further in his 
elimination of them’.80 As Minister of Finance, however, Patrick McGilligan played 
a different brand of economic football in power than did Sean MacEntee.
Keynesianism in the Irish context
McGilligan introduced Ireland’s first capital budget in May 1950 when he declared: 
’One of the primary responsibilities of a government is to promote, by an enlightened 
budgetary and investment policy, the continuous and efficient use of national 
resources in men and materials’.81 Described by Patrick Lynch as the first explicit 
expression of Keynes in an Irish budget and drafted by Lynch in association with 
Alexis Fitzgerald, the budget sought to allocate a certain part of the nation’s finances 
to public purposes and to ensure that the nation’s resources were utilised to advance 
the interests of the community. Lynch, who was very much influenced by the 
Swedish and Norwegian systems, saw the capital budget purely as a matter of capital 
investment. He argued that the only way in which the repatriation of sterling assets 
could be achieved would be by a deficit in the current government budget in which
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the proceeds would go into productive investment. McGilligan was very receptive of 
Lynch’s advice and had undergone what could be described as a Pauline conversion 
from his very conservative, ’reactionary even’ days of the late 1920s.82 McGilligan, 
described by John A. Murphy as belonging to the ’conservative Cumann na 
nGaedheal tradition in economics’, was from his first days in politics conservative in 
economic matters and has historically been viewed as such.83 Lynch puts this 
conversion down to the fact that McGilligan was a man of wide reading who had read 
Keynes and was influenced by him. Keynes’s comments in the Finlay lecture of 1933 
in which he argued that if he was an Irishman he could see very valuable merit in the 
policy being pursued by the Fianna Fail government which had just taken office 
’undoubtedly influenced a thinking man like McGilligan’. Thus by the time he took 
office in 1948 McGilligan was very receptive to Lynch’s advice, much more so than 
anybody in Finance with the exception of T.K. Whitaker and one or two other young 
officials.84 Whitaker, as we have seen, had taken the traditional Finance line on 
deflation but was an official with a ’remarkably adept mind who could change, 
chameleon like, his economic position and support it with a formidable array of 
economic theories and examples’.85 While he still showed deflationist sympathies at 
this stage he was looking to other countries to see how economic development was 
pursued. He studied in detail the 1942 Beveridge report in Britain and closely 
analysed the performance of the Tennessee Valley Authority during Franklin 
Roosevelt’s New Deal in America in the 1930s. He was also influenced by the Monet 
plan in France and the Vanoni plan in Italy after World War Two.86 Thus he was 
no dogmatic or doctrinaire economist rigidly stuck to a particular theory but rather 
one who was receptive to advice and willing to look to other jurisdictions to procure
economic security and advance for Ireland.
The first inter-party government’s economic policy was outlined by John A. Costello
in a speech to the Institute of Bankers in Ireland. Written by Lynch and Fitzgerald
it argued that only by large scale investment could the national wealth of the country
be increased. Costello’s address was unique in that it was the first time in the history
of the state that the head of government had devoted a major speech exclusively to
the principles underlying his government’s economic policy. Lynch believed that
Costello’s government had an unrivalled opportunity to install Keynesian principles
firmly at the heart of Irish economic policy formulation.87 What ultimately
distinguished the inter-party government from Fianna Fail, according to Lynch, was
’a belief that capital investment by the state based on the theories of John Maynard
Keynes, could best solve the basic Irish economic problem of providing jobs for the
thousands who were unemployed or who emigrated’.88 McGilligan outlined the
government’s policy in a letter to Brennan:
it is the intention of the Government to draw a more strict line of 
demarcation than that hitherto followed between capital and non capital 
services. The need for this arises from the greatly expanded 
programme of capital development which we have in hand. Our 
intentions were announced as long as last November when the 
Taoiseach made a pronouncement on the subject at the annual dinner 
of the Institute of Bankers.89
The main opposition to this shift to Keynesianism came from Finance. Most of its 
senior officials, led by McElligott, stringently opposed Costello’s speech and the 
government’s economic stance. McGilligan was, however, an impressive proponent 
of a moderate Keynesianism adapted to Irish circumstances and had actively approved
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of Costello’s speech. As Lee notes: ’The first Finance Minister who was McElligott’s 
intellectual superior, a formidable exponent of whatever viewpoint he chose to 
represent, McGilligan could not be straightened by traditional Finance techniques’.90 
With McGilligan a firm supporter of the new shift in government thinking, indeed one 
of the primary movers behind it, and undoubtedly master over his officials although 
not unwilling to take advice from them, public opposition to his policy came from the 
Central Bank. In its 1950 report the bank implicitly criticised the inflationary potential 
of government policy and expressed serious concerns regarding the monetary 
consequences of the ’extensive programme of capital works on which the State is 
engaged’.91 The next year, however, saw Brennan launch a scathing attack on the 
whole thrust of government policy which caused political uproar. Published in 
October after the Costello government had lost office, after Marshall aid had come 
to an end and when the government was faced with an acute balance of payments 
crisis, it incensed both incumbent ministers, such as Lemass, and ex ministers, 
particularly McGilligan and MacBride. It expressed grave misgivings about the 
financial state of the nation, uncertainties which were shared by the majority of senior 
officials in Finance. The report claimed that the nation was living beyond its means 
and criticised increased government expenditure especially on public works and 
subsidies. It urged fiscal measures to curb inflation, balance the budget and restrict 
improvident spending. It called for restraint in wage policy and restriction of bank 
credit.92 The report manifestly showed that there was a real conflict of opinion 
between those who sincerely believed that Ireland could be stirred out of economic 
stagnation only by massive public investment, for which adequate resources could be 
found solely by borrowing, and those in the Central Bank and elsewhere, who
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believed with equal sincerity that such a policy would eventually defeat its own 
purpose.93
Reaction to the report varied. The Irish Press stated that the independent monetary 
authority had confirmed the warnings of Fianna Fail ministers and it condemned 
policies which were particularly associated with the preceding government.94 The 
Fianna Fail government published an official White Paper entitled Trend of External 
Trade and Payments in 1951 just before the Central Bank’s report in an effort to 
show that the government and the Bank were united in their attempts to enforce 
deflationary economic policies.95 Sean Lemass, however, distanced himself from the 
report. In the Dail he declared that the Central Bank report was not a statement of 
the government’s views on economic policy. He pointed out that the Central Bank had 
emphasised the facts of the economic situation and directed the public to the fact that 
there was a problem to be solved. He added, however, that the government intended 
to follow a policy which was ’diametrically opposite to that which the Central Bank 
suggests’.96 The government’s solution, according to Lemass, was to increase 
production, not cut down consumption. The Dail and the country would have to 
choose between two sources of finance, borrowing or extra taxation to pay for such 
increased production. To the extent that it could not borrow the money, stated 
Lemass, the government thought it worthwhile to get it by increased taxation. Thus 
the Central Bank report had been publicly repudiated by the Tanaiste, apart from de 
Valera the most senior member of the government. MacEntee, who would later clash 
bitterly with Lemass on economic policy, defended the Central Bank’s independent 
position and its responsibility for the safeguarding of the national currency in the
same debate. As Minister for Finance, MacEntee wholeheartedly endorsed the views 
of McElligott and Brennan and pursued a deflationary policy, making a mockery of 
Lemass’s promises in the process.
The response from the opposition was typically scathing. MacBride, who, as we have 
seen, was an enthusiastic advocate of a large-scale investment policy criticised 
Brennan for advising the government to pursue a policy which opposed national 
development and which could only result in increased emigration and a lowering of 
living conditions.97 Dillon and McGilligan were equally harsh. Dillon charged that 
Brennan’s investment policy had been responsible for more than half of the external 
deficit of 1950 and that ’if the report was accepted, the wisest thing young people 
could do would be to fly the country as quickly as possible’.98 Outside the Dail, the 
ITUC rejected the report’s deflationary proposals claiming that they would result in 
higher unemployment, a cut in consumption, lower real wages, increased taxation, 
removal or reduction of subsidies, a restriction of the capital investment programme 
and a standstill on wages. It asserted that building work being carried out under the 
public works programme was of vital importance and should not be singled out as 
affording considerable scope for retrenchment in the economy as the report had 
stated. On the whole, the Congress declared, deflation would exacerbate the nation’s 
problems not solve them.99
Some commentators have expressed doubt about the apparent commitment of Ireland 
to Keynesian demand management and ask whether the 1950 capital budget indicates 
a commitment to expansionary governmental policy. Brian Girvin has declared that
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the 1950 budget can only be described as Keynesian in a very narrow sense. Its 
decision to commit a certain percentage of budget allocation to capital projects was 
important, but only if part of an overall process to facilitate growth in the economy. 
This, he notes, was singularly not forthcoming in 1950. Nor would it be for the 
remainder of the decade.100 Girvin, however, fails to take into account the 
hegemony of the Department of Finance under McElligott and the Central Bank under 
Brennan in the formulation of policy when Fianna Fail regained power in 1951. 
MacEntee was willing to follow, almost religiously, the deflationary policies 
advocated by these institutions. Thus the aims of the 1950 budget never had a chance 
to be realised. That subsequent budgets were deflationary, emphasising a continuing 
commitment to the balanced budget and the fear of a balance of payments crisis, was 
in no way due to McGilligan. Budgetary policy under MacEntee went directly against 
the thrust of that intended by McGilligan and Costello.
A letter from McElligott to McGilligan in February of 1951 illustrates the worries
that the deflationary group had regarding the financial situation. In it McElligott
claimed that he had repeatedly drawn attention to the
progressive deterioration in our public finances, the rapid growth in 
public expenditure and in public debt and the inadequate degree of 
taxation resulting in a series of budget deficits, the growth of which 
has been camouflaged by deductions for so-called ’capital’ services, by 
capitalising subsidies for housing and rural electrification and charging 
as capital many recurrent items on various votes of a totally 
unproductive character such as various public works and buildings, 
harbour grants, airports, employment and emergency schemes, works 
under the Local Authorities Works Acts and others.101
For McElligott removing services from the category of capital services was the only 
possible way of securing a realistic approach to what was one of the nation’s more
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intractable problems. 1950 had been the fourth year in succession of a deficit in the
balance of payments and it was Finance’s forecast that it would continue over the next
three years unless remedial actions were instituted. The minimum requirement that
the situation demanded according to McElligott was
a considerable increase in taxation if the present scale of expansion is 
to be maintained. There seems no prospect of reducing the latter.
Indeed all the indications are for an increase. We have already, in my 
opinion, allowed the situation to drift too far without taking proper 
financial measures, but we cannot delay any longer except at great 
peril to our national economy.102
Brennan and McElligott had become legendary at this stage for their adamantine
refusal to contemplate government intervention in the market and were staunch
believers in a low taxation low spending economy. A month later they were using an
OEEC report on the Irish economy to implore the government to change their course
of economic action. A memorandum for the government prepared by McElligott on
this report suggests that McGilligan had come around to the thinking of his secretary
and that of the governor of the Central Bank:
too much money is being devoted to consumption and too little is 
being saved for capital purposes. The corrective measures are rightly 
stated to be such as would reduce the consumption (primarily of non 
essentials) and expand current savings. ... The Minister for External 
Affairs does not consider that the present level of consumption reflects 
an unduly high standard of living. Neither does the Minister for 
Finance. But like the European Recovery Programme committee, he 
cannot evade the evidence that as a nation we are at present living 
beyond our current income, that is our standard of living is higher than 
we can afford. Of this the heavy external disinvestment for 
consumption purposes is living proof.103
Thus McGilligan could not see how consumption could remain at its prevailing level, 
unless there was a great increase in production, which was unlikely, if at the same
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time the government desired to expand domestic investment by the promotion of 
savings. Savings, he argued, inevitably entailed abstention from consumption. While 
one can only speculate as to whether McGilligan would have gone down the 
deflationary road as this would seem to suggest if the inter-party government had 
continued in office, Noel Browne, Minister of Health in that government, does recall 
him as a conventional traditionalist in financial terms: ’Balance the books, pay your 
way, cut capital expenditure, prime the private enterprise pump and all will be 
well’.104 Although McGilligan could be a formidable advocate of Keynesianism in 
the Irish context and genuinely was disposed to a more expansionary financial 
approach, it does seem that he was willing to revert to a more deflationary outlook 
on financial policy when early in 1951, McElligott finally persuaded him of the merits 
of the deflationary approach to economic policy. Sean Cromien suggests that 
McGilligan, in part because of poor health and in part because he was not enamoured 
of MacBride’s constant interference in matters that were entirely economic, was not 
entirely happy in Finance and talks of him avoiding meetings with McElligott in 
particular and in general keeping a very low profile.105 This supports Browne’s 
theory that once ’it came to the end of the financial year, and the budget approached, 
he [McGilligan] appeared to melt into an orgy of inaction and self-pity, skipping 
Cabinet meetings or arriving late. He clearly dreaded the ’loaves and fishes’ job of 
trying to reconcile our many conflicting claims in such a multi-party 
government’.106 There were indeed many conflicting claims within this government 
with powerful figures like Dillon and MacBride urging their own views on 
McGilligan. There is little doubt that McGilligan’s ’shrewd, critical, questioning 
approach was hampered by the tensions of the Inter-Party government’.107 Of the
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ministers in charge of the main spending departments all had different agendas to that 
of McGilligan. While in essence it appears that he was not willing to follow an 
expansionary policy simply for the sake of it and did take the view that it had to pay 
its way, the demands made upon him from all sides was inevitably going to place 
strains on the government.108 McGilligan was not as radical and did not go as far 
as some of his colleagues, most particularly MacBride, would have liked in curbing 
the extreme caution of his department. Yet his period as minister was the first in 
which Finance was subjected to a questioning political master who was not afraid to 
challenge its traditional orthodoxy. In effect his was a path breaking stewardship.
The reemergence of the deflationists
By the time Fianna Fail had regained power in June 1951, Finance had identified the 
three problems which they saw as being at the root of the financial crisis. Primarily 
the government was not covering ’even the current outlay of spending by taxation’. 
Secondly, the inflationary effect of this was accentuated by the fact that capital 
expenditure by the government was not being met to any adequate extent from current 
savings and was predominantly of an unproductive character in the sense that it did 
not yield consumer goods or services to absorb the increased income it generated. 
Finally, money incomes in the country were being raised ’not only irrespective of 
increases in output but even faster in many cases than corresponding increases in 
Britain, notwithstanding that taxation and living conditions are better here’.109 The 
return of Fianna Fail to government and the balance of payments crisis which 
accompanied them offered McElligott the opportunity ’to drive the economy back 
onto the straight and narrow path of deflationary virtue’.110 While Sean MacBride
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had tinkered with the idea of the getting the government to pursue an exchange rate 
adjustment back in 1949, MacEntee with the support of McElligott refused to 
countenance such a policy in 1952. MacEntee, back at Finance, was only too willing 
to play the deflationary game. De Valera deliberately appointed MacEntee to Finance 
against Lemass’s wishes. As his official biographers point out, it was a deliberately 
conservative choice.111
MacEntee’s deflationary sympathies are aptly demonstrated by the 1952 budget 
introduced on 2 April, the earliest in the history of the state. The budget removed 
subsidies on bread, butter, tea, sugar, alcohol and petrol, and raised income tax by 
a shilling in the pound. Price increases ranged from 28 per cent for butter to 63 per 
cent for sugar and even Maurice Moynihan, official historian of the Central Bank, 
called it a budget of ’unusual severity’.112 MacEntee justified the budget by pointing 
to the balance of payments situation. In the Dail he estimated that in the absence of 
corrective measures, a deficit of £50 million could be expected in 1952. He argued 
that there
was no reason to think that the balance of payments will right itself 
spontaneously. The opening months of this year showed virtually no 
improvement ... and it seems clear that, without an improvement in 
personal savings and a reduction in inflationary government finance, 
the deficit in the balance of payments will remain excessive.113
In the Seanad, he further argued that the possibility of a very severe slump setting in 
could not be ruled out.114 Yet the economy was already in recession when the 
budget was introduced and budgetary policy undoubtedly worsened the position. 
Indeed current expenditure rose only slightly, while current revenue increased 
considerably. Furthermore the balance on the government’s current account went
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from a deficit of £4.7 million in 1951 to a surplus of £5.3 million in 1952 while the 
borrowing requirement fell from £35.5 million in 1951 to £32.2 million in 1952.115 
Budgetary policy had set out to reduce the current balance of payments deficit. In this 
it succeeded, yet by the time of the 1953 budget the balance of payments situation had 
been rectified. The economy was ready for a period of expansion but the deflationists 
in the policy arena were not ready to change direction. There would be no somersault 
to an expansionary regime.
The removal of food subsidies is what the 1952 budget is historically most
remembered for. An interdepartmental committee on food subsidies set up in October
1951 concluded that food subsidies were
nothing more than a general supplement to incomes provided out of 
general taxation; they are a costly social service in which, however, 
the entire community shares without regard to individual income or 
need. There is no real justification for continuing this policy and in 
principle it would be desirable to abolish the food subsidies, provided 
arrangements are made to ensure that the weakest sections of the 
community do not suffer as a consequence.116
The abolition of food subsidies offered numerous advantages according to the 
committee. In the first instance the difficulty of financing exchequer commitments 
would be greatly eased by relief from ’the enormous burden of food subsidies’. It 
would also restore more normal trading conditions, would foster efficiency and help 
to ’remove economic rigidity’ and by allowing real costs of production and 
distribution to be reflected by prices to the consumer ’a more normal price structure 
and pattern of consumption would be created’.117 This committee further argued that 
the abolition of food subsidies would help to counteract the inflationary effects of any 
wage increases granted in the public and private sectors. MacEntee subsequently used
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this committee’s recommendations in a new year’s eve memorandum to the
government which he concluded by stating:
it is essential that the budgetary problems of 1952, already grave 
enough on the basis of existing expenditure should not be further 
aggravated by allowing new commitments to develop. The Minister is 
very conscious of the difficult problems which he will be called upon 
to face ... and he desires that every possible step should be taken to 
lighten his task in advance.118
Brennan, however, was not convinced that the government was taking the financial
position seriously enough, and contemplated retirement. After seeing MacEntee early
in March he wrote that the minister
seemed to imply no intention on the part of the government to arrest 
budgetary expansion of purchasing power. He said his budget would 
throw fresh light on the estimates which were meant to give the public 
a shock. When leaving I told him that I thought it would be far better 
to have someone else at the Central Bank. ... Met de Valera at 5.15 
who talked about the political difficulties of handling of economic 
situation (sic) and about need of avoiding unemployment. I said 
inflation would not cure unemployment but make it worse.119
There is no record in Brennan’s personal papers of a specific response to the budget 
but there can be little doubt that he approved of most of MacEntee’s final budgetary 
package.
The wider reaction
This was not the case with other actors. The budget enraged both the employers and 
the unions. Senator E.A. McGuire, President of the FUE, complained that although 
nobody liked food subsidies, the point was that they should only be abolished when 
it was possible to do so with the least possible upset to the social and economic life 
of the country. While the object of the removal of food subsidies was to lift a weight
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from the exchequer, he argued that it should be done in such a way that ’the weight
is passed on to the consumer at a time when the consumers are getting more wages
or are getting direct reliefs from the exchequer approximating to what they have lost
by the removal of the subsidies’.120 While the budget was, he estimated, likely to
go some way to solving the financial woes of the country it was socially undesirable
and he argued that the economy could be improved by an increase in wages which
raised the purchasing power of workers:
Instead of siphoning purchasing power and drying it up, we should try 
to maintain and if possible, increase purchasing power, I mean 
purchasing power on the part of the public. It is necessary to retain as 
much money as possible in circulation so as to develop and expand 
business, so as to create employment and keep our economy 
strong.121
MacEntee’s reasoning was that if domestic demand were curtailed, leading to a
possible reduction in prices, this would boost exports. He was acting on the
assumption that earnings had outstripped the cost of living. Consequently, it was
believed, there would be no demand for wage increases as a result of the removal of
food subsidies. This most definitely was not the case. McGuire believed that the
government had failed to get its economic policy right leaving the employers to pick
up the pieces of its failed policies:
What has happened is that the whole problem of the Budget has been 
thrown to the employers and into the arena of industrial relations 
generally at a time when we are already occupied with bad trade, 
unemployment, rising costs and higher prices ... This is the problem 
that has been thrown to industry. It represents a very big spanner in 
the economic and industrial machine at the moment when employers
are ... preoccupied with keeping the business and trade of the country
122going.122
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The trade unions were equally embittered by the budget. They claimed that there had
been a 10.5 per cent rise in the cost of living in the past year from 102 to 114 on the
consumer price index. With the removal of the food subsidies the total rise would be
18 per cent. The ITUC also calculated that if the rise in the cost of tobacco, alcohol
and other commodities were included, the figure would be 25 per cent. They argued
that since there was already a definite trend towards deflationary fiscal policy it was
essential that the budget should not accentuate this trend but on the contrary attempt
to counteract and reverse it. MacEntee’s budget did, however, slash purchasing power
and followed almost religiously the policy advocated by the Central Bank in its 1951-
52 report. Inevitably the reduction in purchasing power hit the working classes
hardest. The mirroring of the Central Bank report by MacEntee was noted by the
opposition. James Larkin of the Labour Party declared ’it was no unfair criticism to
say that if the board of the Central Bank had ... presented the budget, instead of the
present Minister of Finance, there would hardly have been a comma changed’.123
The ITUC were more vitriolic in their assessment:
a policy that results in increased unemployment is nationally suicidal 
and socially criminal. Yet this is precisely what will follow from the 
budget proposals. It may be that the Minister of Finance considers this 
preferable to running a deficit in our Balance of Payments and using 
up our external assets. If so we might remind him that all that needs 
to be done to wipe out the deficit entirely is to proceed to slash living 
standards still more savagely, it is as simple as that.124
They argued that there was no reason why a government budget deficit should have 
been completely ruled out notwithstanding MacEntee’s presumption that it ’was 
common ground’ that the current budget must be balanced. The running of a budget 
deficit was justifiable in a deflationary situation such as existed in this period 
particularly when there was a threat of more serious deflation, and given that the Irish
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economy was susceptible to external economic movements and trends. Ultimately it 
was the contention of the unions that the greater part of the additional taxation 
required to rectify the balance of payments difficulties could have been raised in other 
ways. They proposed, for example, a combination of profits tax, higher rates of 
surtax and estate duties and a purchase tax on luxuries. These they maintained would 
have spread the burden of taxation more equitably. Dismissing MacEntee’s 
arguments, they insisted that
deflation far from solving our problems will aggravate them.
Experience has taught us that a policy of deflation once initiated is self
perpetuating being uncontrollable by politicians and bankers, and
leading to slump and depression and endless misery’.125
Finance rejected the ITUC’s arguments, stating that their case ignored the special 
benefits which wage-earners derived from the government’s policy in regard to social 
services, subsidies and housing, but did acknowledge ’that even when a fall in the 
national standard of living is inevitable, certain classes in the community may be able 
to protect their own position or even better it at the expense of other classes’.126 
Finance were extremely worried at any proposed wage increase which they reckoned 
would add millions to personal expenditure, including expenditure on imports, thus 
making it impossible to check inflationary pressures and which in the long run could 
only lead to a rise in unemployment. While this may have been true this policy of 
deflation undoubtedly led to stagnation in the economy because the concern with 
maintaining external reserves took precedence over concern about unemployment and 
development. Although Whitaker still maintains that a deflationary policy was the 
correct approach and calls the budgets of the early 1950s ’progressive’,127 Patrick 
Lynch talks of ’the unceasing struggle against inflation displacing economic growth
40
as an attainable object of policy’ in the years up to 1958.128 Moreover Kennedy and 
Dowling have argued that ’the lack of confidence in the economy, associated with 
falling employment and population, created an atmosphere unfavourable to the 
enterprise required for successful entry into export markets’.129
MacEntee’s budget also received criticism from outside the main interest groups. The
Leader initially saw it as ’a bombshell’ and predicted that its after effects would
continue to dominate policy for the months ahead. Even more importantly it saw
Lemass as having been ’sidelined’ in the economic policy debate that was being
fought out within the party at the time.130 Some months later The Leader showed
its disenchantment with government policy:
an economy with such a history of defeat as ours needs the stimulus 
for enterprise of material progress, and private capital investment 
suffers if this is not given while measures adopted to reduce the 
standard of living incidentally tend to frighten away external 
capital.131
The Statist was also unhappy with the budget but claimed that all was not doom and 
gloom, noting that there was great scope for industrial advancement, especially in the 
field of light secondary industries based on agriculture. Agricultural output, it 
asserted, was far from its possible maximum and furthermore the manpower was 
available to run profitable industries. There was a sting in the tail for the government, 
however, when The Statist proclaimed that ’for British industrialists, with the capital 
to sink in new enterprises and the technical knowledge to run them, there would 
appear to be great opportunities for establishing themselves in Ireland to the mutual 
benefit of both countries’.132 This was hardly a ringing endorsement of state policy
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in setting up indigenous industry.
The Central Bank, however, maintained that the government was on the correct
financial track, and endorsed, albeit somewhat grudgingly, MacEntee’s actions and
urged him to continue in the same vein.133 This brought the bank some unwanted
and trenchant criticism. The Standard in an editorial entitled ’The Central Bank (mis)
reports to you’ accused the bank of going beyond its remit, arguing that:
it is difficult to avoid the view that the commentary has been given an 
emphasis which renders it largely political. Perhaps the most 
disquieting feature ... is its political trend. The political party has 
come to be the supreme unit for consideration in the state, not 
excluding the family, and the Central Bank has insured its own 
continued overlordship in the state’s economy by the success it has 
achieved in setting off one political party against the other - divide and 
rule.134
There can be no doubt that Brennan was apolitical. His support of MacEntee in a
deflationary budgetary context was simply that. As Lee points out he was ’no friend
of Fianna Fail. By 1953, Brennan was a friend of virtually nobody’.135 Denis
Gwynn writing in The Cork Examiner after Brennan’s retirement offered what is
surely the most perceptive interpretation, that Brennan and McElligott together ’have
presided with shrewd judgement and highly trained experience over the management
of Irish public finance without regard to party politics’.136 The Leader in a profile
of Brennan aptly summed up his relationship with politicians:
He conceived it to be the special function of the civil servant to guard 
the professional politician against himself and his friends and, at the 
same time, to protect the interests of the people against both. ... 
Brennan is one who has served his country more than usually 
well.137
Within the Central Bank’s report, Brennan stated that the views expressed in the
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previous year’s report had ’lost none of their appositeness and indeed have been 
reinforced in urgency by the heavy deficit in the balance of payments’.138 The fact 
that the report for 1951 had criticised so outspokenly the inter-party government’s 
budgetary strategy, while that for 1952 had supported Fianna Fail policy does not 
reinforce The Standard’s position. No political party would ever have Brennan’s 
unqualified support as he ’distrusted them all’.139 The report, however, came in for 
criticism from newspapers around the country. The Cork Examiner noted that the 
report ’seems to have been drawn up by or under the inspiration of a pessimist’ and 
argued that the ’note of alarm in the report will not excite the Community, and not 
a few will hold that it has been overdone’,140 while the Evening Herald commented 
that even though there was a mild recession in the autumn and winter of 1951 ’the 
industrial and commercial parts of the economy required careful nursing. Instead of 
which they have received very drastic treatment’.141 In a political sense de Valera, 
during the 1954 general election campaign felt a need to publicly defend the aims of 
the 1952 budget declaring that ’our aim ... was the simple one of making ends meet - 
of balancing current expenditure by current revenue, as any prudent person would 
do in his own private affairs’.142
By March of 1953 Brennan patently had enough of all governments, inter-party or
Fianna Fail, and decided to resign. He wrote to E.C. Fussell of the Reserve Bank of
New Zealand, with whom he was in regular correspondence, outlining his position:
I have been in fundamental disagreement with our governments for 
some time past on matters of monetary and financial policy and as 
there has been no sign of improvement but rather the contrary, I felt 
... [illegible ?] reluctantly to go out at the end of the financial year.
My board has consistently supported my views and both the board and 
the Finance Minister pressed me to stay on but I felt unable to retain
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any responsibility in the circumstances.143
There is little doubt that Brennan’s resignation was felt deeply by his board. James
Meenan, appointed in February 1949, felt Brennan’s retirement was ’a great loss to
the public service, which, just now has very few standards to judge policy by. But
it is traditionally an ungrateful task to provide such standards’.144 Brennan had
intimated to the board and the government, early in 1953, that he wanted to step
down. He told de Valera about his desire to resign, but both MacEntee and de Valera
attempted to change his mind. MacEntee wrote to Brennan on the latter’s meeting
with de Valera telling him the prospect of resignation was ’as unwelcome to him [de
Valera] as it is to me’.145 Brennan’s resignation was a watershed. The Central Bank
had become indelibly associated with him. Those on the deflationist side of the
economic fence saw his departure as inflicting a mortal blow against their own side.
Lord Glenavy pleaded with him not to go:
even now I beg you to reconsider ... to try to persuade you against 
what the members of the board consider will be a disastrous blow to 
the cause of monetary wisdom ... The Central Bank is your creation.
I do not think it would survive your going under present conditions.
It may survive but it would have a long and maybe hopeless task in 
trying to recover from the blow of your departure. Two more years 
under you as Governor would make all the difference - knowing as
well as you do what is involved can you not make the sacrifice of them 
years?146
Brennan, however, could not be dissuaded from his course and duly resigned on 31 
March 1953 and was replaced by McElligott, with Owen Redmond becoming 
secretary of Finance. In a recent article Stephen Lalor has somewhat casually 
maintained that Brennan was attracted to the notion of civil service intervention but 
maintains that his training and experience led him to see such intervention as a
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negative operation preventing expenditure.147 While Brennan wholeheartedly found 
the idea of increased expenditure to be abhorrent, and clashed with both Fianna Fail 
and inter-party governments over financial policy, he nevertheless recognised that 
civil service intervention in the political sphere only went so far. He could only offer 
his advice, no matter how trenchantly and leave it at that. Once he perceived that his 
advice to government was being disregarded he decided that he had no choice but to 
exit the public arena.
MacEntee versus Lemass
The performance of MacEntee at Finance between 1951 and 1954 is interesting in that 
it shows him following the Central Bank line regarding policy and wrestling the 
initiative from Lemass and his strategy of increasing production and reducing 
deflation. McElligott paid him the highest compliment a senior civil servant could 
possibly accord an active politician when he wrote to MacEntee, then recovering from 
illness, in 1954:
you carry now as always my respect for your ingenuity and courage 
and my admiration for the single-minded manner in which you have 
served your country ever since I came to know you, nigh forty years 
ago and in different circumstances. If all Ireland’s sons were so 
devoted to her service how different would be her recent history.148
While MacEntee may have earned the plaudits of similar minded deflationists, Lemass 
took a different route. We have seen that after the 1950-51 Central Bank report, he 
had attempted to distance himself and the government from the bank.149 MacEntee 
supported the thrust of Central Bank policy as it was in accord with his own 
deflationary sympathies, and managed to isolate Lemass. Prior to the budget Lemass 
cautioned the Dail about the possible dangers of pursuing deflationary policies,
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claiming that all developed countries were worried about the possibility of deflation:
Almost every country in the world which, like ourselves, was 
concerned at the beginning of this year or towards the end of last year, 
at the danger of the inflationary forces, which were then active, are 
now no longer worried, any more than we are, about the danger of 
runaway inflation. They are beginning to get much more worried about 
the possibility of deflation, of the downward spiral beginning to 
move.150
The dominance of MacEntee’s restrictive economic policy marginalised Lemass. This
affected his role with the unions as they and his urban constituents had to face a
disproportionate burden of the belt tightening impact of the budget. During the Fianna
Fail government of 1951-54 Lemass and MacEntee fought out a battle within cabinet
to direct government economic policy. There was a fundamental difference in their
economic philosophies. MacEntee was an ardent deflationist preoccupied with the idea
of sound money; Lemass on the other hand was an expansionist who believed in using
the power of the state to encourage demand and investment. In September 1952 they
engaged in correspondence about the possibility of raising a national loan to be used
to encourage investment in the country. In reply to Lemass’s promptings on the
necessity for such a loan, MacEntee responded that this thesis lacked a sound factual
basis. Its premise was that ’Irish resources would support a much greater capital
investment in Ireland if only the banks and other Irish institutions desisted from
channelling them into British investments’:
This is a misconception, beloved of propagandists to which the Stacy 
May Report has given spurious respectability. It is absolutely absurd 
as a basis for policy. First it is not true that Irish resources, in the 
form of current savings are adequate to support present levels of 
investment in Ireland. The fact that we have had to draw so heavily on 
external resources for years is proof of that.151
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The Stacy May report to which MacEntee referred was produced by the IBEC
Technical Services Corporation which was favourable to Irish industrial policy and
to the setting up of the IDA in particular, but which was also very hostile towards
agricultural and especially fiscal policy.152 It advocated that policies to attract
foreign industry and build up native industry should be pursued notwithstanding
costing criticisms by Finance and the Central Bank. As to the former the report
suggested that the government should attempt to attract American capital in particular
and drew specific attention to the approach adopted by Puerto Rico. The impact of
this report on subsequent industrial policy has been criticised by some who were
involved in the Department of Industry and Commerce:
while the report put forward phrases like rifle selectivity rather than 
shotgun diffusiveness and held out the glories of Puerto Rico, where 
is Puerto Rico now? But everyone went for it. All you had to do was 
set up a suitable tax regime and foreign industries would come 
flooding in.153
While the expansion of native industry was stressed, in reality this aspect took a back 
seat to attracting foreign industry within the department. The attitude of ’get the 
foreigners in to give us the jobs, while protecting our own’ became widespread.154 
Stacy May, as The Economist pointed out in an article entitled ’The Irish Troubles’, 
noted
the astonishing degree of state control in the economy ... this is due 
as much to the failure of private enterprise as to ministerial ambitions.
A review of the principal groups of Irish industries allows them in 
general a greater degree of efficiency than they usually get credit for 
though the yardstick of comparison with the United States hardly 
seems helpful.155
While The Economist might have thought that Irish industry was somewhat hard done 
by in Stacy May, Finance were appalled at the whole thrust of the report. They
demanded that the report not be published but de Valera overruled their objections. 
It was a rare example of the ’Chief’ allowing what amounted to hostile criticism of 
something indigenously Irish. He did not have to look into his heart to see that the 
industrial fabric of the country was not in a healthy state. While he might have 
wished that his people might live off the land and lead happy frugal lives, he realised 
that industrial development was a necessity if his country was to have any chance of 
keeping its place among the nations of the earth. Thus he was willing to have the 
report issued. IBEC had drawn attention to the low productivity of Irish industry, and 
attributed this to the low level of investment in plant and machinery. The mandarins 
in Finance and their acerbic minister were not convinced, although there is some 
evidence that Stacy May did have an impact on some officials. One has commented 
on how T.K. Whitaker, in particular, was influenced by it because the economy in 
1952 ’was really a disaster’.156 Whitaker, as we have seen, supported the MacEntee 
line on financial policy at this stage. He was responsible for writing the deflationist 
budget of 1952. Indeed Whitaker wrote to MacEntee, at a time when MacEntee was 
ill, stating ’I could not let this opportunity pass without expressing my great 
admiration for the courage behind the 1952 budget and for your unsparing devotion 
to public duty when everyone would have held you executed’.157 In this context 
while he may have balked at the idea of the cost of the Stacy May report, he was not 
averse to the principle underlying it. As an ardent free trader he wanted to see 
protection reduced and the infusion of foreign companies into the Irish economy 
would obviously be a stepping stone to such an eventual outcome.
In 1953 Lemass put proposals before the government to pursue an expanded capital
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programme by means of setting up a national development fund of £5 million, to be
replenished in each financial year. Finance were horrified. MacEntee’s response is
worth quoting in full in that it shows him in typical balanced budget pose. As
guardian of the nation’s money he was not willing to fund industrial development if
it meant that his achievements of stability in prices and money values were to be
sacrificed at the altar of capital investment:
There is reason to fear that the decision of the cabinet committee in the 
field of expenditure have given rise to the belief that the "lid is off" 
and that the economy is no longer to be seriously thought of in 
connection with existing services or with proposals for new ones. Such 
an attitude can only encourage avoidable spending. In the absence of 
increased tax the additions of the current items in the £5 million, 
together with the interest charges for borrowing, makes it virtually 
certain that the 1953 budget will be in deficit. In any event, if next 
year’s budget is to be balanced, additional taxation will be inevitable 
for the current items and to service the borrowing, including the carry 
over of temporary borrowing from this year. For all these reasons, the 
Minister for Finance views with the utmost anxiety the proposal to add 
£5 million to the borrowing programme.158
The Central Bank were equally as upset by the proposals and asked: ’is not the whole 
situation being approached from the wrong angle? Government expenditure is no cure 
for unemployment. The lesson of past history is that the private sector of the 
economy is depressed by high rates and taxes’. They argued that there was evidence 
of inflation already existing in the economy and that the new proposals would add to 
inflationary pressures: ’the effect of new expenditure on employment is transitory but 
a dead weight debt and taxation are added too for a long time’.159 Lemass saw this 
national development fund operating within the protective sphere for Irish industry. 
As the architect of the Irish protective system set up in the 1930s, he was not yet 
willing to commit himself fully to abandoning it in favour of a policy of free trade. 
While he did realise the need for export-led growth, for the immediate future it would
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have to be within a protectionist framework. Furthermore there was nobody in the 
Department of Industry and Commerce who was willing to question the very essence 
of protection.160 MacEntee, however, objected to the commitment to protection on 
the grounds that it prevented Irish industry from seeking export markets, and he 
believed that Lemass was mistaken in his view that Ireland could generate growth to 
absorb the unemployed. As we have seen, however, Irish industry in the early 1950s 
was not excited by the option of aggressively pursuing export markets. Moreover 
MacEntee did not put forward an alternative strategy for providing employment for 
those seeking work other than to call for low inflation, low taxation and low public 
spending in order to foster an enterprise culture. An injection of new money, he 
argued, would not be the cure for the country’s economic ills. Ultimately Finance and 
the Central Bank still saw agricultural exports as the mainstay of the Irish economy. 
What was needed, they argued, was an expansion of real production, particularly of 
agricultural produce that could be exported at competitive prices. This development 
fund, they protested, would only defeat the very purpose it was designed to 
serve.161 The growth of capital expenditure, they believed, would have serious 
implications for the stability of the agricultural sector. Despite these strenuous 
objections de Valera and the government sided with Lemass and accepted the need 
for such a fund. It came into operation in December 1953 and lasted until March 
1957.
The disagreement over the development fund was just one of a number of disputes 
over economic policy in the lifetime of the Fianna Fail government. In late 1952 
Deputy Michael Moran urged that a ’special meeting be held in the near future for
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a full discussion of Government policy’.162 A meeting of the full Fianna Fail 
parliamentary party in January 1953 was consequently devoted entirely to economic 
policy. During the course of the discussion de Valera explained that the policy of the 
government was ’to pay its way and that any additional services called for by the 
people could only be paid for by taxation’ and stressed that ’increased production - 
principally from the land - was the remedy for most of our problems’.163 While this 
was quintessential Fianna Fail policy it did not satisfy all within the party, and within 
six months a motion sponsored by twenty deputies was put before the parliamentary 
party declaring
The party is of the opinion that in present circumstances a policy of financial 
austerity is no longer justified, and requests the government to frame a 
progressive policy suited to the altered situation, with a view especially to 
putting an end to the undue restriction of credit by the banks, and making low 
interest loans available for farmers and house purchasers.164
The debate which followed this motion lasted through July and when no decision was
reached was then postponed until after the summer recess. The topic, however, was
not discussed again until January 1954. The minutes of this particular meeting are
brief simply declaring that
after a number of teachtai had contributed to the debate, the acting Minister 
for Finance, Proinsias Mac Aogain, replied and An Taoiseach made a 
comprehensive statement on the party’s general financial and economic policy, 
Deputy Carter withdrew the motion on behalf of the teachtai who signed
it.165 '
There is no further record in the Fianna Fail parliamentary party minutes dealing with 
economic policy until January 1957, by which time the second inter-party government 
had almost run its course. The attempts by some deputies to place government 
economic policy on a expansive footing did not succeed as financial policy continued 
to be restrictive, notwithstanding the launching of the development fund. The minutes
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do not indicate whether Lemass was involved in backing this motion. What is clear, 
however, is that it echoed what he had been arguing since Fianna Fail had regained 
power in 1951. The development fund was a rare victory for Lemass during this 
period.
As Lemass attempted to regain some of the policy initiative within Fianna Fail with 
this fund, he also set about rebuilding his relationship with the unions, which had 
taken a beating of sorts since MacEntee’s 1952 budget. In July 1953 de Valera and 
he held a meeting with the ITUC and the Labour Party, where Lemass denied that 
Ireland faced a recession. He did, however, use the occasion to recommend to the 
government the need for significantly increased public expenditure. His policy 
objectives in employment were strikingly similar to those of both Congresses and 
moreover the means of achieving this aim was alike, massive state intervention.166 
For the next four years Lemass, in opposition for most of them, was to retain his 
commitment to state-led economic intervention. He called for a new expansionist 
programme which challenged the Irish banking system to play a greater role in the 
economy, launched a critique of restrictive practices and protectionism and most 
significantly urged foreign capital to invest in Ireland.167 The latter was something 
that both the unions and the employers were calling for. Aodogan O’Rahilly, a major 
industrialist of the time, maintains that the real aim of economic policy in the 1950s 
should have been to encourage all manufacturing enterprise, both Irish and foreign, 
and contends that Lemass-type inducements to outside investments could have been 
started earlier.168 While some investment incentives were now in place and the last 
barrier to new export-oriented investment was the restriction of foreign investment
in Ireland, Irish businessmen were very reluctant to attempt anything new in either
production or marketing terms. The files of the Department of Industry and
Commerce are full of applications for more state protection and higher tariffs on
imported goods up to the early 1960s.169 Between 1952 and 1957 An Foras Tionscal
received only 249 applications, of which 75 were approved and 39 fully realised. It
has been estimated that 1,700 jobs were created at an estimated cost of £460 per
head.170 Throughout the 1950s, the IDA encountered considerable difficulty in
encouraging foreign companies to locate in Ireland. Most of these companies had not
considered the possibility of setting up in Ireland, while those who had were
frequently discouraged by the Control of Manufactures Acts.171 The IDA did,
however, see that export-led growth in an increasingly competitive world was the
only way to expand and develop the Irish economy. Lemass in opposition had, as we
have seen, recognised that this was the case but he also acknowledged the constraints
that were placed on those trying to develop Irish industry, thus he began to
reformulate his ideas once back in government in 1951. As Sean Cromien points out:
Irish industrialists of the 1950s really were not very dynamic. They 
had low taxation, and at the slightest hint of competition they came 
back looking for a higher tariff. So there was a worry that these were 
not the type of people who were going to revitalise the Irish economy.
That is why there was such an emphasis on bringing in investment 
from outside. There was quite a change of heart on the part of 
Lemass, who had been the architect of protection but who had quickly 
come to realise that it was necessary to allow foreign industry in to 
participate in and own Irish industry.172
Yet state-led enterprise was not something which the employers viewed with any great 
enthusiasm. It was valid that efforts be made to attract industry, but any infringement 
on private enterprise was to be avoided. As McGuire, writing in 1951, asserted:
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All efforts of Government should be directed to a widespread 
distribution of private ownership, and nothing should be done by the 
State that will unnecessarily penalize or discourage the ideal of large 
numbers of persons being engaged in small business, or individual 
enterprises of any kind ... it is essential that State control and 
interference be limited to the minimum, and that the fullest 
encouragement should be given to the formation of vocational groups 
in the community which will be urged to take an active part in the 
carrying on of the life of the nation.173
Whether any government, either Fianna Fail or Inter-Party would involve the various
groups remained to be seen, yet it is noticeable that an economic realignment of sorts
was being encouraged by such industrialists as McGuire, and as we shall see later by
both the unions and the farmers as well.
54
Chapter Two 
Changes in the political economy 1954-1963
Lemass and the problem of protection
January of 1954 had seen Lemass ask the IDA to review the whole policy of
protection. He had by then become convinced that foreign capital could undoubtedly
fill a much required need. The evidence that Lemass had gathered in his years in
power suggested to him that indigenous Irish industry could not fulfil the objectives
of economic and industrial growth. He had been persuaded to retain the IDA when
he returned to office in 1951 and that body was adamant that the Control of
Manufactures Acts would have to be amended as they were a restriction on foreign
capital entering the country.1 Fianna Fail’s defeat in the 1954 election left Lemass
in a position to do much thinking on this issue. While realising the difficulties of
protectionism, and the advantages that foreign capital offered he was still reluctant
to tamper with the Control of Manufactures Acts as it had been the cornerstone of
Fianna Fail industrial policy since 1932. Lemass was being urged by some within the
party to grasp the opportunity that foreign enterprise would give to the economy.2
In any event his spell in opposition gave him much time to mull over this vexed
question as if he was to amend the Control of Manufactures Acts, he would be
turning Fianna Fail industrial policy on its head. During the election campaign of
1954 MacEntee had emphasised that
if the wise and far seeing economic and financial policy of the Fianna 
Fail Government were continued the value of our currency would 
continue to increase ... The financial and economic policy of the 
Fianna Fail government had given the country a balanced budget, 
expanded social services and increased employment. It had enabled the 
country to conserve its reserves so that today every pound of them was
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increasing in value and it had enabled all our obligations abroad to be 
met.3
While this was classical economic orthodoxy, and MacEntee could legitimately claim 
that he had pulled the country back from the brink of economic collapse, what it did 
not say was that Fianna Fail’s performance in industrial policy was rather abysmal. 
Between 1951 and 1954, MacEntee and Finance attempted to reject all the main 
initiatives promoted by Lemass to develop industry on grounds of cost. The 
fundamental problem remained protectionism. As T. Desmond Williams perceptively 
noted:
Fianna Fail introduced it, Fine Gael continued it. Most people, 
however, including leading spokesmen in both administration and 
opposition, question the success of that policy ... But if protection 
were to be reduced many of these infant industries would collapse.
Certain social consequences would then follow, involving damage to 
the interests of the worker and the employer. These interests in 
different ways can not be ignored by the politician ... As 
representative of city and town they control the marginal vote which 
makes all the difference to the parties concerned. When a recent crisis 
threatened the textile industry, the immediate reaction on the part of 
the Minister was to impose a flat tariff of from 50 to 75% on imports.
This may have protected to some degree ... but it favoured the least 
efficient as much as the most efficient firms in the industries 
concerned; it also provided no genuine solution over a long term.4
This was the fulcrum of the problem for Lemass. As his economic philosophy on 
protection was developing, he had to balance how its removal would affect his urban 
constituents. In any event MacEntee’s policies of economic orthodoxy were 
repudiated by the electorate. Fianna Fail’s share of the vote fell from 46.3 per cent 
in 1951 to 43.4 per cent in 1954 and they lost seven seats to fall to 65. Fine Gael 
were the main winners in the election gaining ten seats bringing their total to 50 and 
increasing their vote by nearly 7 per cent to 32 per cent. More worrying for Lemass
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was the slippage of the Fianna Fail vote in Dublin to 39.3 per cent down from 46.4 
per cent in 1951. Fine Gael, Labour and Clann na Poblachta had all gained ground 
in Dublin at Fianna Fail’s expense.5 It would be essential for Lemass that he stop this 
trend away from Fianna Fail in urban areas if he was to gain a stranglehold on 
economic and industrial policy once Fianna Fail returned to office. Patrick Lynch 
talks of Lemass remarking on how his interests stretched only to industrial 
development in Dublin ’and as far as agricultural development in the west is 
concerned, the west is the wild west’.6 Bew and Patterson have commented on how 
Fianna Fail’s failure in urban areas presented Lemass with a golden opportunity to 
identify the party with economic expansion.7 This, however, is more a case of 
reading history backwards. In 1954 there was no certainty of Fianna Fail having a 
quick return to office and emphatically no certainty that Lemass would succeed de 
Valera as party leader. A profile of Lemass in The Irish Times in July 1953 
remarked: ’when the time comes it is assumed he will succeed his chief. But will it 
be as easy as that?’.8 Furthermore The Leader in a commentary on the 1952 budget 
noted that
the Taoiseach himself is temperamentally disposed towards ’austerity’ 
and he has himself thrived in applying it in his own case. The ’modest 
frugal’ life has generally been the ideal advocated by him for Ireland, 
while he has rarely shown the same exuberant enthusiasm for an 
industrialised and prosperous Ireland which the Tanaiste has always 
endeavoured to promote.9
In essence what was important for Lemass was that, in opposition, he develop an 
economic programme that he could put into operation once he was back in office, and 
more importantly that it would be a programme that would deliver results. In 1954 
it was not clear whether he would be able to do either.
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The second inter-party government
It was the second inter-party government that would first have the chance to develop 
a programme for economic expansion. It never took it. Fiscal policy continued to be 
restrictive under the new Minister for Finance Gerard Sweetman, a man reported to 
be so conservative ’that if present at the creation of the world, he would have voted 
against it’, and as having ’one of the keenest minds of the nineteenth century’.10 He 
endorsed his department’s orthodoxy as had all of his predecessors. While McGilligan 
had to an extent departed from these orthodoxies, most noticeably with the capital 
budget of 1950, Sweetman took a conscious decision to revert back to traditional 
finance techniques. Despite following such a deflationary line a large deficit of £35 
million emerged due on the whole to the falling volume of agricultural exports. This 
problem was exacerbated by a capital outflow, which increased the decline in external 
reserves to £47 million. This reflected a slowing down in economic growth, a loss 
of confidence in the economy and a drying up of profitable outlets for capital in the 
country.11 The authorities thus decided to respond with measures which were 
designed to restore balance to external trade, to reverse the decline in external 
reserves and to place the economy on a sounder and more credit worthy basis. To 
these ends Sweetman imposed special import levies and additional taxes in March 
1956. He followed these with further measures in May and July greatly widening the 
range of the import levies and increasing the rates of levy on items which had been 
subjected to increase in March. The gravity of the economic situation is graphically 
illustrated by an episode early in 1956. Frederick Boland who had moved from 
External Affairs in 1950 to be ambassador to Britain comments on how he was 
summoned back from London early in 1956 for a meeting with Taoiseach, John A.
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Costello, Tanaiste, William Norton and Minister for Finance, Gerard Sweetman:
they told me that the state of the finances - the balance of payments - 
was bad, very bad and drastic measures would have to be taken to put 
it right, and that these measures would hit British exports to Ireland 
very severely. So I had to explain this as best I could to the British 
Government, so I said ’What are they going to do?’ ’We’re going to 
put a duty of 60% on all durables, machinery and so on, coming into 
the country’. Well I said ’the British won’t like that. Listen would you 
not make 60% and 40% preferential in favour of British and 
Commonwealth’. So Norton said, ’Yes we could do that, if you think 
it will make it any easier’. So they gave me a list of things they were 
going to put duty on and I set off.12
Boland saw both the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Harold Macmillan, and the 
President of the Board of Trade, Peter Thorneycroft, on the issue and ultimately the 
British swallowed the unpalatable Irish duties without a ’ruffle of disagreement 
between the two governments’. The episode is, however, indicative of the drastic 
state of the Irish economy and also suggests a rather haphazard approach to trade 
policy formulation.
By 1956 four years of deflationary policies had taken their toll. In that year industrial 
production fell by 3 per cent, agriculture by 7 per cent, Gross National Product by 
1.3 per cent and employment by almost 2 per cent.13 By the end of October, imports 
had fallen by £15 million as compared with the same period in 1955. Much of this 
saving was, however, illusory since it arose from the running down of imported stock 
which would have to be replenished at a later date. Furthermore, exports had, at the 
same time, fallen by £3 million due to a decline in the value of livestock and other 
farm products.14 Sweetman was insistent that the measures he took were correct. He 
declared that ’what is at stake is our economic independence. If we should lose this 
the political independence we have achieved would be a mere facade. The government
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are determined that both will be preserved’.15
Walsh has argued that the effect of the massive cutbacks was undoubtedly to prolong 
the recession and make its impact more severe than would have been the case if the 
level of spending had followed longer term guidelines and shown less erratic year to 
year swings. While the ratio of foreign reserves to imports declined substantially 
during the 1950s, it remained high by international standards. The ultimate 
justification for holding such reserves is to help a country through exceptionally 
adverse periods such as 1955 was. The failure to mobilise reserves during the 1950s 
in order to maintain output and unemployment unquestionably led to unnecessary 
sacrifices which were borne particularly by the unemployed and emigrants:16 the 
1956 census showed the population at 2,894,822, the lowest ever recorded for the 
state.17
Sweetman’s economic policy was vigorously backed by Finance and the Central 
Bank, yet within the government there was deep division. Costello himself had grave 
doubts as to the wisdom of such stringent economic measures while in the Labour 
party there was deep dissatisfaction. The Provisional United Trade Union 
Organisation [PUTUO] held two special conferences on the twin problems of 
unemployment and emigration and actively criticised Labour for hurting its own 
supporters. The Irish Times noted that ’since the imposition of the special levies, the 
clamp down on public services such as housing, and the restriction of credit generally 
with their conjoint effect upon employment, the unions have been out of patience 
altogether’.18
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In industrial policy the inter-party government remained committed to a private
enterprise economy, but were willing to increase state involvement when private
enterprises were unable to pursue various projects which might be viable:
It has been accepted policy in this country that the state should not 
engage in industrial and commercial activity unless it was clear that 
private industries were either unwilling or did not possess the 
necessary resources to carry out a particular project. It might in fact 
be said that it was only as a last resort that the state entered any field 
of industry or commercial activity.19
The government did, however, set out to attract foreign investment to Ireland. If Irish 
enterprise was unwilling to take the risk of establishing native industries, William 
Norton, leader of the Labour party, and the new Minister for Industry and Commerce 
decided that he would attempt to attract foreign enterprise. Initially the government 
decided to accept the proposal of an Anglo-American oil combine to erect an oil 
refinery in Cork harbour. This deal worth £12 million was the largest sum invested 
in a single private enterprise in Ireland.20 Following this Norton, in the spring of 
1955, decided to go on a European tour in an attempt to persuade foreign investors 
to come to Ireland. Accompanied by the chairman of the IDA, J.P. Beddy, and Luke 
Duffy, a member of the IDA board, Norton extolled the virtues of Ireland for those 
who might be willing to invest foreign capital. In Sweden, for example, he 
proclaimed that the country was singularly free from trade disputes, and more 
curiously from a Labour leader, that ’our wage levels are very much lower than 
yours’. Beddy for his part reiterated that industry in the country was protected but 
added that it would not have been feasible to set up native industries without such a 
policy. His main argument was that indigenous firms would have had to face the 
competition of long established manufacturers in Britain whose names and products
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would be very well known in the country. Without protection it would not be possible
to establish such new industries and face this competition. Ireland did have a number
of advantages, stressed Beddy:
we maintain absolute parity with sterling and there is no difficulty 
whatever in our arrangements with Britain. There is no credit 
restriction exercised by the government through banks in Ireland in 
relation to industry ... almost all industrial goods produced in Ireland 
enjoy the right to free entry to Great Britain ... The Irish government 
favours private enterprise and does not itself engage in industry unless 
in special circumstances.21
Ireland’s close links with Britain were being put forward as one of the main reasons
why foreign capital should invest in Ireland. Yet it should be recalled that Finance
were following the British line in fiscal policy to the obvious detriment of any Irish
industrial development in that there was chronic underinvestment in the Irish economy
by the time the second inter-party government assumed office. In any event Norton
travelled to America, again with Beddy, early in 1956 in his attempts to attract
foreign industry. He explained his motives for such visits:
The steps now being taken to attract external investment to Ireland 
should not in any way deter our existing manufacturers from 
proceeding as rapidly as possible with their own plans for 
development. The whole purpose of stimulating external investment in 
Irish industry is to promote the establishment of new types of 
industries and to secure an expansion that would not otherwise take 
place. Irish manufacturers, who are catering efficiently for the needs 
of the market may, therefore, rest assured that their interests will be 
fully guarded.22
The problem with this, however, was that it was bound to create quite an element of 
doubt amongst those industries who catered only for the home market and were not 
too interested in attempting to find new markets. These industries were not looking 
to share in a harvest of expansion and were obviously worried as to how an influx of
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foreign capital would affect them. The more vibrant industrialists, however, had no
doubt but that foreign investment was good for industry and would help it expand and
develop. As Aodogan O’Rahilly has commented:
as a country we needed more dynamism in an economic sense, whether 
we got it from at home or abroad was immaterial, we needed it or else 
we were not going to advance much further industrially or in any other 
sense either.23
Fianna Fail opposed Norton’s initiatives. It is tempting to see this as merely opposing 
for opposition’s sake, particularly in the case of Lemass who undoubtedly was in 
favour of bringing foreign capital into the country. In late 1955 and early 1956 
Lemass was actively advocating large-scale schemes of expansion. He still insisted, 
however, that the Control of Manufactures Acts not be repealed though he did admit 
that they should be reviewed.24 De Valera and MacEntee, by contrast, still believed 
in the preeminence of agriculture over industry. While they both realised that the Irish 
economy needed a vibrant industrial arm, there can be little doubt that they 
considered that the future well being of the Irish economy lay in it having a strong 
agricultural export base. As the Irish economy was about to enter its worst depression 
since independence there was as yet no likelihood that indigenous industry would lead 
the country out of its black trough and into a bright new dawn.
The National plan and the emergence of T.K. Whitaker
At this stage Finance was still insisting that Ireland’s recession was ’solely a monetary 
crisis’.25 This, however, was not the case. The parliamentary secretary to the 
government John O’Donovan wrote to Sweetman on the perils of continuing with 
Finance orthodoxy:
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it is almost past understanding how arguments which have been proven 
wrong time and time again are still produced for the purpose of 
conditioning the members of governments of this country to agree with 
courses which are contrary to their own firm convictions and then- 
political advantage, and which experience has shown to be contrary to 
the good of the community in Ireland.26
In October 1956 Costello, under pressure from Norton, launched a plan of national 
development covering every aspect of the Irish economy. He announced a series of 
grants, tax reliefs and other incentives to industry and agriculture, which were to 
become the hallmark of the new system of foreign-led industrialisation under free 
trade. The spur for this development was a paper by T.K. Whitaker, delivered to the 
Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland, entitled 'Capital Formation, Saving 
and Economic Progress' .27 Whitaker argued that the raising of output in agriculture 
and industry should have a higher priority in the allocation of savings, stating that the 
utmost use should be made of means of raising output which are sparing of capital 
so as to make savings go as far as possible and thus relieve the immediate sacrifice 
in consumption. Furthermore he argued that saving and production should be 
encouraged and excessive consumption discouraged. This would primarily enable 
capital development of a productive nature to be stimulated. He maintained that there 
should be a liberal attitude towards profits to encourage industrial expansion, arguing 
that assistance to agriculture should be directed specifically towards the development 
of productive capacity. There is a marked difference between this work and some of 
Whitaker’s earlier writings. Ronan Fanning comments that this paper ’attempted to 
blaze a trail for the radical new departures in policy which characterized the years 
ahead’. Yet one should not necessarily portray Whitaker as having undergone a 
Pauline conversion from ardent deflationist to Keynesian expansionist.28 Some
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commentators have contended that Whitaker’s actions were an attempt to gain control
of the economic, if not the political agenda and to exclude more radical options.29
Whether Whitaker recognised that to defend the conservative position he had to act
as a radical and regain control of economic management is open to question. As J. J.
Lee points out Whitaker had distinguished himself hitherto ’less as a radical innovator
than as an exceptionally effective advocate of the conventional Finance wisdom’.30
The traditional view, one cultivated by Whitaker himself, is that this young civil
servant, promoted in advance of his senior colleagues, acted decisively in the face of
an economic crisis the like of which the state had not experienced since the
famine.31 This is quite different to interpreting his motives to expand the Irish
economy as an attempt to reinforce traditional policy by different methods. There is
evidence which suggest that senior civil servants in Finance were conscious of the
demands of their political masters that they play a more positive, interventionist role
in framing policy. While Costello’s plan was in part a response to Whitaker’s
promptings, the then Taoiseach later recalled that he had been fully aware that
unless we produced a plan soon we were heading for trouble. In order 
to cope with the balance of payments difficulty we put levies on 
imports that caused unemployment. I felt there should be some 
economic plan to deal with the situation, something constructive to 
coincide with the strong measures we were taking. We had to give the 
economic body a tonic as well as medicine.32
Seeing that the political tide was turning against traditional Finance thinking it is not 
unreasonable to assume that Whitaker, ardent deflationist of a previous era, turned 
his considerable mind and talents to new forms of economic growth. He has spoken 
of how disturbed he was by mass emigration in particular.33 More importantly he 
voiced the belief that ’something had to be done or the achievement of national
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independence would prove to have been a futility’.34 In this we have an implicit 
statement that by the mid 1950s, conservative economic techniques employed since 
the foundation of the state were outmoded for a new generation. On his appointment 
to the secretaryship, Whitaker, as J.J. Lee has tentatively suggested, might have felt 
that he had to prove himself, but what is more important is that ultimately Whitaker 
was no dogmatic deflationist but rather a widely read dynamic young civil servant 
comfortable with numerous economic theories and willing to put them into practice 
for the good of his country.35
On the industrial front Costello’s plan included a special incentive to encourage 
exports by a remission of 50% on profits derived from increased exports, to be used 
for expansion of production, even more generous government grants for certain types 
of new factories, tax exemptions for much of the profit of the mining industry, the 
immediate appointment of a Capital Investment Advisory Committee to advise on the 
best methods of financing new enterprises, and the establishment of an Industrial 
Advisory Council, composed of industrialists and trade unionists, to secure informed 
opinion on matters of welfare and development which did not come within the scope 
of existing bodies such as the Factories Act Advisory Council.36 Costello also 
announced that the IDA had begun efforts to interest continental and American 
industrialists in the establishment of factories for the manufacture of goods outside 
the existing range of governmental activity. A former official of the Department of 
Industry and Commerce has traced the strength of the IDA and its eventual hegemony 
over Industry and Commerce in industrial policy to this speech, claiming that the 
preeminence Costello gave it was just the boost it needed to establish a niche for itself
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and make itself indispensable.37
Despite these measures Fine Gael lost ten seats at the March 1957 general election. 
The economy was the main issue in what was generally a lacklustre campaign, with 
Fianna Fail claiming that the inter-party government had failed to deal with the 
deteriorating economic situation, was responsible for the high level of unemployment 
and had no policy for recovery and indeed could not have had because its members 
were divided.38 This division was not just on party grounds. Fine Gael were deeply 
divided over Sweetman’s cutbacks, particularly his intention to cut off food subsidies 
in the upcoming budget. Four members of the party’s elite, Minister for External 
Affairs Liam Cosgrave, Attorney General Patrick McGilligan, Parliamentary 
Secretary to the Government John O’Donovan and Minister for Health Tom 
O’Higgins threatened to resign.39 The defection from the government of Clann na 
Poblachta deferred such action but it is clear that a considerable group within Fine 
Gael were unhappy with Sweetman at Finance. Yet Sweetman himself fought a 
vigorous campaign. He claimed that Fine Gael had a progressive policy which ’built 
on the national solvency ensured by my tenure as Minister for Finance will create an 
expanding economy with greater production and exports, particularly in agriculture 
and will enable us to have a higher standard of living’.40
He stressed that the appointment of a savings committee, the initiation of a savings 
campaign, the development of a national loan on attractive terms, tax reliefs and 
incentives for increased personal savings given in the 1956 budget as well as the 
shifting of the balance of taxation away from income to less essential expenses were
all evidence of Fine Gael’s belief in the necessity for savings and for incentives 
towards greater earnings. Fine Gael, he added, was in favour of production, savings 
and domestic development but was opposed to excessive spending on less essential 
imports and to the wasteful use of external reserves. He thus maintained that the 
special import levies were necessary to achieve this and protect the country from 
insolvency:
The firm action taken last year has saved our economic structure and 
it is accordingly now possible to plan ahead and develop our resources 
on the rock of national solvency. The Capital budget that the Fine Gael 
Minister for Finance intended to introduce would have provided both 
directly and indirectly for increased employment, would have sustained 
and increased production and would have laid the firm basis and 
confidence required for orderly development.41
Sweetman, however, never got the chance to implement another budget as people 
voted against the government and the bleak economic situation. The electorate, weary 
of the harsh economic climate, chose Fianna Fail as the party most likely to ease 
economic severity.
Fianna Fail in office
Fianna Fail, however, were equally divided. Lemass kept a low profile during the
campaign as the Fianna Fail platform offered nothing in the way of a growth oriented
programme. If anything it preached the old traditional patterns of economic
organisation, particularly in agriculture, and offered no alternative policies. In reality
it mirrored a speech de Valera had given in Cork the previous July:
Our past successes should be an inspiration to us. The whole doctrine 
of faith in ourselves, self reliance, self discipline and self support is 
today as energising nationally and as fruitful as ever in the past. The 
present difficulties should be regarded as no more than as a challenge 
to our manhood, our national character and determination, to our
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ability to organise, to work and to make good.42
In essence it was MacEntee who was the main spokesman for Fianna Fail during the
election. In typically caustic fashion he accused Costello of being in the past an Irish
Nazi who had ’studied Hitler’s Mein Kampf and sat at the feet of the late Dr.
Goebbels’. This bizarre attack was in response to an assertion by Costello that with
the exception of 1946, this was the first occasion in peace time in over 25 years that
Ireland’s international payments account was about to be brought into balance. This,
according to MacEntee, was a shameful lie as Fianna Fail had a credit balance of
over £2 million on the external account in 1938 despite the fact that they had had to
pay the British government £10 million in liquidation claims with which the Irish
government were saddled ’under secret arrangements which Costello’s associates
signed in 1923’.43 MacEntee launched similar verbal assaults on Fine Gael
throughout the campaign, but what is most interesting is that to some extent he
sympathised with Sweetman’s performance as Minister. Sweetman’s budget in 1956
can be compared to MacEntee’s in 1952. Showing his true conservative colours,
MacEntee talked of supporting Sweetman
in the bitter struggle which I suspected he was waging with many of 
his colleagues to get them to accept the principle of a balanced budget.
But I made it clear that the present burden of taxation was oppressive 
and that expenditure should be reduced so that the burden might be 
lightened. Such support that I gave Gerard Sweetman obviously 
annoyed his leader.44
This, claimed MacEntee, was in striking contrast to the position Costello in particular
had taken to the 1952 budget:
Despite having reservations and with many doubts as to the wisdom of 
the measures which the government was taking to deal with the grave 
situation which it had created Fianna Fail had given it such support as
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thought justified in doing in the nation’s interest.45
While MacEntee could claim with some justification that he had the nation’s interest
at heart in his pursuit of deflationary economic policy, and would support such
policies no matter who was in government, there were others in Fianna Fail who had
a different economic agenda. A number of people left the party in disgust after the
1952 budget while others transferred to Lemass’s constituency in the belief that he
represented the authentic voice of Fianna Fail and would eventually win this policy
battle.46 Lemass himself was strangely subdued during the 1957 campaign. It may
be that, as one former official has speculated, he felt that the IDA was becoming
more powerful and that, even back in government his influence would be curtailed
at Industry and Commerce.47 Furthermore he had clearly lost the economic policy
battle with MacEntee during the previous Fianna Fail administration and could well
have feared that if MacEntee was reappointed Minister for Finance the same would
happen. MacEntee was highly critical of Lemass’s Clery’s 100,000 Jobs speech of 1
October 1955 and a preceding memorandum on financial policy that Lemass had
prepared for Fianna Fail’s central committee in mid-April 1955 which advocated
greater government intervention in the economy and called for full employment.48
In fact Lemass originally submitted his Clery’s speech in the form of a memorandum
to the party with a meeting of the party committee deciding that
Mr. Lemass could speak in public in general terms on proposals set 
out in his memorandum but that reference to the Central Bank should 
be omitted; it could be pointed out, however, that our resources are 
ample to finance agriculture and industrial development.49
It would appear that the party were anxious not to get involved, or let Lemass become 
embroiled, in a public squabble with the Central Bank as had happened in 1951.
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While Lemass was given a somewhat guarded go ahead by the party for this speech, 
MacEntee took something of a back seat. In late 1954 Fianna Fail decided to ask 
members of its central committee to submit memoranda on areas of major policy. 
While Lemass quite naturally took industry, it was Frank Aiken rather than 
MacEntee, who was recovering from illness, who undertook the task of attempting 
to shape Fianna Fail’s financial policy in opposition.50 Nevertheless by the time of 
the 1957 election MacEntee had reemerged as the main Fianna Fail financial 
spokesman and could reasonably have been expecting a reappointment to Finance in 
any Fianna Fail government. This was not to happen.
In the political sphere, the aftermath of Fianna Fail’s victory in the general election 
of 1957 brought one major decisive change when de Valera decided not to reappoint 
MacEntee to Finance. MacEntee was undoubtedly disappointed. His diary of 8 March 
records that de Valera ’had already seen Ryan and Aiken before me. He was 
apparently committed to both’.51 It was James Ryan, who had performed with 
distinction in Health after Noel Browne’s problems with the mother and child episode, 
who eventually received Finance while Aiken got External Affairs. Lemass returned 
to Industry and Commerce, with MacEntee being effectively demoted to Health. 
Unfortunately this is the only record we have of MacEntee’s reaction to his demotion, 
and we can only speculate as to de Valera’s motives. Brian Farrell maintains that ’in 
1951 de Valera had refused his [Lemass] request not to reappoint MacEntee to 
Finance; in 1957 he acceded’.52 Farrell’s evidence is from an interview with Lemass 
and thus its veracity is not in question. Yet while this has remained the accepted 
wisdom ever since there is no documentary evidence to complement it. Sean Cromien
states that as far as he can recall ’de Valera had great difficulty in getting anyone to 
take the job’.53 This, however, must be seen in the context of someone taking it 
once de Valera had made a conscious decision not to reappoint MacEntee. Ryan it 
seems was a compromise choice. Lee, the only author to suggest a tentative reason, 
and even then more to do with the leadership than the demotion from Finance 
advances the belief that MacEntee ’was discredited by his association with the 
unsuccessful policies of the previous Fianna Fail administration’.54 While this may 
indeed be so, de Valera himself cannot escape the charge that he had wholeheartedly 
supported MacEntee’s policies. If anything de Valera must stand equally as indicted. 
There is no evidence that de Valera was willing to listen to alternative advice. Some 
years later he complimented Whitaker on Economic Development, but added ’ach ta 
rudai eile nios tabhachtai’ [But there are more important things].55 De Valera’s idea 
was that Ireland would produce and consume whatever it needed, exporting only what 
was necessary to obtain foreign exchange. MacEntee’s conservative economic views 
would not have seen the light of day if de Valera had opposed them. As Tim Pat 
Coogan has pointed out in his truculent biography of de Valera, the Fianna Fail 
cabinet was ’a democracy in which one vote counted - Eamon de Valera’s’.56 It is 
interesting that in the Fianna Fail parliamentary party minutes of this period de Valera 
is referred to officially as the ’Chief’.57 There can be no doubt about his status. As 
absolute head of the party and the government no major policy decision could be 
implemented without his approval. In any event, de Valera, astute politician as he 
was, had undoubtedly realised that Fianna Fail had gone to the country in 1948 and 
1954 with conservative economic records and had been defeated in both. The 
economic crisis the Fianna Fail government confronted in 1957 was so severe that
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there was every likelihood that a conservative approach would only exacerbate the 
problem and more importantly return the party to opposition at the next election. De 
Valera thus decided that change was necessary. It was a change brought about by 
electoral fortunes, not a deliberate break with traditional Fianna Fail economic 
policies. He consequently relegated MacEntee and promoted Ryan to Finance. There 
Ryan left the running of the department to his officials, Whitaker in particular, and 
concentrated on getting Whitaker’s ideas accepted by cabinet.58 As Whitaker has 
speculated:
First of all one must see that Dev recognised, through the eminence he 
gave to Lemass, the deficiency in his own viewpoint. De Valera was 
supplementing his idealistic view of things by a practical go-getter 
person in Lemass. Dev was still Taoiseach when they decided to 
publish this piece of official advice ... One is left thinking that it was 
his political instinct - it was a way out, a brilliant way out from being 
imposed in the old policies. Dev presumably had the perception to see 
that change was necessary.59
There can be little doubt, as Pauric Travers points out, that ’de Valera can have had 
little stomach for the abandonment of protectionism and self-sufficiency’.60 By the 
time Fianna Fail won the 1957 election he was remote from much of the debate 
within the party. Yet he did recognise that the policies of economic retrenchment had 
resulted in defeat for his party twice in the previous nine years. With Lemass at last 
having overcome the financial orthodoxy of MacEntee, what could Irish industry look 
forward to as the ideology of free trade began to take a foothold within the Irish civil 
service and body politic?
Fianna Fail’s return to office in April 1957 with an overall majority saw Lemass 
restored as Minister for Industry and Commerce. He immediately began the gradual
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process of opening up the state to new foreign investment, though without as yet 
removing tariff obstacles. He did, however, face an obdurate civil service in his 
attempts to initiate reform. A report from Industry and Commerce, during the Irish 
negotiations to join EFT A, predicted that in the event of protection disappearing, a 
significant section of Irish industry would simply cease to exist. It estimated that up 
to 60 per cent of industrial employment (154,000 in 1954) would be lost if 
unrestricted entry of foreign goods were permitted: ’Whatever the outcome, we must 
face the disemployment of from 80,000 to 100,000 persons, to say nothing about 
consequential disemployment that may be expected in other directions’.61 Patrick 
Lynch maintains that this report shows the paucity of thinking within the civil service 
at the time and declares that in retrospect the view is ’sheer nonsense’ when one 
considers what the country was losing through emigration at the time.62 Emigration 
between 1946 and 1956 was in the region of 300,000 while employment in 
manufacturing industry in the period increased by only 34,000. The economic 
instability which plagued Irish policy makers throughout the 1950s led to serious 
unemployment and consequently mass emigration. The relative success of the British 
economy at this time and its labour shortage provided a strong pull for emigration. 
Wage rates in Britain moved far ahead of those in Ireland, as did overall standards 
of living facilitated by the developing welfare state. Historically, Ireland had 
compared its living standards with those of Britain, and the distance between them 
widened during the decade. Ireland’s historic association with Britain caused mental 
as well as practical problems. Todd Andrews, for example, argued that a 
psychological sense of inferiority pervaded the country and the farming community 
in particular. This was an important point emanating from one of the prime public
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servants and industrialists of the era. For Andrews and the policy making community 
in general
the keynote of the national economy is agriculture and until we have 
fully utilised our national resources in agriculture nothing further in the 
way of substantial development is likely ... I feel if the farmers want 
help they should get it if for nothing else than to show the goodwill of 
the country towards them and disabuse them of distrust.63
Policy makers of all hues and from all parts of the civil service were at one with 
Andrews’ description of the importance of the agriculture to the economy. All those 
interviewed in the course of this research whether industrialists, civil servants or 
agriculturalists, have emphasised the belief in the primacy of agriculture for the Irish 
economy which dominated policy making. Yet one of the most significant features of 
the 1950s was the virtual collapse of the small marginal farming sector, leading to the 
demise of agriculture as a focus for employment or growth. This posed a serious 
problem for policy makers. If one compares Ireland with some other small Western 
European states one can see that substantial change took place in the structural 
composition of the labour force in most of these states, but not significantly in 
Ireland. This in itself was significant in Ireland but not as significant as elsewhere.
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Table 1
Share of labour force in Manufacturing Industry and Agriculture 
Manufacturing Agriculture
1940 1950 1960 1970 1940 1950 1960 1970
Austria 22.0 22.7 30.8 31.1 39.0 32.3 22.8 13.8
Belgium 35.3 36.6 34.6 32.0 12.1 — 7.2 4.6
Denmark 25.1 26.8 28.9 27.6 29.9 25.6 17.8 10.6
Finland 15.4 20.7 21.5 24.7 57.4 46.0 35.5 20.3
Netherlands 25.3 — 30.5 24.0 18.8 — 10.7 6.1
Norway 22.1 25.8 25.5 26.7 29.5 25.9 19.5 11.6
Sweden 27.4 31.0 34.2 29.2 28.8 20.3 13.8 8.1
Switzerland 35.5 37.3 39.8 37.7 20.8 16.5 11.2 7.7
Ireland 12.2 15.2 17.0 20.2 45.3 39.6 35.2 25.4
[Source: Lars Mjoset, The Irish Economy in Comparative Perspective, pp. 112-113].
It is possible to identify a significant difference between Ireland and Europe up to the 
late 1950s. For the most part Ireland restored its protectionist framework for industry 
after the war, while import substitution remained the policy goal for most political 
parties and successive governments. Though industrial protection had brought limited 
success, its continuation contrasted sharply with policy in most other European 
states.64 Furthermore, as we have seen policy making continued to emphasise 
agriculture over industry, again in contrast with Europe. Agriculture continued to 
employ a significant part of the labour force, but in addition the small family farm 
was idealised as a social unit rather than as an efficient economic unit. Yet as Lee and 
O’Tuathaigh note, Lemass
had never shared de Valera’s dream of a small farmers Utopia. De
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Valera was reared in an agricultural labourer’s cottage. To him, the 
security of the small farm represented the grasping ambition of his 
ancestral class. Lemass, Dublin bom and bred, had no feeling of 
romantic nostalgia for small-farm Ireland. The only surplus he saw 
coming off small farms was children. Small farmers could not 
produce, in his view, the surpluses necessary to build up a thriving 
economy.65
Lemass recognised that the sustenance of de Valera’s pastoral society was heavily 
dependent on Ireland’s privileged access to the British market, an objective which had 
been realised in the 1948 trade agreement and maintained subsequently. In 
comparison with its continental competitors, such as Denmark and the Netherlands, 
Irish farming was relatively high cost and inefficient. Its position in the British market 
was secured not through competitive advantage, but due to political negotiations 
between the two states and agreements which excluded continental competition. There 
was a well founded fear in Ireland that any opening of British markets to European 
competition would lead to the weakening of the Irish advantage. Thus the newly 
returned Fianna Fail government knew that they had to develop a strong industrial 
policy which could stand side by side with agriculture in developing the Irish 
economy.
By 1957 Fianna Fail realised that they had to travel along a different economic path 
than they had previously taken while in government. Lemass had hinted at this at a 
parliamentary party meeting in January 1957 where he made a statement dealing ’with 
certain short term proposals involving government expenditure and retrenchment, 
which he felt were required to deal with the grave immediate problem of 
unemployment’.66 In his first budget speech Ryan unequivocally spelt out the 
economic objectives of the government and their commitment to attaining them:
77
It is clear that we have come to a critical stage in our economic 
affairs. The policies of the past though successful in some directions, 
have not so far given us what we want. Further progress on a 
worthwhile scale calls for a comprehensive review of our economic 
policy. The direction and rate of our future advance will depend on the 
decisions we take now. There are no easy expedients by which our 
difficulties can be solved.67
This speech fundamentally supported Whitaker’s stance and reassured the country’s 
premier civil servant that the government was committed to export led growth. 
Lemass recognised that existing investment and output were not sufficient to maintain 
the level of demand he believed necessary to obtain full employment and he became 
a wholehearted supporter of Whitaker’s export led ideas. Whitaker himself had 
instructed his officials that it was ’desirable that this Department should do some 
independent thinking and not wait simply for Industry and Commerce or the I.D.A. 
to produce the ideas’.68
Thus it was in the atmosphere of a new government and a more active and 
interventionist Department of Finance, that Economic Development was born. 
Whitaker h im se lf  has stated that it was Gerard Sweetman’s tenure of office as finance 
m in ister which did much to pave the way for Economic Development. Not only did 
Sweetman appoint Whitaker to the secretaryship of Finance in breach of seniority 
principles, he also established the Capital Investment Advisory Committee and 
initiated the Irish application for membership of the International Monetary Fund and 
of the World Bank. These innovations were intimately linked with the immediate 
origins of E con om ic Development. Sweetman also provided tax reliefs for exports in 
1956 which emphasised the need for a substantial increase in volume and efficiency 
of national production.69
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Theodore Hoppen has described the production of Economic Development and its
impact in curing what seemed the terminal disease of emigration and unemployment
in the following terms:
the story of how such things were for a time banished is one which 
Irish historians have become so accustomed to telling that, like all oft- 
repeated tales, it has acquired something of the character of myth. In 
its most usual form the role of modern St. Patrick expelling the snakes 
of depression with a wave of his Keynesian crozier has been divided 
between two dynamic innovators, namely, T.K. Whitaker ... and Sean 
Lemass.70
Whitaker advanced a three pronged strategy: more planning, fewer tariffs and greater
emphasis on productive investment. Lemass did not hesitate to join him. As Lee has
memorably pointed out of Lemass:
there were few societies in Europe which appeared to offer less scope 
to a merchant adventurer than the stagnant Ireland of the mid-twentieth 
century. Only a conquistador of the spirit, however pragmatic his short 
term tactics, could have embarked on such a journey.71
A renewed activism
Yet Lemass and Whitaker were not alone. At a wider level the mid 1950s saw
developments pursued which went some way towards solving the psychological
problems Todd Andrews talked of when he pointed out in 1957:
psychologically speaking we have not fully severed the British 
connection and our economic and administrative reflexes were too 
much conditioned by our past historical and present economic 
association with Britain. We are inclined to rely too much on the 
British framework of reference for our ideas on policy. If we have the 
confidence in ourselves which we are entitled to have, and if we have 
a determination to act as well as to think, I believe it possible to 
achieve this wish ... A psychological blight seems to have descended 
on the country and the young people in particular seem to have lost 
confidence in our future.72
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Studies, the influential Jesuit journal, devoted a whole issue in spring 1955 to ’Ireland 
Tomorrow’. The editor, who had made ’no attempt to tailor the essays to a rigid, 
preconceived pattern’, found it ’all the more remarkable, therefore, to discover the 
common undertone running through these pages: the plea for a more creative 
outlook’.73 This was just one example of discontent running through the various 
political journals. The Leader, under the editorship of UCD historian T.D. Williams 
and UCD economist Patrick Lynch, Hibernia, and The Bell, edited by the radical 
socialist Peadar O’Donnell produced provocative and well informed political and 
economic comment. However, The Bell had by 1950 lost most of its political cutting 
edge and was predominantly literary in content by the time of its demise in 1954.74
At official level the degree of worry amongst public servants as to the welfare of the
country was crystallised by the launch in 1953 of the journal Administration,
’designed to give civil servants an outlet to express opinions on professional matters
and eventually to form an institute of public administration’75. In general the senior
civil service at the beginning of the 1950s was ’seriously deficient in its capacity for
abstract thought and somewhat unskilled in the art of public administration except
among purely traditional lines’.76 Yet in 1952 some younger officers in the civil
service had set up the Association of Higher Civil Servants and it was through
Administration that they ’could vent some spleen, as it were’.77 The establishment
of Administration was, as Garret FitzGerald points out,
a remarkably brave venture in those dark days of the early 1950s, 
when uniquely amongst industrialised countries in the dynamic post 
war years, the Irish state, just three decades old, was sunk in the 
economic stagnation and intellectual torpor of that least distinguished 
decade of its history.78
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Early in 1952, what can only be described as an inspired group of civil servants in 
the Department of Local Government at the Custom House, together with colleagues 
from some other departments, established an informal committee to organise meetings 
on issues of public policy. Headed originally by Patrick Doolan, Collector of Customs 
and Excise, its first meetings drew an inordinate response with Tom Barrington 
recalling that on some occasions ’up to five hundred people would turn up’. Doolan, 
according to Barrington, ’was fed up with the way the Association of Higher Civil 
Servants were bellyaching about pay rather than discussing policy making initiatives. 
That was the driving force for him’.79 Eventually this group, which included 
Barrington, Brendan Herlihy and Des Roche, did manage to persuade the association 
to finance the discussion group. Within six months of their first meeting 
Administration appeared, publishing in journal form papers which were read to the 
discussion group as well as other specially commissioned papers.80 Adminstration 
quickly saw its readership rise to 2,000. It received support not only from within the 
civil service but also from local government service. Furthermore academics, 
foremost among them Basil Chubb and Patrick Lynch, involved themselves from the 
start. Whitaker also used the journal as an avenue for his thoughts. His influential 
article ’The Finance Attitude’, in which he still advocated that deflationary measures 
were best for the Irish economy, was published in the Autumn 1954 edition.81 The 
importance of the foundation of Administration was that it showed, in a most 
fundamental way, the restless discontent that there was in parts of the civil service. 
The former civil servants interviewed during the course of this research all maintain 
that there was a sea change in thinking about how the country was performing in the 
early parts of the 1950s and what remedies could be put into place to rectify the
situation amongst some in the civil service. This concern was reflected in pockets of 
influence throughout the country. While Ireland was still isolated from mainland 
Europe and its trading blocs, some senior policy makers were not content to rest on 
their laurels and simply leave events to themselves. For them there was no sense of 
complacency or contentment. Paddy Lynch maintains that while this is true when one 
considers
Whitaker and a few others, yet for the most part too many in the civil 
service took the view that if you wanted economic planning, go ahead 
but we must look after our own departments in the traditional way.
This shows the paucity of thinking in the service, it needed radical 
reform. It simply worked on a day to day basis. There was no long 
term strategic planning or thinking in place.82
Local government was one such department. Dermot Nally, who began his
distinguished civil service career in that department, recalls:
Local government was in a different world to the rest of the 
government departments. It had no influence, did not attempt to have 
any and did not really relate to national policy making to any degree.
We were really in the wilderness in the sense of national policy 
making.83
This position was symptomatic of most government departments. There was little
independent thinking. By the mid 1950s it appeared that if the civil service did not
attempt to reform from within, it would simply become a bureaucratic monster, going
through the motions of government, offering old solutions to new problems, and
extremely reluctant to try anything even remotely tainted with novelty. There were
many within the policy community who believed, however, that the civil service
needed to be drastically reformed. Todd Andrews in 1957 wanted to
divide local government into eight or ten regions, run them by a small 
number of elected representatives plus a manager endowed with the 
same powers as at the present. I would remove from local
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administration some of the functions at present exercised by county 
councils. ... I think we should change our ideas to permit the civil 
service to take a more active part in the affairs of the country than 
they are permitted to do at present. ... Civil servants should be able 
to comment outside their department remit and should be permitted to 
serve on local councils.84
While these may have been radical proposals, and later Andrews stopped advocating 
such developments when he realised that the managers did not want an expansion in 
their role, the more significant point is that there was a body of opinion in public life 
who maintained that a stagnant civil service was serving the country poorly and 
change was urgently needed.85
The Catholic Church and economic policy
The Catholic Church also entered the debate on the country’s economic affairs. Ruth
Barrington maintains that the liberalisation of the Irish intellectual climate of the
1960s was seen in the fact that ’bishops asked for increased state intervention in the
affairs of the community, not less’.86 While this is broadly true, some individuals
within the hierarchy were advocating such a policy years earlier, though they couched
their arguments carefully. William Philbin, Bishop of Clonfert, was one of the first
into the fray when he delivered a lecture entitled ’patriotism’ in August 1957. He
argued that a highly developed national culture would give the world something to
remember the Irish by other than ’our name carved on a tree’:
For such ends we may not neglect economic realities. If our numbers 
diminish much further we shall not have the strength or the interest left 
to develop the spiritual and cultural resources of our people and to 
offer the world evidence of an individuality justifying our struggle for 
independence.87
The equation of the national struggle for independence with the struggle to gain a
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healthy expanding economy was also one that Whitaker himself used when he argued
throughout 1957 and 1958 that without a progressive economy, political independence
would be ’a mere facade’.88 Philbin argued that it was vital to keep national
prosperity abreast of what were rapidly rising living standards in other countries. This
was evidently the only way of
preventing our country of being drained of its most ambitious citizens.
We cannot progress along these lines without the all out effort of all 
our people. There is need for the whole of our patriotic energy. ...
Surely a moral is easily drawn from the fact that our economic 
backwardness is being used more and more as an argument against the 
reintegration of our country. A healthy economy is a presupposition of 
any political progress. To exist at all is more important than the 
political manner of one’s existence. ... Our patriotism needs to realist, 
not escapist, practical not spectacular and romantic. If only a remnant 
of the Irish people is left at home, living on a run-down economy, it 
will matter little how we are governed, we shall be a negligible factor 
in human affairs.89
In this one can see implicit criticism of de Valera’s vision of the pastoral society.
While this vision might have been entirely laudable, in economic terms it had failed
and there were those within the church willing to say that it had failed. A country that
was not succeeding on the economic front had nowhere to go. Yet some within the
clery were enthusiastic followers of de Valera’s Ireland. Father Terence Cosgrove,
parish priest of Kilnamona, county Clare, for instance stressed that
we in the Republic have not fared too badly at all, taking due account 
of all the circumstances. ... May Ireland be eminently successfully in 
her task, may she complete her work at home and may she be as she 
was in the Golden Age of history, an exemplar and a light to
nations.90
Here one can see illustrated two positions within the clergy on Ireland’s economic 
problems. In essence catholic comment on the economic issues came down to a matter 
of individual choice. As Archbishop Joseph Cassidy has pointed out, ’that was just
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the way it was, the hierarchy had no real concrete position on government economic
positions, and would not have been put out by individual priests or bishops making
occasional comments on current events’.91 It is interesting that Christus Rex, which
styled itself as a catholic journal of sociology, opened its pages for critical comment
on the economy to writers of various ilks: one did not necessarily have to be a
member of the clergy to contribute to it. Thus Whitaker’s Economic Development
came under much scrutiny. The anonymous PMcK, for instance, wrote in the July
1959 edition that while Economic Development gave a complete picture of national
economic policy for the immediate future and the diagnosis added up to a ’partial
confession of failure, there may be some misgivings about the future. It does not
seem likely that there will be any lessening of the government grip on our economic
life’.92 Government interference in the economy and in the life of the citizen was
something that had preoccupied the clergy for some considerable time. In April 1952,
William Conway, then Professor of Moral Theology at Maynooth, and later to
become Cardinal and Archbishop of Armagh, offered one of the more balanced
statements of the time when he examined the reasons for the rapid growth of State
power. While he demonstrated that this growth was a response to genuine needs and
was accepted by Catholic social theorists, he did argue that
the growth and power of the State has become so sudden and so rapid 
that men of almost all shades of political and economic thought are 
beginning to wonder whether we have not loosed something which is 
getting out of control.93
Conway did recognise that the State ’had not merely the right but the duty to interfere
in economic affairs when the common good demanded it’, and declared that it was
’no part of the Church’s teachings ... that State intervention is wrong in principle and
therefore to be opposed in all cases’.94 He did insist, however, that the Church was
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right to be watchful and to oppose the government when it felt that it had no other 
option. In essence some in the Catholic Church were prepared to comment 
individually on the economic situation and the role of government but on the whole 
the church formulated no concrete position on economic policy.
The question of state control in the economy raised its head the following year when
Patrick Lynch’s celebrated article ’The Economist and Public Policy’ appeared in
Studies. In this article Lynch made a case for a more positive role for the state. He
attacked the critics of ’intervention’ as ’unhistorical’ and in many ways unrealistic.
He went on to argue:
There may well be methods other than extended state activity of 
solving the economic and social ills associated with high rates of 
emigration. Many people may be satisfied with a stationary population 
and prefer to let emigration continue. If so, well and good, but if not,
it is evident that existing organisation of the Irish agricultural and
manufacturing industries cannot provide work for 25,000 additional 
persons a year. It is not therefore a question of whether the state plans 
or not, but of what kind of planning the state undertakes.95
Lynch then went on to argue that ’intelligent centralized planning’ would achieve a 
better balance in the state capital programme. This was indeed a radical proposal for
a young economist, just out of the civil service and newly appointed at UCD to
espouse and it garnered a hostile reaction from some quarters. The same issue of 
Studies contained four more traditional responses, including two from the clergy. 
Lynch recalls that the editor of Studies, Ronald Burke Savage was quite critical of 
much of the article but had no qualms about publishing as long as some commentators 
could reply in the same issue to the article.96 Lynch had no difficulty with this, but 
his respondents did have a lot of difficulty with his arguments. Edward J. Coyne, S.J.
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Professor of Moral Theology at Milltown Park, for instance, declared that social
perfection ’does not lie in the direction of centralization of economic and social
powers of the state. ... Social perfection in human society is not found in maximising
the positive economic and social functions of the state’. F.C. King criticised Lynch
for not defining the limits of state intervention, claiming that ’on the contrary, he
seems to envisage without dismay the prospect that state intervention and state powers
will continue to extend unchecked’.97 While Lynch’s article spawned quite an
academic debate at the time on the issue of state control and intervention in the
economy, Economic Development, as we have seen, was welcomed on the whole by
the clergy, with Philbin’s ideas in particular mirroring Whitaker’s. As Ronan Fanning
points out Whitaker deliberately quoted Philbin in Economic Development so as to
lessen the possibility of its being damned with pejorative ’socialist’ connotations of
’planning’, hence Whitaker’s preference for ’Economic Programme’ as opposed to
Economic Plan’98 There is little doubt, however, but that Whitaker and Philbin were
of like mind. Christus Rex also saw an important contribution on economic affairs
from Labhras O’Nuaillain, an economist from University College, Galway, who in
April 1958 maintained that
the prospect of a substantial expansion of industry based on Irish 
private enterprise alone does not appear to be very bright for some 
time to come. In many parts of the country, the people with capital 
have no enterprise; the people of enterprise, in many cases have no 
capital, and a good many enterprising young people have left the 
country altogether. The introduction of foreign capital and foreign 
technicians is not a thing to be deplored, but to be welcomed, 
especially when they bring new skills and industries with a large male 
labour content.99
Bringing in foreign expertise was one of the fundamental tenets of the new economic 
strategy Whitaker was planning for the Irish economy. Moreover for O’Nuaillain, ’a
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long term comprehensive programme of planned development is imperative if we are
ever to remedy the basic structural defects in our economy’.100 When these lines
were written, Whitaker, and his team, were in the throes of completing Economic
Development and it does seem remarkable that within public commentary, there was,
to an extent, a convergence of minds on the solutions required to boost the Irish
economy. O ’Nuaillain argued that the conventional notions, and lines of approach
adopted in the formulation of national economic policy since the foundation of the
state would ’have to be cast aside before this State will be firmly on the road to
rehabilitation’. He continued:
One of such notions that must be abandoned is that the sole repository 
of wisdom lies in the headquarters of State Departments. There are 
sections of the community, in the Professions, in the Trade Unions, in 
Industry and Commerce, in Agriculture and in the Universities, able 
and willing to give objective and competent advice and views on the 
essentials for views in a programme of national rehabilitation.. The 
Government that seeks out the advice and support of such people and 
learns to canalise that reservoir of national pride and self respect so far 
untapped, will be the Government, no matter its composition, that will 
set this nation on the road to national prosperity.101
While there is no evidence that anyone engaged in national policy making was
influenced by this article and the argument contained within it, it is interesting to note
that O’Nuaillain’s hypothesis calling for development of corporatist style relationships
between the economic interest groups and government was, to a degree, taken on
board in the years after the publication of Economic Development when the various
professional bodies were consulted during the making of national policy as the
government put in place a conscious political structure which did integrate the
organised socio-economic producing groups through a system of representation and
co-operative mutual interaction.
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In addition, the whole question of the role of the civil service implicitly raised in this 
article was one that was receiving more attention by the late 1950s. A job in the civil 
service in the Ireland of the 1940s and 1950s was considered to be a plum position 
in society. Of those civil servants interviewed in the course of this study, Whitaker, 
Nagle, Barrington, Lynch, Cromien and O’Cearbhaill all entered the civil service out 
of monetary considerations, with the phrase ’I needed a job’ cropping up 
continually .102 Todd Andrews in 1957 maintained that it would be better for the 
country if those individuals who entered the civil service out of such considerations 
went into industry instead and argued that they would if national industrial 
development proceeded at a rapid rate.103 Moreover a number of years earlier, a 
parliamentary party meeting of Fianna Fail adopted a motion calling on the Minister 
for Finance ’to take immediate steps to effect a gradual reduction in the number of 
civil servants so as to bring them into line with what the country can afford’. 
MacEntee, as Minister at the time, responded by explaining that ’a special effort was 
being made to effect such a reduction’.104 In essence the argument about the civil 
service mirrored the debate about interacting with the economic interest groups in that 
both were a part of a re-examination of the way government conducted its business 
in the period.
The appointment of T.K. Whitaker and the new ’Finance’
The appointment of Whitaker as secretary of Finance in 1956 is normally considered 
to be a radical departure for the civil service, in the sense that traditional hierarchical 
expectations were ignored. As Lynch points out, ’Sarsfield Hogan who was scheduled 
to succeed Owen Redmond was very able, but from a different generation, in many
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ways it would have been a tragedy had he been appointed’.105 More fundamentally 
Whitaker himself came to the post with different expectations and with an intellectual 
development distinct from many of his predecessors or colleagues.106 His challenge 
would be to take his senior colleagues with him in moving the Irish economy ’out of 
the desert and into the promised land’.107 He realised, however, that this land would 
have social and political, as well as, economic implications. It was within this 
context, and under Whitaker’s impetus that the Irish government looked to Europe for 
a way out of the economic morass that the country found itself in.
For the most part policy makers reflected public opinion until the second half of the 
1950s. A conservative policy making consensus existed, which continued to support 
the dominance of agriculture as the primary focus for economic policy. Industry 
retained a secondary, if significant, place in this structure, though it possessed little 
influence because of its size and lack of political weight. Lemass had fought a losing 
battle against MacEntee and Finance in the 1951-54 Fianna Fail government. His 
reappointment to Industry and Commerce in 1957, and more importantly MacEntee’s 
demotion from Finance to Health, is usually seen as the moment where he finally 
gained the upper hand in his battles with Finance. Finance had historically been 
associated with a conservative viewpoint of fiscal and monetary policy, and ministers 
usually followed the traditional classical economic line advocated by McElligott. Sean 
Cromien has spoken of how imposing a figure McElligott was within the department: 
’he basically ran, with Brennan, financial policy in the state for close on thirty 
years’.108 McElligott, and Finance in general, considered the economic link with 
Britain and the emphasis on agriculture to be of paramount importance in maintaining
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economic equilibrium. Their criticism of protectionism was more a concern with the 
balance of payments situation than an advocacy of an expansionary industrial policy. 
Yet with the arrival of Whitaker to the helm, Finance, notwithstanding its historical 
cautiousness in economic policy, had changed decisively. By the turn of the decade 
it was the department that did most of the intellectual thinking within the civil service 
and it was the department that administratively would lead Ireland on a new path. 
Finance, under Whitaker, continued to oppose protectionism, but from a more 
dynamic viewpoint than previous. It was Industry and Commerce which would come 
to support, albeit reluctantly, free trade.
Altruism in the country: the case of the EDC
Notwithstanding the criticisms of Irish industry running through Professor Lee’s
writings, there were some signs of unrest in business circles at the country’s
economic weakness.109 By late 1956 a small group of businessmen and professionals
who had been influenced by the development in Lemass’s economic ideas were
contemplating getting together in a concerted attempt to improve the country’s
industrial and economic performance. As Joseph McCullough maintains:
we were all greatly influenced by Lemass who was a gruff man, but 
who really inspired people to do things. He was all for, in a matter of 
fact way, of getting rid of all the obstacles, grabbing things by the 
scruff of the neck. We have to do it, let’s get on with it, that was his 
attitude’.110
Spearheaded by a group of engineers consisting of Joseph McCullough, Padraic 
O’Halpin, A1 Kelly, James Myler, and an architect David Keane, this little circle had 
what one member has described as ’fire in their bellies’ to rid Ireland of the scourge 
of emigration and mass unemployment.111 Their idea was a simple one. They would
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analyse the import and export statistics in the hope of identifying those imports which
could be replaced by home made goods. O’Halpin and McCullough were members
of the Institute of Engineers of Ireland [HE] and were trying to influence policy
mainly to show that Ireland needed more engineers in order to have more industry.
Thus they set out, originally on an ad hoc basis, to try to develop indigenous
industry. In essence they wanted to see that plant which was normally imported would
be made in Ireland. As Kelly has pointed out:
when I joined the ESB in 1947, not a single solitary thing used was 
made in Ireland. My job was to get things imported, but I knew these 
things could be made in Ireland, I was insisting that they should be 
made in Ireland having seen that it could be made in Ireland. Basically 
it was not a policy decision but truly altruism.112
Out of this dynamic positive and normative mentality a national economic advisory 
group of HE was set up in October 1956 to ’advise central council on any action or 
policy which might be appropriate in the present period of national economic 
difficulty’.113 Out of their subsequent report and the developing economic situation 
was born the Engineering Development Council [EDC]. O’Halpin, described as the 
driving force behind this group, believed that the time was right for an industrial 
initiative whatever the party in power. Although all who were initially involved in the 
EDC were personal supporters of Lemass, not all were members of Fianna Fail.114 
Joseph McCullough, for instance, son of the revolutionary leader Denis McCullough, 
came from an anti Fianna Fail home.
O ’Halpin succinctly summed up the frustration that his generation felt over such 
economic problems:
In most old countries, the ability to influence policy lies mainly with
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hereditary aristocracy, from their mutual friendships, or in the hands 
of the wealthy, or in powerful trades unions. We have few, or even 
none, of these forces. Power here lies with hereditary politicians and 
with the Church. Neither of these is immediately concerned with 
economic disturbance, so that no great energy is released by these 
disturbances.115
He felt that while they could do little with the church, there was something that they 
could do with politicians. O’Halpin, a Fianna Fail organiser, was close to Lemass and 
believed that more could be done by the state to increase prosperity for the people. 
His generation was different from previous ones: ’in particular our concern for the 
country has less nationalism and more regard for people. We are not upheld, as they 
were, by the belief that social progress would quickly follow on political freedom’. 
Certain people on the National Executive of Fianna Fail had approached O’Halpin in 
1956 to propose a motion that its annual Ard Fheis demand a policy statement on 
economic issues. With Fianna Fail in opposition this item was probably the most 
important on the agenda as economic issues were dominating the political sphere at 
this time. Yet de Valera spent half of his presidential address rebutting such inferred 
criticism. It was no secret, O’Halpin claimed, that ’many on the National Executive 
felt the need for a less traditional approach’. While this demand was resisted by the 
National Executive, with O’Halpin blaming ’strong personalities’, presumably 
MacEntee, the economic resolution was carried by the Ard Fheis after a recount.116
In early 1957 Lemass and O’Halpin entered into correspondence on the possibility of 
making the machinery and equipment requirements of local public authorities, the 
Board of Works, the CIE, the ESB and Bord na Mona the basis of an engineering 
industry on a larger scale than had hitherto been achieved. The trouble was, however,
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that these authorities had always been inclined to oppose such developments,
preferring a situation where they could buy freely in competitive markets according
to their own requirements, and to avail without constraint of all new developments.
To ensure their participation, argued Lemass, would mean introducing a centralised
control which it would not be easy to make effective. He was, however, convinced
that in regard to future industrial expansion,
we must start thinking in terms of attracting into this country large 
external firms to locate export factories here, and frame our tax and 
other laws to encourage and facilitate this result. I cannot say the effort 
will succeed but I would prefer to make it before planning state 
activity in the industrial field.117
Throughout 1957 O’Halpin as a member of the economic advisory group of the IIE 
engaged in discussion with Lemass and with the Department of Industry and 
Commerce once Fianna Fail were back in office about the possibility of setting up a 
commission to enquire into the mechanical engineering industry in order to make it 
more profitable and to create more jobs in this sector. What they ultimately had in 
mind was creating a design authority for promoting mechanical equipment that was 
being imported by or on behalf of state organisations. Discord, however, entered into 
the discussions when the IIE group felt that they were being stalled by the 
department:
We feel that a prima facie case has been set up in our documents for 
your intervention in this situation by a commission or other 
authoritative agency. If our views have failed in main argument or in 
entire conception or by your decision to resolve the situation in another 
way we had hoped to be informed. ... It seems to the group that the 
impetus for Governmental decision in general may arise out of 
combinations of circumstances that we are not likely to affect and 
which are not caused by approaches such as ours.118
O’Halpin felt that if their document had failed in arousing active interest and
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corresponding effort it would be a mere luxury on their part to reinforce that failure.
For his part Lemass believed that the Dundalk Engineering Works, a new company
which had taken over the Great National Railway engineering shops at Dundalk, was
involved in the activities that O’Halpin’s group were suggesting:
the examination of the practicability of manufacture, complete or 
partial, and of the possibilities of standardisation is in progress in what 
is, in my view, the best possible way in so far as it is being 
undertaken by those who have the ultimate responsibility of making 
good on any conclusions they may reach as to what is feasible.119
In these circumstances Lemass did not think that there was anything much more to 
be gained by the setting up of a committee as O’Halpin had suggested. Far from 
being put off, however, this group continued their efforts and eventually set up the 
EDC which consisted of employers, trade unions and technologists. They claimed a 
dramatic effect on employment and were responsible for getting a number of 
industries firmly established. Among these were J&L McLoughlin Steel 
Manufacturers, Murphy Brothers and Thompsons of Carlow, both of whom were also 
involved in the mechanical engineering industry.120 This group had the support of 
a number of influential public figures. Todd Andrews, the distinguished public servant 
told a symposium of Cumann na n-Innealtoiri, early in 1958, that ’it was their 
function to undertake advisory work of getting capital for engineers to go into 
business’.121 While the engineers may have achieved a good deal, Irish society had 
to itself undergo a psychological change to show itself that it was capable of 
competing with its competitors abroad. For Andrews, who was appointed chairman 
of CIE in September 1958, the problem was in convincing both industrialists and 
public servants that this could be done. He told a meeting of Tuairim in 1960:
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we will beg, borrow or buy advice and information from any country, 
if it is to our advantage, but in the heel of the hunt we must rely on 
our own strong right arm and our native abilities which are quite 
strong. Our watchword for CIE, as indeed for all our national efforts, 
must be confidence, again confidence, always confidence. We must 
have absolute self assurance. That self assurance is the key to our
future success and progress. It seems to me that our people have an
extraordinarily high measure of ability but we frequently lack the 
audacity to rely on our judgements and act upon them.122
This lack of self confidence was something that Whitaker was implicitly trying to 
bring to the fore within the pages of Economic Development. As Patrick Lynch 
maintains: ’if Economic Development did nothing else it at least gave people in the 
country a belief that something was about to be done about the pretty dire economic 
situation’.123 Yet Economic Development did not impinge on the consciousness of 
the body politic immediately. The major newspapers gave it only cursory treatment 
while the political parties showed a similar lack of interest. The Fianna Fail 
parliamentary party minutes of the period are fascinating for their discussion, or 
rather lack of it, of Economic Development. In its first discussion of the document 
it was recorded that ’the Party be given a directive on the implications of the recent 
White Paper on Economic Expansion’. Ryan gave this meeting, at which Lemass was 
not present, a general resume of the contents of the paper which was then followed
by the rather bizarre spectacle of a discussion ’in which arterial drainage and of
certain very necessary drainage schemes was stressed by several members’.124 A 
planned session devoted to the White Paper on 6 January was deferred to 28 January, 
when Lemass ’explained that the proposals in the White Paper were to be regarded 
as an outline of minimum requirements for the future and do not exclude further 
proposals’.125 The agricultural effects of Economic Development were not 
discussed until March. While this seems to have occupied the party somewhat more
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as the debate ran into April, the minutes of these discussions are even more sparse 
than usual although they state that the debate continued with contributions from 
various deputies.126 It would appear that few politicians, whether in Fianna Fail, as 
the evidence suggests, or elsewhere were greatly struck by the attempt to 
revolutionize national economic policy making.
A new consensus
Notwithstanding the fact that the political parties were having trouble rousing
themselves over economic issues at the national level, there is evidence of an
emerging consensus on economic policy by 1958. Garret FitzGerald, writing the same
year, noted that Economic Development emerged from a crisis of national self
confidence which was provoked by the economic difficulties of 1956-57. He added:
it seems scarcely probable that the authors whether politicians, civil 
servants, businessmen or economists would have felt able, or, in other 
cases, have been given the opportunity to put forward such radical 
reappraisals of traditional national policies, had this psychological 
crisis not taken place.127
This reinforces Whitaker’s view that the years 1955-56 had plumbed the depths of 
hopelessness with the balance of payments crises overcome only at the cost of 
stagnation, high unemployment and emigration.128 In such a situation a broad 
consensus of interested parties was needed in order to facilitate a new departure in 
economic policy which would transcend party politics. As FitzGerald comments, if 
the First Programme for Economic Expansion had been launched without reference 
to the document on which it was based, Economic Development, there was a danger 
that it might not have received the bipartisan treatment that was necessary if it was 
to provide an agreed basis for the development of the Irish economy.129
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Economic Development, completed in May 1958, became the basis for the White
Paper published on 12 November 1958. The fact that Economic Development itself
was published on 22 November is significant. By publishing it after the publication
of the Programme itself, the government made it clear that the Programme was not,
and was not claimed to be, a policy prepared by Fianna Fail. Rather it was a national
policy programme prepared by the head of the civil service. This had the desired
effect, and the Programme was accepted as a type of national plan. Its most critical
feature was its premise to shift from protection towards free trade and from
discouragement to encouragement of foreign investment in Ireland. This, as Lee
points out, involved a dramatic reversal of the rhetoric, and to a large extent of the
practice of all policy, but especially Fianna Fail policy, since 1932.130 Whitaker
argued that the government should encourage industries which would be competitive
in world markets and provide a continuing source of employment at home:
we can no longer rely for industrial development on extensive tariff 
and quota protection. Foreign industrialists will bring skills and 
techniques we need, and continuous and widespread publicity abroad 
is essential to attract them. If foreign industrial investment does not 
rapidly increase, a more radical removal of statutory restrictions on 
such investments should take place.131
The main theme of both documents, as David O’Mahony pointed out at the time, was 
that ’an increase in investment and an expansion in demand - coming from agriculture 
- will set in motion a general expansion in the national product’.132 In companion 
with this was the aim of attracting foreign industry. Whitaker outlined two ways to 
attract foreign corporations: removing restrictions and giving incentives for foreign 
firms to establish bases in Ireland. The Control of Manufactures Acts were amended 
and a series of proposals intended to attract outside investors to Ireland were
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recommended. He proposed that the IDA should expand its staff, particularly in
North America, in an intensification of its efforts to attract foreign capital. He further
proposed increasing the capital available for outright industrial grants. This was a
point echoed by Todd Andrews:
I cannot see any quick way, or indeed any way of providing these 
20,000 jobs out of our own resources; the capital must be brought in 
from outside. ... I do not think that we have enough trained people 
technically and commercially to enable us to spend £100 million per 
annum. We must try to induce established industries to set themselves 
up in the country.133
Andrews had in mind such novel proposals as setting up casinos in the country. He
was particularly worried about the poor state of Irish tourism and claimed that only
one new hotel had been founded since the foundation of the state. Moreover some
commentators were insisting that
the need to maintain some margin of tax advantage over more 
developed countries in north-western Europe seems evident, if we are 
to attract foreign investment and foreign enterprise, for even if it can 
be argued with some reason that the level of taxation may not, perhaps 
have such a significant effect upon domestic investment as is 
sometimes suggested, it is clearly of paramount importance where 
foreign investors are concerned.134
An essential element in this new approach to economic policy was a redressing of the 
balance between economic and social investment in the public capital programme.135 
This programme would gain support from a rising level of domestic savings, based 
on steady growth in real national income, and domestic savings could be 
supplemented by reasonable recourse to foreign borrowing to promote productive 
home investment. Thus a decision was taken to accelerate Ireland’s economic progress 
through an inflow of external capital directed to types of development which would
99
increase the country’s productive capacity and which would bring with it new 
techniques and methods. Economic policy thus became more expansionary, an 
appropriate Keynesian response according to Whitaker, at a time when Irish costs 
were competitive and world trade was buoyant.136
While there were some significant differences between Economic Development and 
the Programme for Economic Expansion, which arose out of their different parentage, 
such differences were for the most past cosmetic as the main thrust of both documents 
was the same. Where Whitaker had argued for intensive cattle production as the 
foundation of agricultural prosperity, the White Paper did not want to abandon 
completely Fianna Fail’s traditional preference for tillage. Whitaker’s proposal to 
locate new factories in large urban centres was omitted from the White Paper owing 
to Fianna Fail’s policy of decentralisation of industry, despite Lemass’s own doubts 
about his party’s line. While the political document did advance a firm commitment 
to a 2 per cent annual growth in Gross National Product over each of the ensuing five 
years, Economic Development was, in time honoured civil service fashion, suitably 
vague about targets. Yet on the whole the two documents were remarkably 
similar.137
Originally, indigenous Irish industry split over the new incentives to industry that had 
begun with the inter-party government and had been continued in 1957 by Fianna 
Fail. Just after the general election the FIM held their annual conference and their 
president proclaimed: ’the Irish industrialist is disappointed that he finds himself no 
nearer to expanding his export business whilst the newcomer, either from within or
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without the country, can now enter the field with financial benefits and taxation
remissions which are denied to the pioneer’.138 Irish Industry, the journal of the
FIM and an ardent advocate of nationally owned industry, put the case for local
industry when it wrote:
Today our Irish government is favouring the foreign investor more 
than ever before. Huge free grants of the Irish people’s money are 
being given to those coming in here to establish industries, a good 
portion of such free grants being from moneys received in taxation 
from Irish manufacturers.139
This, however, was not a unanimous view.
Finance versus Industry and Commerce: Opposing views
The main impetus to change the way manufacturing industry conducted itself came 
from the Department of Finance. The formation of the EEC in 1957 and the reaction 
of non OECD members to it was one of the major factors which gave rise to 
Economic Development.140 After the publication of Economic Development and the 
First Programme for Economic Expansion. Whitaker went on the offensive against 
protection and its supporters within the civil service. In December 1959 he issued a 
memorandum entitled ’Reasons for Reducing Protection’. Its first line came straight 
to the point, declaring: ’The inadequacy of a policy of protection as a remedy for the 
problems of unemployment and emigration has become obvious in recent years with 
the increasing saturation of the limited home market’.141 The average number 
engaged in manufacturing industry had increased by only 2,000 between 1951 and 
1958. Finance thus argued that it was only through enlarging its sales on export 
markets that Irish industry could in future provide jobs in increasing numbers for 
those who sought a livelihood in Ireland. For this to happen a steady increase in
101
exports would be needed to support greater internal activity and the higher 
expenditure on imports which would have to coincide with a general improvement in 
employment and living standards. It was recognised by all sides that external 
purchasers would not turn increasingly towards Irish products unless these products 
were fully competitive in price and quality. By the end of the 1950s only a few Irish 
industrial products would have passed this test.142 By contrast most of the other 
countries of Western Europe already had large and efficient industrial sectors. 
Furthermore between 1949 and 1958 the volume of Irish industrial production went 
up by only 23 per cent whereas in OEEC countries taken as a whole the increase was 
73 per cent.143 Thus to Finance it was obvious that the country could not hope to 
share in the economic advance of Europe if it were merely to try to safeguard the 
industrial status quo. They argued, therefore, for a determined drive to increase 
efficiency and lower unit costs to enlarge sales in export markets against what was 
growing competition. The non-competitiveness of many Irish industries was related 
to the smallness of the home market, the inadequate utilisation of productive capacity 
and the lack of opportunities for economies of scale and specialisation. The only 
remedy to these deficiencies was to bring about an expansion of effective demand for 
the products of Irish industry. Finance saw two ways in which this could be achieved: 
firstly by attracting external purchasers through the offer of high quality goods at 
competitive prices and secondly by raising real incomes and purchasing power in the 
non-industrial sector of the economy as was the aim of policy in relation to 
agricultural exports and tourism. In essence progress under the first option depended 
on raising productivity. This, however, would be greatly increased by success under 
the second. The need for urgent action to bring down the cost and improve the quality
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of Irish manufactures was made all the greater by the emergence of two distinct
trading blocs in Europe. Competition in export markets would undoubtedly grow as
the major countries of Europe, through tariff reductions and freer trade, achieved
greater specialisation, higher output and lower costs. Ultimately the high protective
tariffs associated with Irish industry reinforced the non-competitiveness of Irish
manufactures. In the case of the vast bulk of protected industries, exports formed only
a small proportion of output:
the scale of protection is such that in many industries there is no 
effective competition at present. There are over 400 protective tariff 
references and of these over 100 provide for tariffs of more than 50 
per cent ad valorem (full) or 33 1/3 per cent (preferential). A 
gradually increasing element of competition on the home market would 
be a much more general and effective spur to improvements in 
efficiency than special aids and incentives to which only the 
progressive undertakings will respond. As long as high protection is 
maintained there will be no compulsion to get into shape for export 
markets. Sheltered against the normal consequences of inertia, 
unprogressive managements can use the high protection they enjoy to 
make inefficiency profitable.144
The aim of Finance was gradually to lower protection in the context of an agricultural 
exports arrangement which would increase purchasing power on the home market. 
Tariffs, Whitaker claimed, were justifiable economically only as a temporary help for 
’infant industries’, while he maintained that a growing number of countries were 
formally recognising, by their participation in common markets and free trade areas, 
the mutual benefits to be derived from freer trade.
The FII had recognised that fundamental changes in Irish economic policies were 
necessary and imminent and would involve progressive reduction of protection for 
Irish industries, leading eventually to free trade conditions. Its National Council
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issued a pamphlet entitled ’European Free Trade and the Prospects for Irish Industry’ 
in which it argued that Irish industry was sufficiently strong and adaptable enough to 
meet the situation and could develop and prosper ’provided that action is taken in 
time by individual firms and by industries and that the co-operation and assistance of 
the government was forthcoming’.145 While the FII appeared confident, there was 
no guarantee that individual firms would make the effort required to make a success 
of free trade. This document represented a sea change in the attitude of the FII to 
protectionism. Up to the late 1950s the FII were ardent supporters of protectionism, 
yet now they realised that new trading conditions meant new attitudes would have to 
be adopted. This new attitude in the FII was crystallised by the coming to power in 
the organisation of a younger breed of industrialists who believed that Irish industry 
could survive and flourish without protectionism if they were given the vigorous 
support of government. Charles Murray maintains that the country was fortunate that 
the leadership of the FII was changing around the time that Finance were 
contemplating abandoning protectionism and entering a European trading bloc. He 
claims that it would not be unfair to say that the FII were completely negative up to 
that stage in their perceptions of free trade.146 Whitaker argued that with the support 
of the FII, state aid in the transitional period when the ’sheltering screen’ of 
protection was being gradually lowered could take the form of loan capital on 
reasonable terms, technical assistance grants and other such incentives. This would 
be made available to assist in the process of adaptation and modernisation of industry. 
Ultimately Finance wanted to be associated with some form of economic trading 
group which would enable the country to share more certainly in the economic 
advance of countries more favoured than Ireland’s:
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a closer degree of association with the international economy, through 
reduced protection and participation in a free trade arrangement, would 
help to compensate for the narrowness of the domestic market, more 
especially if it also promised a surer and better market for agricultural 
exports. It is only by gearing ourselves for a growing trade with the 
rest of the world that we can tackle, with real prospect of success, the 
problems of unemployment and emigration.147
Whitaker’s memorandum sent a shock wave through some sections of the civil service 
with Industry and Commerce particularly aghast. J.C.B. MacCarthy, its secretary, 
replied tersely that he could not accept the views set out in the memorandum as 
anything other than a somewhat idealistic approach which was not backed by anything 
more than faith in the operation of the economic laws that were expounded, namely 
free trade:
the harsh realities of the situation are that we have our industries, with 
many thousands of people employed in them, and we cannot really 
afford to use them as guinea-pigs. You say protectionism is only for 
’infant’ industries but ours are not yet out of their teens and still need 
a measure of paternalism. It is well to remember that if the war years 
and their immediate aftermath are excluded, as they ought to be, our 
industries have not had much more than a decade of protection. Even 
the adult industries of the great industrial nations need and get 
protection.148
In essence Industry and Commerce were warning about the dangers of Irish industries 
being involuntarily led from Whitaker’s advocacy of the discipline of tariff reductions 
to advocacy of complete free trade. MacCarthy claimed that this might be an easy 
transition to make in the abstract but would be an entirely different thing in practice. 
He did concede that industries could be subjected to well thought out, prudent cuts 
in protection as an incentive to efficiency but these would have to be made very 
carefully and ’on a basis that would not leave us without the power speedily to 
reverse engines as and when experience dictated’. He finished his reply by saying that
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he hoped Whitaker would have a chance of ’tempering economic theory to the facts 
of our industrial life’ before they next met, while adding that he hoped that 
Whitaker’s memorandum was intended to be provocative rather than doctrinaire.149
Whitaker was enraged. He accused MacCarthy of forcing him to accept either one of
two denigratory epithets, provocative or doctrinaire. He claimed that his original
document contained the essence of realism and was not, as MacCarthy had insinuated,
an advocacy of complete free trade. Whitaker’s paper basically advocated a
progressive discipline of tariff reductions with the right to arrest the process where
any major industry came under dangerous stress. Clearly stung by MacCarthy’s
riposte, he responded with his own denigratory epithet:
We both of us know people who are more Catholic than the Pope; 
should Industry and Commerce not guard against becoming more 
protectionist than the Federation of Irish Industries. ... I am personally 
convinced that the issue is not one of economic theory but one that 
bears directly on our hopes of future economic development’.150
The FII had always been the most protectionist of organisations and by comparing 
Industry and Commerce to them Whitaker was undoubtedly giving the impression that 
Industry and Commerce was some sort of administrative dinosaur harking for a 
bygone age. MacCarthy swiftly responded. In what can be seen as perhaps a softening 
of the hard edged tone that had been adopted by both men, he addressed ’Dear Ken’, 
instead of the customary ’Dear Whitaker’. Whether this was because it was Christmas 
Eve is not clear, because there can be little doubt that Whitaker’s jibe about the FII 
had annoyed MacCarthy. He asserted that it was his duty to point out the pitfalls that 
lay ahead in free trade conditions for industry and said that there was a tendency to
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underestimate these risks, whilst adding:
I am sure that you would not wish to be unfair in any comment but I 
do think that the third paragraph of your letter of the 23rd December 
hits a little below the belt. After all, it is the Government and not the 
Federation of Irish Industries that has to take the decision.
While this may indeed have been true, MacCarthy went on to reiterate the old
Industry and Commerce position that protectionism had served Ireland well.
Ultimately their debate came down to the future direction of the Irish economy.
Where Whitaker stressed the point that industrialisation, under protection, had not
solved the unemployment problem and that the continuation of the policy of
industrialisation under protection would not provide the expansion the country
required, MacCarthy preferred to take the view that
as far as employment is concerned, if we had not had the protective 
policy and, even if it is not a cure for all our ills, is it logical to toss 
it overboard, unless it is clear that something better can be substituted 
which will not only maintain employment at the existing level but give 
the scope for expansion which is desired? All I am seeking is to get 
the alternatives clearly stated so that a considered choice can be 
recommended.151
There was nothing in MacCarthy’s remarks that could give any solace to the
thousands who had emigrated throughout the decade and those left without jobs as it
closed. Protectionism had clearly failed them. Yet MacCarthy was insisting that it
remain. His pessimism can be contrasted with the optimism of someone like Todd
Andrews, who was asking the country to leave the dark days of the past behind it and
begin afresh. As he told one audience:
I ask you to disabuse your minds of the pessimism so terribly 
expressed by Patrick Kavanagh: "It will never be spring always 
autumn, after a harvest always lost, When Drake was winning seas for 
England, we sailed in puddles of the past, seeking the ghost of 
Brendan’s mast".152
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Whitaker, however, was not seeking the complete abandonment of protection. For 
him the problem was that protected manufacture for the home market offered little 
prospect of increased employment, and in a highly competitive world, continued 
protection could not guarantee the maintenance of existing employment at acceptable 
real wages. Thus if employment opportunities were to be created for the fresh 
thousands who sought work every year, industry had quickly to become more 
efficient so that its products could be sold on an increasing scale in export markets. 
This could be achieved by accepting an external commitment to reducing tariffs, 
accompanied by appropriate industrial incentives and aids towards industrial 
adaptation and modernisation.
Whitaker advanced these arguments to MacCarthy in his reply, but also attempted to
launch a new line of attack. The Christmas spirit had not quelled his sharp instincts.
He declared that it was over a decade since Industry and Commerce had felt it
necessary to seek to establish the Industrial Efficiency Bureau to ’force the pace of
progress in industrial efficiency’. While this legislation had not been proceeded with,
responsibility for making periodic reviews of existing tariffs was subsequently
imposed on the IDA. Whitaker argued that these reviews had been infrequent with
very few tariffs being reduced:
There can be no doubt that an externally-applied discipline, provided 
it is not too severe, will arouse less opposition, appear less 
discriminatory, and be more effective than a system operated entirely 
at the discretion of the domestic administration. The best way to get 
costs down to competitive levels is to face industrialists with the 
certainty that tariffs are going to be lowered. In their present mood 
and in an external trade relationship, I believe they will accept this 
pressure and react favourably to it.153
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While this may indeed have been true, the reference to the IDA was bound to upset
MacCarthy. Whitaker has been described as an individual who was not easily
offended, yet he did tend to get ’very crusty’ about people criticising the whole
impetus of free trade.154 MacCarthy, like Lemass originally, had opposed the setting
up of the IDA and had always held a suspicion that the IDA were in some way trying
to preempt the work of Industry and Commerce. In any event he did not take kindly
to Whitaker’s remark. Declaring that he could never agree that the introduction of
an externally-applied discipline of tariff reductions would be sufficient justification
in itself for entering a free trade association, he took Whitaker to task for arguing that
there was a possibility of the country being left ’stranded on a high and narrow
protectionist plateau on which acceptable living standards could be provided only
temporarily and for a diminishing number of our people’:155
It is at least equally important ... that we should not so minimise the 
risks of ’Free Trade’ as to obscure the possibility that the plateau or 
whatever replaces it would be occupied by a diminished number of our 
people even though their living standards, because there were fewer of 
them, might be enhanced. We must remember that ... increased 
emigration would, in our circumstances, be an almost inevitable 
consequence of reduction of industrial employment.156
Whitaker’s comment was in a letter to Con Cremin secretary of External Affairs 
which was seconded to Industry and Commerce, Agriculture and the Taoiseach’s 
office. The Whitaker to MacCarthy correspondence were also seconded to the other 
main departments and would in fact have been seen by Lemass.157 Cremin had 
responded to Whitaker’s original memorandum in a positive mode but did have some 
significant objections. Yet it is noteworthy that he could validate criticisms of 
Whitaker’s document without starting a major administrative row as was the case with 
the MacCarthy - Whitaker correspondence. Cremin was particularly worried about
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the possibility of a setback in industrial production as a result of the reduction of 
protection and a consequential outflow of redundant manpower. He did, however, 
maintain that
a good case appears to be made for modifying our protection policy 
and for bringing to bear an international commitment. It is a question, 
however, whether there is not a tendency to discount, on the basis of 
abstract reasoning which may not be entirely applicable in practice, the 
possible adverse effects of the removal of protection. It could be 
contended that, in the economic field, the circumstances prevailing are 
in some ways so unusual as to weaken, or at least introduce serious 
qualifications to, otherwise sound theoretical conclusions even when 
they can be supported by evidence elsewhere.158
Whitaker responded to Cremin’s comments by stating that he did not think that
the force of our reasoning is lessened by describing it as "abstract" or 
by referring to our conclusions as "theoretical". I have yet to see any 
convincing argument, on practical or theoretical grounds, for the 
opposite thesis, i.e. that the maintenance of a policy of high protection 
will raise employment and living standards and reduce emigration.159
Commenting on Cremin’s reservations of a set back in industrial production and
employment, Whitaker contended:
You give no grounds for making such an extreme assumption. Even 
if it were true - and I do not think it is - would it be an argument for 
being satisfied with the status quo? I have given ... what I regard as 
sound reasons for the view that continuance of a high protection policy 
offers no prospect of increased industrial output and employment; 
rather does it promise a virtually uncurbed flow of emigration. ... I 
strongly suggest that we can be over - timid about the scaling down of 
protection having regard to the urgent and vital need to increase our 
competitiveness in the export field. ... I have made my points rather 
vigorously in this note but I am sure that you will not mind since our 
joint aim is to reach the right conclusion and this can best be achieved 
by the cut and thrust of argument.160
While it was between Whitaker and MacCarthy that the cut and thrust of debate about
protectionism was at its fiercest, Cremin’s involvement can be seen as descending
from the days when Frederick Boland was intimately involved with Marshall aid.
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Cremin also played an active role in the government’s application to join the EEC in 
1961.
MacCarthy’s response to the original memorandum did not impress Whitaker.
Whitaker had three points that he wanted MacCarthy to address if, as MacCarthy kept
implying, there were no worthwhile prospects for the expansion of industrial exports
to a European free trading area. He pressed MacCarthy as to whether his pessimism
was due to the non-competitive character of most of Irish industrial production; how
it was proposed to overcome this, if the discipline of gradual tariff reduction was not
applied; and what grounds were there for expecting even that existing industrial
output and employment could be maintained, never mind expanded, unless industry
was somehow made to become more efficient in the near future. Whitaker clearly had
no intention of giving up his attempts of swaying MacCarthy to a free trade position:
’despite your rather forbidding reiteration of "I could never agree", I have not
abandoned the hope of persuading you to see matters from a dynamic rather than a
static viewpoint’.161 MacCarthy, however, was not in the business of seeing things
from a dynamic viewpoint. Industry and Commerce under his leadership had by the
late 1950s become a ’department of disillusionment, without any backbone and not
intellectually well endowed’. A former official of the department has described the
correspondence between Whitaker and MacCarthy in the following terms:
Industry and Commerce did not have any faith in what they were 
doing anyway. They were only going through the motions of putting 
up this resistance but it was easier for them to do that. MacCarthy had 
lost faith in the protectionist mindset. He was a very able man ... yet 
he would go with the tide. He adopted the institutional position in that 
correspondence defending the traditional departmental view. ... The 
problem with Industry and Commerce was that the start of everything 
was a view expressed by the Minister.162
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The power exercised by Lemass in cabinet would seem to have had a detrimental
influence on his officials in Industry and Commerce in that they did not really have
to do any independent thinking. All the people interviewed during the course of this
research have put on record the view that Lemass was an extremely able, powerful
politician who was undoubtedly master of his officials. This mastery, however, made
his officials in some way a lacklustre group in comparison to the other senior
departments, most notably Finance. In any case MacCarthy replied in kind to
Whitaker, claiming that it grieved him
to note that our correspondence seems to have done little to bring this 
discussion down to earth. The view expressed in your letter that our 
industries would gain more from expanded exports than they would 
lose in the home market, and that there is no need to fuss about 
getting an adequate quid pro quo for joining either EFT A or Britain in 
a free trade association is so far removed from our viewpoint that ... 
there is no point in continuing this correspondence.163
The implication that Whitaker was talking economic theory rather than economic 
practicalities at the nadir of the correspondence was undoubtedly calculated to leave 
MacCarthy holding the moral high ground. He, being the defender of traditional Irish 
industries, was not going to feed them to the wolves of free trade orthodoxy, while 
Whitaker was the shepherd who would abandon his flock to such economic precepts. 
Whitaker did have the final word, arguing that MacCarthy’s response could not be 
accepted as being a ’fair or reasonable summary of the views expressed in my 
previous letters’.164 This rather anodyne response did not disguise Whitaker’s anger 
at having failed to move Industry and Commerce towards a free trade perspective. He 
resolved to try again and within two years had succeeded in bringing Industry and 
Commerce in from the protectionist cold. Tadhg O’Cearbhaill has maintained that
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Industry and Commerce
would have felt an obligation to a lot of those people who had set up 
Irish industry and did so on encouragement and word of Industry and 
Commerce and also because they got protection. I don’t think there’s 
any question that they were obstructing the advent of free trade, but 
they definitely felt an obligation to those already in industry. Thus they 
argued their views strongly. During the free trade negotiations, I was 
secretary of the committee of four secretaries and you talk about 
strong views, well whatever you think about their views being strong 
in writing they were far stronger in person. ... There is no doubt about 
it, a lot of roaring and shouting went on when protectionism was 
discussed.165
Bringing Industry and Commerce on board
By November 1962 a proposal to initiate a unilateral 10 per cent tariff cut in 
protective industrial duties was supported by Industry and Commerce on the grounds 
that it ’would serve as a spur to industry to hasten plans for adaptation and 
reorganisation and would constitute in the eyes of the EEC an earnest sign of our 
good faith’.166 The previous two years had seen Lemass exert ’substantial pressure’ 
on his former department to embrace the orthodoxies of free trade. Lemass held 
strong views. While he was willing to listen to opposing viewpoints, as in the case 
of Industry and Commerce and Finance, he had decided that free trade was the only 
way to secure the economic future of the country. It was Lemass, the progenitor of 
protectionism, whose leadership as Taoiseach may well have inspired Industry and 
Commerce to change its tune. Tadhg O’Cearbhaill maintains that when Lemass 
became Taoiseach he made strenuous moves to bring Industry and Commerce into 
line with what had become his own viewpoint on the free trade question and entrance 
of a European trading bloc.167 He told a correspondent in July 1959:
It is of course true that the Irish economy at its present state of
development is not producing enough resources to maintain all our
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population at the standard of living we desire them to enjoy. The 
fundamental task facing this country is to expand its total production 
so that this situation will be brought quickly to an end. This cannot be 
done, however, by just wishing for it but by sustained hard work in 
support of an intelligent development programme. The Programme for 
Economic Expansion provides one element and we are now trying to 
generate the other.168
This second element was to enter a free trading body in an attempt to develop Irish
industry and subsequently Irish exports. It went hand in hand with bringing new
industry to Ireland. The protectionists of Industry and Commerce still made their
protests known to the government and continued to advance caution in negotiations
with the EEC. At a meeting of secretaries in April 1961, MacCarthy maintained that
although ’he did not to wish to make an issue of the conflicting departmental
viewpoints, ... he was anxious that the delegation to the G.A.T.T. would not be put
into the position of having to enter into tariff negotiations’.169 He was willing that
tariff negotiations be settled within the context of the EEC but was insistent that no
other economic body should be attempting to get the government to reduce tariffs.
MacCarthy was appointed chairman of the CIO and it was from this position that he
finally agreed on the necessity to bring down tariffs and readapt industry to free trade
conditions.170 Whitaker wrote to MacCarthy in July 1962 advocating a unilateral all
round tariff cut of between 10 and 15 per cent on 1 January 1963:
this suggestion deserves serious consideration on a number of grounds.
The most important is the need to maintain a psychological impetus 
towards rapid adjustment to EEC conditions during the period of 
uncertainty - which on present indications may be longer than we 
thought - about the entry of Britain and ourselves to the EEC. We 
have got the preparatory work going well on the industrial side. A 
whole series of reports on industrial surveys will be appearing over the 
coming months. There will, however, be a psychological barrier - 
however illogical this may be - to the undertaking of effective follow- 
up action so long as uncertainty persists not merely about the terms of 
accession of Ireland but even on the question of Ireland’s accession to
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the Community.171
Whether Ireland was admitted to the EEC or not, greater industrial efficiency would 
be necessary. Indeed this was even more urgent and necessary if Irish exports would 
have to face additional competition from Europe without the offsetting advantages of 
membership of the EEC. For Whitaker, Ireland could not lose by such a reduction 
as they would have to get down to nil in the EEC context by 1970 and any immediate 
reduction would be a step in the right direction: ’procrastination in making tariff 
reductions merely steps up the rate of reduction to which we will have to submit on 
joining the Community’.172 Even more important perhaps was the consideration that 
such a step would show the EEC the desire of the Irish government to adapt to EEC 
conditions and could only be advantageous in the ongoing negotiations. Moreover the 
other applicants as members of EFTA had scaled down protection as had the existing 
members of the community. As all these would be Ireland’s competitors there did not 
really seem to be any alternative to EEC entry. MacCarthy while agreeing with the 
general thrust of Whitaker’s remarks maintained that ’we should make every effort 
to ensure that full credit will be given to us against the rhythm of tariff reductions for 
any prior reductions’.173 While the evidence is somewhat inferential the position of 
Lemass was crucial to the conversion of MacCarthy from archetypal protector of 
native Irish industry to the cautious supporter of free trade. There is an inconsistency 
between the dynamic Lemass grasping the nettle of free trade as Taoiseach and that 
of his old department providing the main opposition to the somewhat inevitable 
outcome of membership of a European trading bloc. MacCarthy’s role has been much 
neglected by historians and he plays little or no part in any of the important studies 
of the period. Yet his role as Secretary was hugely significant. He had entered the
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civil service at Finance in 1927, but had served in Industry and Commerce since 1945 
and had continued that department’s orthodoxy in terms of protection when he 
succeeded John Leydon as Secretary in 1956. Moreover most of the thinking in 
Industry and Commerce came from the top down. Thus with Lemass’s exit it was 
vital that the department be infused with political strength. In this context Lemass’s 
appointment of Jack Lynch to succeed him as Minister of Industry and Commerce 
was an important one. Appointed Minister at the Department of the Gaeltacht by de 
Valera in 1957, Lynch was seen as progressive on economic issues. He also had had 
dealings with Lemass when he was responsible for the running of the Underdeveloped 
Areas Act in 1951 as Parliamentary Secretary to the Government and to the Minister 
for Lands. He had evidently impressed Lemass and on his appointment was told by 
the Taoiseach that Industry and Commerce was now his responsibility. While Lemass 
would be captain of the ship, Lynch had assumed the position of trusted lieutenant. 
Thus Lynch to an extent took on the mantle of guiding Industry and Commerce away 
from a policy of protection, a policy which had been ingrained in its philosophy for 
a generation. In essence though it was Lemass who was the key figure in getting 
MacCarthy to accept the inevitability of tariff cuts.174 Once he, along with Lynch, 
had politically sided with the free trade position, MacCarthy was left in an 
administrative limbo. When Lemass was Minister for Industry and Commerce and 
explicitly supported the policy of protection it was easy for MacCarthy to support him 
from within the administrative framework. With Lemass as Taoiseach now attempting 
to get Ireland into a European trading bloc and supported eagerly by his own 
handpicked Minister for Industry and Commerce, MacCarthy was persuaded of the 
necessity of free trade and tariff cuts. He had come a long way since 1959.
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While Industry and Commerce had in principle come to accept free trade there were 
still some deliberation on what form the unilateral cut should take. They maintained 
that if a reduction, ’which is strongly supported by this Department’, was to take 
place, it should exempt some products. MacCarthy also recommended that the cut 
should be at some later undecided date as ’we still have no information as to what 
will be decided for this country to be the base date, i.e, the date at which the tariffs 
operating will be taken as the tariffs to which the agreed rhythm of reductions will 
be applied’.175 Implicit in this comment were the old differences between Industry 
and Commerce and Finance. The former were reactors to events, inherently cautious 
and in many ways reluctant to leave protectionism fully behind them, and were 
willing to adopt a wait and see approach. Finance, however, had changed 
immeasurably from the days of McElligott when it was they who were the cautious 
deflationists. They were now willing to intervene in the economy to gain results. 
Whitaker’s department had taken the lead on the EEC question and were constantly 
proposing ideas on which approach the government should take. Ultimately Industry 
and Commerce proposed that the tariff cut come into operation some time in 1963. 
They had to some extent fallen in line with the Finance view. They were, however, 
very much now playing second fiddle to the policy activists of Finance. In November 
1962 it was announced that ’in anticipation of our entry to the EEC, the Government 
has decided to make a unilateral reduction of 10% in protective duties on industrial 
products on 1 January next’.176 This was described in the official announcements 
as an initial step in an elimination of protection, and thus it could be taken that there 
would be further reductions at appropriate times in the future whether Ireland joined 
the EEC or not.
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With this statement the Irish body politic had launched the way for an export-led 
industrialisation policy which was to dominate industrial and economic policy in the 
1960s. Economic Development and the First Programme for Economic Expansion had 
both been extremely conscious of the changing nature of economic relations in the 
late 1950s. While neither declared an explicit aim of entering a free trade bloc, the 
initial steps to that outcome had been put in place. The formation of the EEC and 
EFTA would create two important trading blocs and could offer economic opportunity 
or pose new threats.
While the government was not directly looking to Europe with the publication of 
Economic Development, there can be little doubt that it set in train the decision to 
apply and the further decision to reduce tariffs within that context. The 1950s had 
ended with Irish industrial development policy in a state of confusion. At an 
administrative level, Finance were leading the way, arguing for substantial changes 
in the protected sector. Supported by External Affairs, Agriculture and the IDA, they 
were determined to bring Ireland into a European trading bloc and thereby to expand 
the country’s economic frontiers. In this they were at first opposed with intransigent 
hostility by Industry and Commerce, but there was a wind of change blowing within 
Irish industry itself, which under a new leadership was to play an important role in 
getting the department to face up to the challenges of free trade. Ultimately Industry 
and Commerce was playing a losing game. Changes in the Control of Manufactures 
Acts and new incentives to induce foreign industry to locate in Ireland were evidence 
of how the Finance viewpoint was slowly winning the day. By 1963, however 
reluctantly, Industry and Commerce were willing to take on the joint responsibility
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of developing Irish industry within a free trade context.
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Chapter Three 
The evolution of trade union influence in the economic policy process 
1948-1964 
Economic trends in Ireland and Western Europe
In analysing the role of the trade unions in this period, it is important to look at the 
economic sphere in which they were operating and how this compared to other 
western European states. Protectionism which been continued after the war was 
reinforced during the 1950s. The crisis in the Irish economy in the 1950s lay not so 
much within industry as within agriculture. However, due to the importance of 
agriculture for the economy as a whole, the crisis affected industry to much the same 
degree. Industrial employment continued to increase, though at a slower rate than 
before. Unlike the 1930s, however, it proved impossible for protected industry to 
provide enough employment for those leaving the land and for those entering the 
labour market for the first time. One consequence of this was the accelerating 
emigration which was a feature of the decade.
Table 2 
Population of Ireland
1946 2,955,107
1951 2,960,593
1956 2,898,264
1961 2,818,341
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Table 3
Estimated net emigration from Ireland
1946-51 119,568
1951-56 196,763
1956-61 212,003
1961-66 80,605
[Source: Census population of Ireland, 1966, vol.l,].
Moreover, Irish wage rates, which had historically remained quite close to those 
prevailing in Britain, fell far behind in this period. By 1960 the average British 
worker earned at least forty per cent more than his Irish counterpart.1 This income 
gap served as a strong incentive for skilled workers to emigrate even when not 
threatened by unemployment. Between 1951 and 1958, Gross Domestic Product rose 
by less than one per cent per year. Employment fell by 12 per cent, and the 
unemployment rate rose. Irish Gross Domestic Product/capita fell from 75 per cent 
to 60 per cent of the western European average. Yet during the 1950s real product 
per capita grew at 2.2 per cent per year and industrial output expanded at 2.8 per cent 
yearly, while output per farmer grew at a respectable 3.4 per cent. Noting these 
figures, Haughton maintains that ranking the 1950s as a period of failure and 
stagnation is but a ’half-truth’.2 He thus maintains that Ireland’s performance is only 
disappointing when compared to the standards of neighbouring countries and not in 
historical terms. Yet placed in a comparative perspective, Ireland after 1945 failed 
to maximise its opportunities in the expanding European economy and consequently 
did not share in the affluence that accompanied it. It was during the 1950s that 
Ireland went into relative decline against similar states in Western Europe. In most
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states the process of post-war recovery was characterised by intensive 
industrialisation, the development of a strong export potential (often in manufacturing) 
and the acceptance of a broadly multilateral and free trade environment expressed 
through the recognition of GATT rules.3 Ireland clearly did not share in this 
experience, mainly because it made little attempt to. Economic policy making 
continued to be restrictive, agriculture remained in a hegemonic position and Ireland 
was still on Europe’s periphery in a political sense. Unlike other European states 
Ireland did not achieve self-sustained growth in the course of the 1950s. Serious 
balance of payments problems plagued policy makers during the first half of the 
decade, followed by recession and then a depression in 1957.4 This was in contrast 
to the rest of Western Europe. For trade unionists a further contrast may be made. 
In Sweden, for example, in the 1950s the government’s macroeconomic programme 
was designed by Rudolf Meidner, a trade union economist, while in Britain the Trade 
Union Council [TUC] had considerable influence on the Conservative government’s 
economic policy.5
The trade union movement in Ireland
In Ireland, however, things were different. Trade union influence was at best indirect 
and depended on Fianna Fail being in office as union influence on both inter-party 
governments was negligible. The existence of two Congresses caused great difficulties 
for unions, weakening their efforts, dissipating their resources and making impossible 
a common front against the employer organisations, steadily growing more powerful. 
A divided trade union movement meant that any negotiations with the government 
were destined to reach an unsatisfactory conclusion for one or other of the Congresses
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given the rivalry that existed between them. In practice, however, there were no 
serious ideological or organisational differences between the two Congresses while 
personal discord between the leaders had gradually disappeared by the mid 1950s.6 
Thus by the late 1950s both Congresses realised that a common front was necessary 
for negotiations with both employers and government. Unity, however, was a long 
time in coming.
By 1948 the unions as part of the labour movement were generally supportive of
protection. For them it seemed to have brought about some improvement in the
industrial situation even though they did have difficulties with low pay and women’s
unemployment. As Donal Nevin has commented:
the principle of protectionism was overriding. There was this residue 
of the idea of self sufficiency, if we could produce all our own goods 
we would have full employment or that if we could keep out imports 
we would have plenty of work. There was no conception of developing 
a large export capacity like the big industrial companies. It was not as 
if anybody was talking about opening up protectionism and looking for 
new markets. Thus for both the union movement and the rest of the 
policy making arena, there was two strong feelings: the need for 
protection to develop employment and the assumption that if you took 
self-sufficiency in that way you could create new jobs.7
This was the thread running through union thinking on economic policy throughout 
this period. As actors within the policy process they did have the ’ear of the Minister 
for Finance’, even though they were often ignored.8 For example before the 1952 
budget both Congresses met with MacEntee but were unable to convince him that 
their approach to economic policy was the correct one. An area where trade unions 
did have some influence, however, was in pay bargaining. Pratschke maintains that 
the unions used their power in the post-war years moderately and were not
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unreasonable in their demands for pay increases.9 This was not how the employers 
organisations saw the situation, while the unions themselves were well able to play 
’hardball’ in pay negotiations.10
Pay bargaining
Between 1946 and the late 1960s, pay bargaining took the form of a series of pay
rounds. The first recognisable such round, apart from the initial effort to catch up
immediately after the wages standstill orders were lifted, was a centralised framework
agreement negotiated in 1948 under the auspices of the Labour Court chaired by
R.J.P. Mortished.11 The 1948 agreement, known as the ’Joint Statement of
Proposals to be observed in the negotiations for the adjustment of Wages’, was
negotiated by the ITUC and CIU on the one hand and the FUE and its associated
organisations on the other. A sum of a maximum of eleven shillings a week pay rise
was hammered out as well as a statement of principles which recognised a number
of inequities, including the need to compensate workers for the rise in the cost of
living. This held until the end of 1950 when, despite the best efforts of the Labour
Court to secure a general agreement, the FUE and the ITUC in particular could not
reach a consensus:
The Court is one of the opinion that both employers and workers 
should give active and unprejudiced consideration to every practicable 
method of securing greater and more economical production so as to 
facilitate the raising of the general standard of living in this country.12
Unfortunately neither side could see a way forward within this centralised system and 
the settlements subsequently reached were individual ones which showed some 
diversity. By 1952 the idea of a national agreement gained currency again after the
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unions sought wage increases following the April budget. The CIU concluded an 
agreement for twelve shillings and sixpence a week for men, which became the 
general pattern; women got substantially less, usually half. The ITUC did not 
participate. They entered into separate discussions on a wage agreement at the 
invitation of the FUE. After intense negotiations the ITUC became suspicious of the 
FUE’s motives:
the agreement on wages is not intended to facilitate the settling of 
wage demands but to restrict making of wage claims and hamstring the 
trade unions in their negotiations for wage increases. ITUC on the
other hand, was anxious that real wages agreement should be made,
the terms of which would be readily understood and which would be 
of practical assistance to workers and employers’ organisations in 
forthcoming negotiations for higher wages.13
The ITUC were convinced that the ceiling figure of 12/6d proposed by the FUE was
a ’most harmful and dangerous one’ from the point of view of the trade union
movement and declared that it should be rejected by all trade unions. It appealed to
workers of all unions to unite and stand together in a determined effort to defend their
living standards and to secure a just wage that would enable them to live in decency
and comfort. Donal Nevin, then research officer of the ITUC, wrote to the General
Secretary of each affiliated organisation on the national executive rejecting the
provisional agreement with the FUE as
inadequate to the needs of the present situation. In particular, 
conditions attaching to questions of a figure for wage increases would 
in their opinion render an agreement largely ineffective and raise 
almost insuperable obstacles to the successful negotiations of wage 
increases which would provide adequate compensation for the rise in 
the cost of living.14
The FUE for their part rejected out of hand the ITUC’s insistence that there should 
be a higher ceiling limit than 12/6d to the wage negotiations as detrimental to
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economic stability, which they saw as the real objective of national wage agreements. 
The FUE bemoaned the difficulty of having to deal with two separate Congresses in 
the negotiations but said that they had still managed to put before both bodies 
identical proposals. While the CIU accepted the offer, the ITUC rejected it leaving 
the FUE to state that it ’has taken such steps and advances just as far as in its full and 
considered judgement is in the National Interest and must repudiate all responsibility 
for any element of failure which may attend its efforts’.15
The problems over wage rates between the two groups lay in their differing approach
to the question of Ireland’s economic difficulties in the early 1950s. For their part the
ITUC claimed that demands for higher wages had always followed, not preceded,
higher prices. Prices had spiralled sharply in early 1952: they were 11 per cent higher
in February than they had been twelve months earlier.16 This, according to the
unions, could not be attributed to wage increases, and they claimed that the effect of
a round of wage increases on retail prices tended to be greatly exaggerated. The
principal factor affecting internal prices was the level of world prices, which was
beyond the state’s control. Thus, the unions argued, a rise in wages would in no way
contribute to a rise in prices. Furthermore, since there was no scarcity of goods there
could not be said to be inflation in the proper sense of the word. Rising prices were
not the same as inflation, which in any case had been brought about by the huge rise
in the cost of imports. Ultimately for the ITUC,
wage increases in present circumstances will not have any significant 
effect on price levels. They cannot bring about inflation since clearly 
the economy requires an injection of purchasing power to counteract 
and offset deflationary forces at work. Unless wages are increased a 
more severe deflation will set in, creating further unemployment and 
intensifying our economic difficulties.17
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Thus they advocated an increase in wages and salaries commensurate with the 
increase in the cost of living while avoiding any unnecessary dislocation of industry. 
In essence the budget of 1952 was the catalyst for the unions’ wage demands. As 
Donal Nevin recalls: ’we had to play hardball with the employers organisations as 
they were not averse to playing one Congress off against another to the detriment of 
workers’.18
Not surprisingly the FUE took a different view of things. There was a serious fall in 
demand for consumer goods during 1952 which led to unemployment and short time 
working in a number of consumer industries. A further sharp drop in consumption 
would more than likely be followed by an even higher level of unemployment, 
bringing about further mass emigration, industrial stagnation and a fall in production 
and productivity. The ITUC’s proposals, they felt, could not but fail to prejudice the 
prospect of an ultimate agreement on wage policy. The FUE saw themselves as 
endeavouring to formulate an attitude to wage policy which might lessen the danger 
of national disruption on the head of wage claims and bring about the coordination 
and balance in negotiations which would tend to avoid such disturbance. They 
foresaw problems with maintaining trade and sustaining levels of employment at a 
time when overhead charges were mounting in the face of a frightening fall off in 
trade turnover. Thus the figure of 12/6d was as far as they were willing to go. In fact 
John O’Brien, Director General of the FUE, stated that the national council ’has 
strained its judgement beyond what it considers fully prudent in the present 
circumstances ... To go further would be to shut our eyes to the reality of the 
position’.19 They saw the ITUC as damaging the national economic welfare by
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indiscriminate demands for wage increases and claimed that any advancement in the
negotiations to this point (the 12/6d ceiling) were on the initiatives of the employers.
Inevitably the discussions broke down as the FUE would not move on the ceiling
price for wage increases while the ITUC had further grievances which they wished
to air after they had reached a ceiling figure suitable to them. The FUE were not
going to give them the chance to raise these other matters of contention:
you seek upward revision on the figure of 12/6d and that on securing 
a figure acceptable to you, the redrafting of various paragraphs 
(containing the principles) to which you are unable to agree would not 
present any great difficulty ... My council would not be willing to 
conclude an agreement on wage policy in absence of any of the 
principles set out. Acceptance of such principles does on the other 
hand preclude insertion of a higher figure. Your proposed basis 
therefore for a further conference makes it clear that no advantage 
would come from it and it was agreed that the conference should not 
be prolonged beyond prospect of agreement.20
The FUE and the ITUC failed to resolve their own differences in economic and wage 
policy, which ultimately meant that a wage round was in place which did not include 
a Congress which had 214,000 members and contained two of the largest three unions 
in the country, the Associated Transport and General Workers Union and the 
Workers’ Union of Ireland. This agreement, known as the fourth round, did prove 
remarkably solid, however, and lasted until 1955 providing wage and price stability.
The fourth round came to an end in 1955 and it was in the negotiations for the fifth 
round that the ’real push’ came.21 Restraint was abandoned and the unions sought 
not merely compensation for the rise in the cost of living but a restoration of pre-war 
standards. There was a great diversity in the level of increases, ranging from eleven 
shillings to sixteen shillings and six pence. The FUE complained about the behaviour
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of both Congresses in seeking such increases regardless of the impact upon other 
sections of the public. The Director General, John O’Brien, referred to ’the constant 
and early use of the strike threat and the fact that employees did not appear to wish 
at the moment to have strikes’.22 The FUE were also concerned about public bodies 
and other organisations who made deals with the unions without consulting them first. 
The transgressors included the Irish Sugar Company and the ESB.23 These varying 
pay increases came during the administration of the second inter-party government, 
as the 1954 general election consigned Lemass and Fianna Fail to the opposition 
benches once again.
Whatever about these fears, further pressure for a wage adjustment mounted in 1957 
after the by now inevitable two year span. The two Congresses had joined together 
into PUTUO, at a time when the trade union movement was profoundly in need of 
a common centre and a united leadership, and moreover was conscious of its need in 
such dire economic times. After the 1955 wage agreement the trade union movement 
became very wary about unstructured wage agreements and was confronted with 
rising pressure for a further adjustment to cope with the increased cost of living in 
circumstances which were highly unfavourable.24 The movement, aware of the need 
for restraint, negotiated a national settlement which restricted increases to ten shillings 
a week. While this arrangement settled the question of wages for the time being, the 
question of Europe soon began to dominate the union agenda.
The trade unions and Europe
The attitude of the trade union movement to Irish membership of any European
129
trading bloc was mixed. By the late 1950s union leaders were well aware of the need
for greater competitiveness and productivity. The International Confederation of Free
Trade Unions, to which PUTUO sent representatives, welcomed any movement that
would harmonise European trading conditions:
trade barriers between the participating countries in the form of tariffs 
and quotas will gradually be reduced and finally abolished during the 
transitional twelve year period and provide member countries with a 
market of 250 million people. It would lead therefore to a greater 
degree of industrial specialisation in the countries of Western Europe.
The European trades unions are convinced that such cooperation would 
do much to raise and harmonise living standards, to improve social 
conditions generally and to extirpate national rivalries provided, 
however, that such cooperation is established in a realistic and 
progressive spirit.25
Trade unions throughout Europe saw the liberalisation of trade as a solution to the 
industrial problems of their nations and suggested ways of making any such free trade 
area work. They rather unrealistically claimed that the abolition of unemployment was 
indispensable if a free trade area was to function properly. Thus they sought changes 
in industrial structure and employment, a reduction of tariffs, gradual abolition of 
quotas and the insertion of rules in a treaty on the setting up of such a free trade area. 
For the trade union movement the fruits of new industrial methods could only be 
reaped by large economic units. Furthermore the pace of technological change 
required an economic policy which would be based on a wider level than that of 
national borders. There seems to have been a remarkable degree of acceptance of the 
desirability of establishing a free trade area and what differences there were seemed 
negotiable. At a European industrial conference in London in 1958, the French did 
have reservations that the area’s policies could be inconsistent with those of the 
Common Market and that any proposed cooperation with the EEC would be illogical.
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They argued that it would be better to enlarge the six to include projected members
of EFTA. Frank Cousins of the British TUC, meanwhile, was emphasising the
importance of retaining within participating countries ’the right to take action
necessary to retain full employment’, something of a holy grail for the trade union
movement. Representatives of the Irish unions, employers and farmers’ organisations
were present at this conference and all made reference to the somewhat
underdeveloped nature of the Irish economy and mentioned that Ireland would need
to receive some special assistance in such an industrial area. This was a route the
Irish government itself was taking in its negotiations to enter the area. The Irish case
did receive some lukewarm endorsement. Ruaidhri Roberts in his report to the ITUC
on the conference commented:
it should be noted that endorsement of cases made by underdeveloped 
countries does not represent a specific endorsement of each proposal 
put forward but rather an endorsement of the view that these areas 
should receive adequate special privileges to enable them to 
participate.26
The attitude of the Irish trade union movement to joining a trading bloc was more 
circumspect. For their purposes certain major economic conditions had to be 
addressed. Primarily they believed that an increase in Irish exports was vital. 
Agricultural products still constituted three quarters of trade exports with the vast 
amount going to Britain. If Ireland remained outside a trading area which included 
Britain, this would create major obstacles in the way of maintaining exports to 
Britain. They furthermore argued that there did not seem to be any real prospect of 
increasing trade by any considerable magnitude. In an important memorandum written 
by Donal Nevin on the trade union movement’s attitude to the free trade area, it was
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recognised that the industrial sector of the country was relatively weak. Some 
industries suffered from inefficiency and bad management, while others were 
inevitable victims of a small home market. Membership of an industrial area might, 
it argued, remedy some of the deficiencies but for too many industries the problems 
arose out of geographical position, lack of resources, and the absence of traditional 
export markets for industrial goods.27 The memorandum noted that there would be 
an increasing reliance on external aid in building up big export industries if the 
country was to make any significant advances in industrial development, while 
declaring that ’any uncertainty in relation to Ireland’s participation in the free trade 
area would make it increasingly difficult to attract outside industries’ notwithstanding 
that labour costs in Ireland were among the lowest in Europe.28
Ultimately the unions saw Ireland as a small underdeveloped country which did not
represent any threat to other European states. It did, however, face enormous
emigration and employment problems which they anticipated would not affect
Ireland’s chances of associating with EFT A as the purpose of such a bloc was to
improve economic conditions and living standards:
It is clear that if our economic conditions were to be worsened and our 
living standards jeopardised by participation, other EEC countries 
would take cognisance of the fact. Anything else would be markedly 
contrary to expressed aim of movement to create European 
cooperation. Ireland cannot hope or expect, nor should she desire, to 
remain unaffected by these developments on the continent. Our weak 
economy, beset as it is by acute problems, will be profoundly affected 
by them. Whatever our ultimate attitude towards the Free Trade Area, 
we must recognise the necessity for grappling with this new situation, 
the difficulties as well as the opportunities it presents.29
Thus on the understanding that the idea of a free trade area was designed to improve
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the economic position of all participating countries and that small underdeveloped
countries would be afforded the opportunities of reaching a high level of economic
development, the trade union movement in Ireland was, in principle, in favour of
Ireland joining such an area. These remarks were prefaced by the usual union mantras
of commitment to full employment and the elimination of the economic compulsion
to emigrate as the unions ’endeavour to ensure that the policy adopted by our
government will be in harmony with the objectives sought by the international trade
union movement in supporting the principles of a free trade area in Europe’.30 For
the trade unions, better economic organisation had to be regarded as a means towards
the end of improving social conditions, and they were insistent ’that this end not be
lost sight of in the welter of economic proposals’. Laurence Hudson, President of
PUTUO, reiterated this point when he declared that he believed that the attitude of
alarm at the prospect of the collapse of the industrial arm of the country was not
justified either by reason of the likely consequences of a free trade area or by reason
of the state of the industrial sector:
by international standards - and not merely the highest American 
standards - we are not as inefficient as some of our defeatists would 
suggest. Nor for that matter are the golden opportunities that some 
seem to think would face our agricultural industry in the event of our 
joining the free trade area at all certain to be realised.31
Ultimately the unions were willing to enter into any trading bloc if it brought 
improved conditions to their members.
There were some in the union movement who were willing to put a different slant on 
the European issue. John Swift, General Secretary of the Irish Bakers, Confectioners 
and Allied Workers Amalgamated union, a noted radical once described by the police
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as ’a dangerous agitator’, was more responsive to the idea, although from a different
angle.32 Swift thought that the response to any suggestion that Ireland join a
European trading bloc was too timid, claiming that it stressed that the free trade area
was still in infancy and
our knowledge of this particular infant is so meagre, the decent thing 
for us to do is to hold our hand lest rash moves to acclaim its birth 
might expose us to the risk of seeming to father or foster a spurious 
progeny. This is a misconception. The real progenitors of the projected 
body, the Free Trade Area, are the old pioneers of our own 
movement. That the seventeen governments of the OEEC are now 
working out programmes for more production, full employment and 
higher living standards, for the people of its countries, is proof of the 
influence these old pioneers have come to yield in world affairs. Our 
trade union and labour pioneers taught us to clamour and fight for 
these things. We have been clamouring so long for them we scarcely 
notice the portends of their coming among us.33
Notwithstanding the flourishing rhetoric, Swift argued that the trade union movement 
had to serve the European ideal in honour of the line of progenitors who had seen the 
vision of a united Europe and sought to make a practical reality of the idea. Basically 
Swift was calling for the trade union movement internationally to be at the forefront 
of European economic unity. What was comparatively new was the realisation that 
the unity of the continent and its peoples could only be built on a economic basis, ’on 
a basis of production, distribution and exchange by people who work and who are 
free to live a full and cultured life’. The goals of full employment and rising living 
standards could, he believed, only be achieved if the trade union movement came out 
strongly in favour of the free trade area idea, although he qualified this by stating that 
any such support would be conditional on the area serving the social purposes 
envisaged by the OEEC. Swift was not entirely captivated by the romantic prospect 
of an economically united Europe which would free the downtrodden working classes.
134
He conceded that the process of adjusting to the area would bring serious problems 
of industrial change in which some industries would not be able to exist for any 
length of time once exposed to competition. Thus he advocated that there be a 
thorough examination of such industries to see how they might adjust themselves to 
the economic rigours of such competition. What was not in any doubt, however, was 
the fact that the ultimate aim of EFT A was economic integration and that the union 
movement should lead it.34
The wider reaction to Europe
While the government continued to explore the economic consequences of joining 
EFT A and the unions were broadly in favour, other players in the policy game were 
clarifying their positions. The FUE were enthusiastic about the possibility of Ireland 
entering a type of common market and saw any moves to increase exports as positive. 
The FII were equally as eager and their annual report for 1959 suggested that the 
development of the industrial economy should in the future be considered in relation 
to three factors. Firstly there was the maintenance by existing industry of the home 
market, with progressive reduction in protection, and eventually without protection 
against foreign competition. Secondly there was the development by existing 
industries of export markets with the same conditions in the home market. Finally 
there was the development of new types of industries without the expectation of the 
same measures of protection in the home market as had been available previously.35 
J.C. Tonge, President of the FII, was of the opinion that any changes should be 
directed towards improving the overall industrial position, declared that the 
government should accept responsibility for any radical change in policy, and was
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confident of the government’s attitude in this connection. The insinuation here was
that the government should grasp the nettle of free trade and consign the policy of
protection to the dustbin of history. The FII was urging its individual member firms
to make their own plans on the basis of free trade conditions in the future.
Specifically this meant urgent and constant attention to productivity in all its aspects
and particularly to the question of improving marketing policies and techniques and
renewing efforts to find export markets:
Confidence in our own ability and energetic action now on a planned 
basis by all individual firms and industries with the co-operation of the 
Government and the trades unions and of the public generally will 
ensure that these changes will be changes for the better. The 
Federation believes that the challenge which will be presented by the 
new conditions is also an opportunity for great developments in 
industry in Ireland.36
Fine Gael, back in opposition, also had strong views on EFTA and circulated a 
private memorandum, which turned up in trade union documents, on Ireland’s 
prospects within any European trading bloc.37 This noted that the creation of a 
common customs barrier would profoundly affect the whole pattern of Irish external 
trade. Like other commentators, however, they foresaw the transition from a highly 
protected industrial framework to an open one as having a considerable effect on Irish 
industrial production and employment. While the immediate danger to Irish industry 
could not be exaggerated, Fine Gael estimated that any drop in employment in one 
sector could be compensated by increases in others. They also claimed that, between 
1954 and 1957, 25 per cent of total national income was contributed by the industrial 
sector; any fall off in this figure could only be detrimental to the national economy 
if free trade led to a significant number of industries folding. Only 187,000 or 16 per
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cent of the labour force were employed in manufacturing activities and the Central
Statistics Office estimated that one third of these industries would be affected by a
gradual reduction in tariffs. The effects of thirty years of protection had, however,
been to increase the numbers employed in manufacturing industry by less than
60,000. Furthermore this figure included industries not affected by protection, such
as grain milling, baking, construction engineering, electrical construction and
newspaper production. Thus the labour increases in industries manufacturing some
protected goods could be put at no more that 50,000, four per cent of the working
population. Fine Gael saw this as proof that the advent of free trade would certainly
not lead to large scale unemployment in the country. It was, however, necessary to
have a free period in which protected industries could prepare themselves to meet fair
competition from abroad. It had been conclusively proved, they argued, that the way
to full employment was not to be found in protection as it was becoming increasingly
recognised that the small size of the Irish market had hindered Irish manufacturers
from obtaining the benefits of the economies of large scale production. Expansion of
productivity and employment could be obtained only if a larger market was secured.
Such a market would be available in a Free Trade Area which should prove a means
of expansion for many Irish industries:
The onus of proof must be on those who argue that we should not join 
EFTA or be associated in some way with the EEC. With chronic 
unemployment, large scale emigration and a sluggish rate of industrial 
and agricultural expansion, nobody can be satisfied with the present 
framework of our economy. The prospect of increased exports 
bringing with them higher agricultural earnings and production and 
greater supplies of foreign exchange to help finance domestic 
development is one not lightly to be turned down. The Free Trade 
Area may not contain a magic formula to heal all her economic ills,
But for a country so economically sick as Ireland is, it may easily 
point the way to a remedy, and should certainly not make our situation 
any worse.38
137
As for the government, they perceived the attitudes of industry to be too relaxed. At 
a meeting between the Department of Industry and Commerce and PUTUO regarding 
the impact of a free trade area on industries, Tom Murray, an assistant secretary of 
the department, bluntly affirmed that the greatest possible expansion lay with those 
industries which were already doing an export trade while the most vulnerable were 
those with highest tariff protection. He stated, however, that there seemed to be a 
fairly general attitude on the part of industry that they would not be too badly off 
under the free trade area. This outlook, he argued, was not a pragmatic one. Those 
industries which had experience of exporting and saw new markets on the horizon 
could obviously expect to benefit. However, regarding any special arrangements to 
assist industries likely to be adversely affected, Murray conceded that the convention 
setting up the area was not likely to provide assistance: ’the purpose of the Free 
Trade Area ... was to eliminate the unfit’.39 The attitude that pervaded both the 
business and trade union communities on the length of time that industries could take 
to meet the full rigours of competition was not shared by the government. The Fine 
Gael memorandum, for instance, mentioned a period of up to twenty years, while 
both the FUE and the FII thought in the same terms. The trade unions, on the other 
hand, thought that a period of twelve to fifteen years was more feasible. Lemass 
seemed to believe that Ireland had up to ten years to effect substantial change before 
having to face external competition. As we have seen, his officials were not as 
optimistic.
By 1958 the trade union movement was on the brink of a new era. In February 1959
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the Irish Congress of Trade Unions [ICTU] was formally inaugurated and in July the 
ITUC, founded in 1894, and the CIU, founded in 1945, were dissolved. This was due 
mainly to the work of a committee of PUTUO, consisting of James Larkin and 
Ruaidhri Roberts of ITUC and John Conroy and Leo Crawford of CIU, which had 
been set up to draft a constitution for a united Congress. The ninety trade unions 
affiliated to the new ICTU represented a membership of well over half a million 
workers, two fifths of them in Northern Ireland.40 The healing of the trade union 
split came at an appropriate time, for a unified body could provide advice and later 
influence without there being a contradictory labour voice. This was especially 
important as Lemass’s views on economic policy were closer to that of Congress than 
those of MacEntee, who had embraced a more traditional conservative economic 
outlook. A further development in 1959 was the completion of the seventh round of 
wage increases. This brought to manual workers increases ranging from ten to fifteen 
shillings in individually negotiated settlements. A number of further settlements were 
reached during 1960 amongst clerical and salaried workers. This provided for a 
general revision of the salary scale structure but saw widely varying increases at 
different points of the scale.41 Shortly after becoming Taoiseach, Lemass invited 
Congress to meet him to discuss the question of development, and how cooperation 
might be generated between the various economic actors. Congress, while broadly 
supporting the premise that Ireland enter a free trade body, called on the government 
to adopt a planning strategy that would involve the expansion of the state sector.42 
In broad policy terms Congress was adopting what Brian Girvin has termed a 
consumptionist strategy, which would increase purchasing power thus increasing 
demand.43 It will be recalled that the trade union movement had been stressing such
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a policy in the dark days of 1952. Congress also emphasised that the approach of the 
employers towards higher productivity was one of aiming at a constant production 
level with a reducing labour force, instead of increasing overall production and at 
least maintaining the labour force. It castigated the employers’ approach as fatal to 
the long term prospects of economic expansion and unlikely to win the support of 
workers for programmes of higher productivity.44
Expansion of the state sector was welcomed by some industrialists. Padraic O’Halpin,
a businessman and chairman of the Engineering Development Council, in an address
to a meeting of Tuairim talked of the very welcome direct concern of the state for the
increased prosperity of the people:
where the national grounds for prosperity as our neighbours understand 
it do not exist here, that the people will press more and more for a 
better organisation of their existing assets. To obtain a clearer idea of 
what exactly is meant by organisation of existing assets, it is necessary 
only to think of the present day circumstances which were the result 
of past Governmental actions and to consider how we should stand 
without them: the ESB, the industrial drive beginning in the early 
thirties, Bord na Mona and the Irish Sugar Company are examples. We 
must bear in mind that these advances were not forced on the people 
but in effect demanded by them through their elected representatives.
It is safe to say also that the people have welcomed these events and 
that their expectation of Government includes the advocacy of similar 
organisations in the future.45
Lemass seemed to recognise the validity of this approach but Congress argued that 
government policy, while broadly correct, would not necessarily bring about quick 
results, either in employment or export terms. Congress insisted that Ireland should 
not merely wait for export-led expansion, but should also infuse capital into the 
domestic economy to achieve growth. At this stage the government was pursuing a 
cautious fiscal policy, maintaining spending at existing levels but shifting investment
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from social to capital spending.46 Congress, however, maintained that while capital
investment was important, it would not on its own expand the economy. They argued
that social spending should not be seen as non-productive as it injected money into
the economy which had a knock-on effect. It was during this meeting that Lemass
offered the first hint that he was unhappy about the EFT A negotiations. The ICTU
report of the meeting states that
as far as relationship with the seven [EFTA] was concerned we could 
come in at any time if we wanted to. He [Lemass] did not see it ever 
being to our advantage to do so. If an agreement was come to between 
the seven and the common market, we might change our policy.47
What Lemass was evidently worried about was that Irish industry and agriculture 
would not be able to expand significantly within such an area and he thought that for 
the moment Ireland would be as well off pursuing a policy of maximising trade with 
Britain. Finance, however, was painfully aware of the country’s over reliance on 
Britain. The EEC offered the combined attractions of agricultural and industrial 
expansion. It also had in place a structure whereby Ireland could maintain an original 
strong protective support for a number of years. For Finance the bottom line was that 
they believed that Ireland could not join unless Britain did so as well.48 A downside 
to any application to enter the EEC was that it would undermine the commitment to 
planning in any independent systematic fashion. If Ireland was to accept that 
international competitiveness was the main aim of policy, then planning on a national 
basis would be to an extent rather redundant.49
Notwithstanding this caution on Europe, Lemass had decided to abandon the 
economic policy he had inherited. Budgets were to expand and increased investment
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become a government priority:
It is necessary that the state as such should participate in development 
activities to an even greater extent than heretofore, both as a promoter
of industrial ventures, in spheres where private enterprise has as yet
shown no interest, and as organiser of projects which, while not
directly commercial, will contribute to the overall expansion of the 
country’s economy and help manufacturers and farmers to achieve 
greater production and planning.50
Lemass, in conjunction with Whitaker, consequently decided to establish a planning 
branch within Finance, to be headed by Charles Murray who was Whitaker’s chief 
collaborator in the writing of Economic Development, where proposals for new state 
investment activity would be examined.51 Thus there was an explicit commitment 
from the government to shift in a structured sense both output and exports from
agriculture to industry. This reduced the impact on the economy as a whole of the
considerable fluctuations in price and volume to which agricultural production was 
subject throughout the whole post war period. In particular the rapid expansion of 
manufactured exports in the 1950s tended to reduce export instability once such 
exports became a significant share of the total.52 Cathal Guiomard in a forcefully 
written, if somewhat iconoclastic, study of what is wrong with the Irish economy 
argues that the economic instruments that Lemass favoured at this time ’were 
overwhelmingly a continuation of centuries-old statism, and ensured that business 
would continue to lobby politicians, since the political system was often more 
important than the market in determining business success or failure’.53 He 
furthermore argues that there was no economic rationale behind Lemass’s proposals 
for more state action, asking ’why does nobody believe that economic progress cannot 
be achieved without strong government? Why does private enterprise need 
government leadership?’.54 Guiomard, however, fails to offer any analysis of
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MacEntee’s deflationary policies. He simply dismisses Lemass as a statist, asserts that 
protectionism failed and that Lemass’s policy was based on assumed but unexplained 
market failures, and assumed but unspecified state capabilities. Where Guiomard 
misses the point is that what Lemass was hoping to achieve, and more importantly 
his ways of doing it, were radically different to MacEntee’s. Furthermore, as we have 
seen, industrialists of the day were not infused with sufficient entrepreneurial drive. 
The protectionist mentality dominated their thinking. Lemass, as we have seen, 
believed that Ireland had up to ten years, if not more, to sort out her economic 
problems, prior to having to face demands to dismantle tariff barriers. The 
government was willing to eliminate obstacles to inward investment but was not yet 
ready to open Irish industry to competition from the more industrialised states of 
western Europe, although senior policy makers were attempting to gain the best 
possible terms of entrance to various trading blocs. Irish industry was not yet ready 
and there was no sign that private enterprise was in any great hurry to lead the 
country in an export led industrialised drive.
For both unions and industry, Ireland’s drive to industrialise had enormous 
implications. At a meeting in May 1960 between the FII and the ICTU, J.C. Tongue, 
President of the FII, argued that both sides ’should be concerned with making the 
national cake bigger rather than with the division of the present cake’.55 This was 
something which the unions had brought up in their meeting, the previous September, 
with Lemass. The lack of economic development was something each side blamed the 
other for. Congress responded that they were willing to discuss anything with 
anybody but it is clear that they saw the FII as anxious to increase profits in a free
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trade environment without a concomitant increase in living standards for workers. For 
example when a draft agenda for this meeting was being worked out the FII suggested 
that on the itinerary be an item generally defined as ’the need for increased 
productivity and the problem of restrictive practices particularly in the context of 
changing conditions in Irish industry and the prospects for progressive reduction in 
protection and of eventual free trade’.56 Congress rejected this out of hand as ’not 
acceptable’. As far as the unions were concerned discussions on Europe and the 
expansion of production could not be based on an analysis of Irish work practices.
Trade Unions, the CIO and the EEC
In May 1961 the government decided not to join EFT A, and two months later 
formally applied to join the EEC after it became aware of Britain’s intention to do so. 
For their part the British supported the Irish application.57 In their application the 
Irish government stressed that there was no significant opposition to joining the 
community and that all the interest groups were broadly in favour of entry. For the 
purposes of examining the role of industry in the EEC, the government had 
established the Committee on Industrial Organisation [CIO] in which Congress and 
the FII were directly represented. Originally Congress was left out and had to demand 
to be included. Garret FitzGerald, who at this stage was an advisor to the FII, argued 
that the FII had to work with the government in a general review of economic policy 
and approached Whitaker as to the feasibility of the study. This was truly a radical 
step for business to take. Whitaker readily agreed and FitzGerald maintains that it 
was simply due to an oversight that the unions were left out:
they proved to be most constructive partners. Indeed, insofar as
tensions existed within the committee they proved - as I had anticipated
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- to be between the Department of Industry and Commerce on the one 
hand and the rest of us, with Finance, the CII and ICTU endeavouring 
as a troika to nudge that department into psychological acceptance of 
free trade.58
In the circumstances it might have been more logical to have had a partnership with 
Industry and Commerce but that department had remained protectionist orientated and 
FitzGerald anticipated that it was unlikely on its own to be an adequate partner in the 
exercise contemplated.
Thus the committee was set up with the remit
to make a critical appraisal of the measures that may have to be taken 
to adapt Irish industry to conditions of more intensive competition in 
home and export markets, to undertake an examination of the 
difficulties which may be created for particular industries and to 
formulate positive measures of adjustment and adaptation.59
The Irish Times welcomed the CIO, declaring that ’it could become the most
important single organisation in the country, and will pilot industry through the
transition period’.60 When the CIO reports began to appear in the autumn of 1962
they showed the weakness of Irish industry, especially when it came to export
potential. Not all industrialists were in favour of entry to the EEC. Aodogan
O’Rahilly was deeply worried:
while I welcomed foreign investment, I believed that if we were going 
to enter the EEC then our sovereignty would be lost and in a free trade 
environment we would quickly go under. I drew comparisons between 
entry to the EEC and the passing of the Act of Union at the time as I 
foresaw Irish industry dying Just as what happened in the early 1800s 
due to the operation of economic laws. In many ways I suppose I was 
an old style Fianna Fail nationalist.61
More typical, however, was the response of Jack Fitzpatrick of the FII who told
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Hibernia that Ireland would join the EEC and the result would be the ’blossoming of
our economy’.62 Officially the FII had become a supporter of Whitaker’s policy of
economic planning. It noted that
in the midst of the activities in preparing for entry into the EEC it is 
good to see that the Government have not lost sight of their economic 
planning programme which will have an important bearing on our 
preparedness to face the challenge of the common market’.63
The CIO was part of a continuing corporatist-style initiative by Lemass to involve the 
unions and industry in the policy of economic development in that it saw the 
development of a political structure which integrated the organised socio-economic 
groups through a system of representation and co-operative mutual interaction at the 
leadership level and social control at the mass level. Moreover as Hutton points out 
Lemass’s desire to incorporate the unions found an echo in the dominant trend of 
corporatist thinking within the trade union movement itself.64 The Employer-Labour 
conference came into existence in 1962 and the National Industrial and Economic 
Council [NIEC] was established a year later. These new agencies paralleled the state’s 
commitment to economic planning, although if Ireland had succeeded in gaining entry 
to the EEC in 1963 it is doubtful what impact they would have subsequently had in 
policy formulation. Patrick Lynch recalls ’the freshness and vigour of trade union 
thinking on the desirability of a consensus on the broad economic issues such as 
income policies and economic planning’.65 He describes the representatives of 
Congress as being free from partisanship, people who produced many original 
contributions directed solely to the common good, and he maintains that the support 
of the unions was essential for the success of economic planning that Whitaker was 
promoting. Donal Nevin has also talked of the importance of the unions’ role in
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bodies such as the NIEC, NESC and the CIO arguing that they could have taken the 
attitude that ’it is none of our business but instead played a positive role’.66 While 
this may be so, Congress’ first policy statement on entry to the EEC urged caution 
and advised the government, rather unrealistically, to pursue alternative strategies 
such as searching for new markets.67 More interestingly Nevin maintains that 
Congress as a unified body left its negotiators, usually Ruadhri Roberts and himself, 
to formulate their own stance and adopted their reports on various economic policies 
unanimously. Before Congress was united many full time craft union officials, who 
were involved in complex negotiations with government and the employers on pay 
and other issues had little knowledge of economic problems. Nevin has stressed how 
the union movement and he in particular as research officer relied on the advice of 
academic economists, such as Paddy Lynch, for their policy positions.68
The CIO was involved in incorporating the industrial interest groups into government
structures and within this framework Lemass met the FII and the ICTU in January
1962 to discuss the implications of the application for industry. Lemass told the FII
that they would only have a short period of time to adapt to the new conditions and
would then have to face the full brunt of competition. He recognised that some
industries would not be able to make this transition easily, but said that the
government were aware of this and would seek some concessions from the EEC.
Colm Barnes, President of the FII, protested that Irish industry could not survive
what would amount to a fifty per cent cut in tariffs. As he was to recall later:
while we realised that the EEC would not tolerate stragglers, we
thought it would be a massive act of self deception on the part of the
government if they thought that industry could withstand such tariff 
cuts. Looking back now industry was very weak, but once you were
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in there was great security because you had a captive market and high 
tariff walls which kept out imports. If we had entered in 1963 on these 
grounds native industry already weak would have been decimated.69
Lemass, in response, noted that the Community would probably not give special
concessions to Ireland and that while negotiation was possible they had to accept the
principle of a broad transitional period for concluding the reduction of tariffs. It was
doubtful whether the Community would agree to selective cuts, but if there was a
possibility of securing a special protocol it would be necessary to specify the sensitive
industries. He estimated that if Ireland joined in 1963 effective protection would be
gone within three years of accession and that consequently this was the time span to
be dealt with. Within that period and the longer transitional period adjustment might
be made after consultation with the Community, but he believed that the limits were
well established.70 At another level a former government official has spoken of the
frustration suffered by those officials who undertook the CIO surveys:
we would have an appointment to meet with the Managing Director of 
some firm down the country and we would arrive only to be told that 
he was gone playing golf or was off at the hunt, our experiences were 
literally of that kind. That was the mindset of industrialists at the time.
They had no faith in the CIO, in fact they had no faith in anything.71
Countering this analysis, Joseph McCullough who was heavily involved in industry 
comments:
I was a general manager in a tyre manufacturing firm at the time. Civil 
servants from Industry and Commerce came down to see us but really 
they were hopelessly ill equipped. The idea that these fellows could 
help us to organise when they were not even organised themselves was 
ludicrous. What happened was that civil servants were being 
transferred from one section of Industry and Commerce to another but 
they were all really of the same mindset.72
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Another industrialist has commented on how great opportunities were lost due to the
attitudes of businessmen:
due to that lack of self confidence, which was largely within small 
business, and not having enough strong entrepreneurial spirit, major 
opportunities were lost. However, we had no business people to lead 
us, only politicians and civil servants. Yet there was a feeling that they 
did not know business, the nitty gritty of it, only the theory and as a 
result business people tended to try to ignore them. Their attitude to 
the CIO would be an example of that.73
Although ICTU gave only lukewarm support to the original application, they offered
no dissension to Lemass’s strategy when they met him three days later. Lemass urged
the trade unionists to accept that changes were underway in Ireland’s relationship with
the wider world and that existing preferential arrangements with Britain were already
weakened. He reiterated his intention to seek membership under the best terms
possible, but said that they would have to operate on the assumption that tariffs would
have to be removed by the beginning of 1970. He stressed that it was his view that
state aids to industry designed to promote efficiency should be 
regarded as desirable ... though the form of aid in some cases would 
be modified ... In general it appeared likely that the question of 
adjustment to common market conditions would be a problem of the 
position of individual firms rather than industrial groups.74
This implied that even in the absence of EEC membership considerable changes in 
the Irish economy would be necessary. Congress responded to the government’s 
stance by calling a consultative conference to debate the impact entry to the EEC 
would have on their movement. Congress issued no formal response to this meeting 
but there could have been no doubt in their mind but that Lemass was determined to 
bring Ireland into the community. Hibernia criticised the unions and the other 
economic actors for their general reluctance to comment publicly on economic issues:
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’What is particularly lamentable is that the universities, the large business 
corporations, the trade unions, the private banks and the political parties make so 
little contribution to economic thought and discussion in Ireland’.75
Congress was also involved in complex wage negotiations in the early 1960s which 
overlapped with the proposed membership of the EEC. Naturally in the matter of 
wage negotiations and productivity the trade unions had a different economic agenda 
than the employers. The employers had argued during negotiations in 1963 that the 
central economic purpose of national policy ’should be the attainment of the highest 
possible rate of economic expansion and employment consistent with reasonable price 
stability and without seriously disturbing equilibrium in the balance of payments’. The 
unions in response, however, argued that the primary objective of national policy 
’should be to provide full employment at adequate wages. To achieve this objective 
the expansion of national production is necessary’.76 These negotiations arose out 
of the government’s own white paper on incomes policy, "Closing the Gap, Incomes 
and Outputs", published in January 1963. The government had been worried about 
the spiralling of wages since 1961 (which had seen an electricians’ strike both in the 
ESB and in the private sector). Categorised by Garret FitzGerald as the key dispute 
of the decade,77 it was settled by the Minister for Industry and Commerce, Jack 
Lynch, at the sum of twenty eight shillings a week. This was twice that of the 
emerging national pattern of fourteen shillings, the amount recommended by the 
Labour Court. Furthermore unskilled workers, who had not initiated the strike, 
demanded and received the same increase as the electricians, thus greatly influencing 
the subsequent course of the national round. By the end of 1961 wage increases for
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men were ranging from twenty shillings to twenty five shillings a week. The
government issued the paper because it saw the importance of securing a closer
cooperation between increases in income and output. This, it saw, as a matter of
urgent national importance, and hoped to establish a more orderly relationship
between income increases and the growth of national production. Congress were
furious that they had not been invited to consult with the government in the formation
of such a policy and declared their opposition to compulsory wage restraint or
interference in free negotiations between trade unions and employers. In particular
they were opposed to any attempt to use the power of the state to restrict wages.78
Whitaker had previously outlined the position of the government, declaring that it was
in the interests of economic stability that wages should be related to productivity and
that this proposition was not disputed by the trade unions:
wage increases which outpace productivity increases are nationally 
dangerous and bring no enduring benefit. There will therefore be
agreement on the impact of efforts which are now being made by the
trade unions and employers jointly to work out a more orderly 
relationship between higher productivity and higher wages ... From the 
broader economic and social standpoint there is a strong case for 
taking the general increase in national production as the main guide to 
increases and salaries.79
In late 1963 the FUE and the ICTU initiated a series of meetings, arising out of the 
white paper, which resulted in a ’National Wage Recommendation’ giving a twelve 
per cent increase for a two and a half year period. Neither side were very happy
about the figure but all agreed that it was the best that could be reached in the
prevailing circumstances.
Entry to the EEC and the consequences this would have for the national economy was
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the main preoccupation of Congress in the early 1960s. It publicly responded to the 
proposed application by issuing a policy statement in July 1962 whose main thrust 
was that the conversion of the Irish economy to conditions of free trade should 
proceed
at a pace, over a certain period of time and in such a manner that our 
object of securing a continuing increase in total employment shall be 
kept within such limits that redundant workers will be able to secure 
equally good employment in Ireland without adversely affecting the 
intake of new entrants into industry’.80
It did concede, however, that this object might not be attainable in the context of EEC 
membership. What it did not point out was that there was no chance of achieving this 
objective in protective isolation.
The situation changed dramatically when the Brussels negotiations broke down and
de Gaulle vetoed the British application. While this was a severe setback for Lemass’s
ambitions for Ireland, he let it be known that the government was committed to
maintaining the changes set in place by the application:
We intend to base our policy on the assumption that circumstances will 
emerge which will permit the admission of the present applicant 
countries to the EEC. In such an event we would be faced with the 
obligation to eliminate tariffs on imports from the community by 
1970.81
Congress subsequently held a consultative conference in March 1963 to discuss the 
preliminary reports issued by the CIO on the state of Irish industry. The CIO had 
published reports on the leather footwear, paper and paperbond, cotton, linen and 
rayon, and motor vehicle assembly industries and estimated that these could be faced 
with considerable redundancies if EEC rules were applied to Ireland. The reports
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painted a gloomy picture indeed. Problems of small scale, high import content, low
proportion of exports, little marketing skills and contacts, low specialisation and an
outdated approach to management were all identified as major problems for Irish
industry.82 Unions representing workers in these industries communicated with ICTU
to voice their fears and ask that consideration be given to policy in the light of these
findings.83 For his part, Lemass saw the reports from the CIO as proof that ’the
policy of protection has been clearly and officially shown in post-war circumstances
to be defective in promoting or compelling the effort needed to ensure the continuing
efficiency of industry’.84 In essence the CIO reports painted the following picture:
the competitive industrial sector built up within Ireland’s tariff walls 
is of too small a scale to be efficient in the modern technological 
setting, the obvious answer is build up larger and more efficient 
productive units, to break down the tariff barriers and encourage the 
development of a competitive pattern ... but on a larger, efficient and 
international scale. But one effect of putting Irish industry into this 
wider setting is that exports and international trends over which we 
have little control now become of major importance.85
Congress recognised that if industry was to export it had to be competitive. It would 
not be possible in the EEC to manufacture for export while receiving protection at 
home. Even if Ireland did not enter the EEC there were two good reasons why this 
policy should not be continued, it argued. Primarily, protected home industries tended 
not to export and concealed the cost of inefficiency within high priced products for 
the protected home market. Secondly, the consumer was subsidising the cost of 
inefficiency through the higher prices paid and this represented a drain on the national 
economy. The problem Congress faced was how to ensure that heavy reduction in 
employment did not result from the elimination of tariffs in the process of 
reorganisation of Irish industry. The manpower and social affairs committee of the
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Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD] had adopted 
recommendations that member countries should make an active labour market policy 
an essential element in their economic policies for growth and development. ICTU 
eventually adopted a rather catch all position. They supported the reorganisation of 
industry as desirable, and held that the extent of any reorganisation should be such 
that redundant workers could be absorbed. To enable this to be achieved, they 
advocated the establishment of a planning body to gather employment information and 
adjust investment to overcome cyclical disturbances.86 It is not clear, however, how 
Congress anticipated such a body working or if they really believed that such a body 
would solve the unemployment problems that would inevitably arise once Ireland 
initially entered the EEC. Ultimately the CIO, in its final report, concluded that the 
sectors it examined were not adapting to the new economic environment, even though 
the government had not entered the EEC, was not likely to until 1970, and was 
offering to provide advice and finance to aid the transition. It found that most 
industrial sectors were not internationally competitive, that they concentrated on 
production for home consumption, and that unless adjustment took place there would 
be a considerable loss in employment.87
In conclusion, by the early 1960s the government had decided that the future direction 
of the Irish economy lay in it being associated with the EEC. The trade union 
movement were initially lukewarm in their endorsement of this approach but were 
coopted by Lemass and subsequently involved in discussions on the future 
development of economic policy. Wage negotiations overlapped throughout this period 
with the evolution of an external economic stance and the union movement recognised
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that higher wages and higher productivity depended on the expansion of the Irish 
economy. The government, industry and the trade unions recognised that Irish 
industry would have to develop rapidly to meet the rigours of free trade competition. 
As John Conroy, General President of the Irish Transport and General Workers 
Union, pointed out at the time: ’freer trade is coming and unless we all realise this 
and prepare we will find that every workshop and factory not fully and efficiently 
equipped will cease to produce to economic requirements and all the employees will 
find themselves unemployed’.88 The CIO had pointed out the inadequacies of Irish 
industry to cope with the transition from a protective framework to an interdependent 
economy. All parties involved recognised that there could be no return to such a 
protectionist position and they resolved to adopt a trilateral approach in their attempt 
to revolutionise the Irish economy in the light of new free trade conditions. A 
consensus had emerged that it was better to face an unpredictable world as a member 
of an economic alliance rather than as an isolated economy, and an export led growth 
initiative was adopted. Ireland’s economic interests had taken on a wider agenda, one 
which required the input of industry and the trade union movement. One of the main 
beneficiaries of Ireland entering an economic bloc would be the farmers, and it is to 
state-farm relations that we now turn.
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Chapter Four 
State-Farmer Relations 1948-1964
The evolution of farmer influence
This chapter traces the course of state - farmer relations from the foundation of the 
NFA in 1955 to the official formalising of relations between the government and that 
organisation in 1964. The 1950s saw a redefinition of state - farmer relations. The 
specifically farmers’ political parties of earlier decades had been unable to establish 
Irish politics on a rural versus urban footing and had rarely been more than amateurs 
easily squeezed out by the professionals. The original Farmers’ party did win a 
handful of seats in 1922, but failed to consolidate this modest achievement, its vote 
was eroded, and it faded away in a decade being subsumed into Fine Gael in 1932. 
In the late 1930s another farmers’ party, Clann na Talmhan, emerged in the west, 
catering in the main for smaller farmers, but died out two decades later. Joseph Lee 
puts the absence of an influential agrarian party down to the relative political maturity 
of rural Ireland:
The fact that there was little significant difference between urban and 
rural mentalities precluded peasant backlash. Most parties, North and 
South, articulated some agricultural interests, and made ritualistic 
references to traditional rural virtues. There were streaks of peasantism 
in all major parties, but resentment at exclusion from the charmed 
circle of power, privilege and education never penetrated peasant 
consciousness sufficiently to form the effective basis of a national 
peasant party, simply because there was relatively little exclusion.1
From the 1950s on, however, farmers avoided party and parliamentary politics, 
organising into interest groups or pressure groups, seeking to buildup the power and 
muscle to take on the government in pursuit of their demands independently of the
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party system.2 Events were to show, however, that the established political parties 
themselves were slow to recognise the decoupling of farm issues from the party 
system. May 1950 saw the foundation of the Irish Creamery Milk Suppliers’ 
Association [ICMSA]. Set up with the help of Macra na Feirme, it was from the start 
a militant agitating organisation concerned mainly with those who produced milk for 
manufacturing purposes. In 1953 it conducted the first milk strike in the country, one 
which lasted sixteen days and was hailed a success as the farmers secured an increase 
of 1 3\4 d per gallon for their milk.3 Of even more significance, however, was the 
emergence of the strike, a political weapon hitherto the preserve of the trade unions. 
A year later Macra na Feirme played an even larger role in bringing the NFA into 
existence. The NFA was to assimilate much of the expertise that Macra na Feirme 
had been building up since its own foundation in 1944 in economic and policy matters
and from its inception it was clear that the NFA would carry the brunt of the
bargaining on behalf of the majority of farmers. At the launch in Dublin the incoming 
president Juan Greene declared that it would concern itself mainly with the economic, 
technical and educational problems facing farmers and would be non political.4 As 
Louis Smith, who was to become the official advisor to the NFA, advocated at the 
time:
the NFA ... must present the farmers’ case to the government and
departments of state. This does not involve entry into politics, on
which the Irish Farmers’ Union of the 1920s split. Like all other 
unions it should stay neutral and put its view by argument and 
lobbying.5
Prior to the formation of the NFA various farmer interest groups had considered the 
possibility of uniting under one umbrella. In December 1953 John O’Dwyer, vice­
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president of the ICMSA, and chairman of a committee representing the ICMSA,
Macra na Feirme, the Irish Agricultural Organisation society and the Beet Growers
Association, claimed:
it would be an ideal thing to have such a national organisation 
representative of the whole agricultural community, because then for 
one thing the minister would have no excuse for not consulting us on 
matters relating to the future welfare of our industry, just as any 
industry is entitled to be consulted ... If you have unity and 
coordination between agriculture, which is the vital industry in this 
country and the Government, you should in a short time build up a lot 
of confidence that has not hitherto existed.6
O’Dwyer described farmers generally as being distrustful of governments and having 
every reason to be ’given the happenings of thirty years’. However many in farming 
circles now believed that the time had come to coordinate in unison more fully with 
the government. This, they considered, would enable farmers to help themselves by 
a cooperative movement developed on the lines of the Swedish, Danish or Dutch 
systems. It is clear that the farming community in general felt that it was time to 
adopt a more aggressive and united stance in their dealings with the government, 
O’Dwyer echoed the feelings of many when he asserted that ’agriculture should be 
above the category of a plaything for politicians. The dictatorial policy of 
Governments in relation to agriculture will have to cease’.7 His terminology reveals 
the contempt with which some in the farmer movement held various governments no 
matter what their makeup.
The question of farming unity, however, was not easily resolved. In late 1954 
meetings were held among the various farming groups but these came to nothing. 
Both The Irish Times and the Irish Independent ran editorials urging some form of
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union after the talks broke down.8 Once the NFA had been formed, the ICMSA was 
only one of a number of commodity organisers which feared the possibility of a 
takeover by it. After a long series of negotiations chaired initially by Bishop 
Cornelius Lucey of Cork, it became clear that the basis for unity did not exist. 
Eventually the two main farming organisations, the NFA and the ICMSA, agreed to 
work separately, and their relationship continued to be characterised by friction. 
However as negotiations with the government became more complex in the latter half 
of the 1950s and the early 1960s with entry to the EEC high on the farmer agenda, 
the NFA continued to call for unity amongst farm organisations. Greene in his annual 
address to the NFA in May 1960 argued that the farming community should speak 
with one voice when dealing with the government on the European issue. He 
complained that the government had failed to improve the position of farmers in the 
review of the Anglo-Irish trade agreement of 1960 and that it would only be through 
a united front that farmers could hope to influence government policy.9 The NFA 
also called for unity on grounds other than economic. In late 1963 S.A. Sherry, 
secretary of the livestock division, encouraged all farmers to unite and join the NFA 
as ’it is probably affording Irish farmers the last real opportunity they have of doing 
something worthwhile for agriculture as a social concept as well as a way of life’.10 
However for all their soundings on unity the NFA never quite managed to convince 
the smaller farm organisations that their future lay with the larger group. One 
example from 1962 shows what the ICMSA thought of their larger counterpart. 
Referring to attempts by the NFA to coordinate a unified farming response to the 
growing question of Europe in the 1960s, John Feely, deputy - president of the 
ICMSA, lambasted the NFA, claiming that ’by its gratuitous interference it had done
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and was continuing to do untold harm’.11 J.C. Nagle, a former secretary of the 
Department of Agriculture, has speculated that small farmers, who in the main were 
represented by the ICMSA, felt that they would be swallowed up within the NFA and 
that their interests would not be properly catered for within the larger organisation.12 
Thus they felt that they would be better equipped to argue their own case with the 
government as a separate entity distinct from the NFA. This, however, caused 
innumerable problems for the government, who would have preferred to deal with 
just one organisation. Paddy Smith, the Minister for Agriculture, complained that the 
NFA and the ICSMA ’are as often as not playing for position and, for them, the 
Department of Agriculture and the Minister are just tools to be used for furthering 
their sectional interests’.13
The influence of the NFA
The NFA, however, was the main focus for negotiation with the government during 
the period and it was far more aggressive in its championing of farmers’ issues than 
any other organisation. Its influence spread rapidly in the years after its foundation, 
especially in matters such as the pioneering of livestock marts and bovine TB 
eradication.14 It set up committees to deal with the various farm sectors and initiated 
a vigorous recruitment drive. By the time of its annual conference in May 1960 the 
General Secretary Sean Healy was able to announce that the NFA consisted of 864 
branches and 51640 farm families.15 By this time two issues had emerged which 
were to be of fundamental importance to the NFA and the farming community in 
general. They were interrelated: one was the level of agricultural incomes as 
compared with industrial incomes, the other the impact that Irish entrance to any
European economic grouping would have on agricultural incomes. The NFA took a
definite stance on both issues. In an address to NFA members in Kildare in 1958,
Greene asserted that ’the pulse by which we must assess the economic health of this
country is to be found in a prosperous rural community’. He also maintained that
farmers should enthusiastically support some form of European economic integration:
’European integration is more than our challenge, it will be our salvation if we wish
it so ... If we are to survive it will be as a partner in a larger viable economic unit
of an international character’.16 The NFA had since its inception been extremely
critical of government policy in agriculture. Things came to a head early in 1958
when a motion of no confidence in the government was passed at a special meeting
of the NFA’s council. Greene wrote to the Taoiseach, de Valera, to say
that the council of the NFA unanimously passes a motion of no 
confidence in the attitude of the Government towards the present 
agricultural situation and that the council asks that an interview be 
sought with the Taoiseach to place before him their views on the very 
serious crisis that has now arisen. The council further decided that it 
is vital that farmers throughout the country be more clearly acquainted 
with the situation and is to arrange for public meetings in each 
county.17
This was an important milestone in state - farmer relations, in that it was the first 
time that such a motion had been passed criticising the whole thrust of governmental 
policy and demanding a complete reworking of such. Relations between the NFA and 
Fianna Fail had been fraught since the latter returned to office in 1957 and the motion 
of no confidence only heightened the tension. While the NFA mistrusted Fianna Fail 
over general agricultural policy making, there is evidence that Fianna Fail’s antipathy 
towards the NFA ran deeper. In a speech in Wexford in 1958 the Minister of 
Finance, Dr. James Ryan, criticised the NFA, claiming that they were a pawn of the
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Fine Gael party:
I can recollect three or four Farmers’ unions in the last forty years; 
they all began by telling us they were non political and non sectarian 
but they all ended where they belonged in the ranks of Fine Gael.18
The Irish Times in an editorial entitled ’Politics and Policy’ came down in favour of
the NFA and criticised government policy towards farming in general, stating that
there was a complete lack of evidence that agricultural decisions were dictated by the
balanced needs of a planned agricultural policy:
When can we expect a government which will begin to treat 
agriculture as what the party hacks are saying it is - our major industry 
on the planned prosperity of which our economic survival depends?19
Louis Smith asserts that all agriculture ministers of both parties thought of politics 
first and agriculture second: ’you had all sorts of accusations. Dillon used to say that 
the NFA was nothing but a Fianna Fail rump while Ryan and others thought of the 
NFA as Blueshirts’.20
By September 1959, after five years in existence, relations between the country’s 
largest farm organisation and the department had reached an extremely low point. 
Greene wrote to Smith on the relative positions of farm organisations and the 
Department of Agriculture, stating that ’if good relations cannot be established 
between the two, then I am at a loss to know where we are going’.21 There were a 
number of reasons for this. The NFA had come into existence with a clear set of 
priorities. High on this list they claimed was to establish for the voice of organised 
farming a more progressive relationship and understanding with ministers of 
government and their respective departments, and in particular those most closely
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associated with the agricultural industry. They declared themselves determined to
prove their worth as partners with the government in formulating a predetermined
progressive agricultural policy for the country. J.C. Nagle, in a letter to the author,
has seen in this phrase a hint of undemocratic thinking within the NFA stating that
they ’did not seem to realise the full implications of a government singling out one
organisation as partner over another’.22 Yet the NFA argued that their willingness
to be such partners would require more on their part than the mere passing of wishful
resolutions that ’we wanted more cash per unit of production’. This they were willing
to do and they deemed that they should be armed with the reason why, and the more
important question as to how, this was to be done in the context of the Irish
economy.23 They argued that in all their dealings at governmental level they had
been supported in the knowledge that they had answered these questions. In
attempting to gain a better deal for their members the NFA stated that they recognised
early in their existence that new attitudes would have to be developed if they and the
country at large were to fare better than they had in the past, and that they were
supported in this by public opinion. This was important, they argued, as without it
there was almost nothing to hope for, for the very good reason that the 
future prospects of improving our whole economy are very largely 
dependent on vocational groups being willing, encouraged and even 
assisted, towards doing something for themselves. There is a duty for 
all of us now to determine what progress if any we are making in this 
direction. NFA opinion is disappointed, often even discouraged, in 
having fallen short of the target we set ourselves.24
While claiming that their object was to expose the deficiency rather than determine 
where the fault lay, the NFA for their part had no doubt where the particular blame 
belonged for their failure to reach their targets. In the September 1959 Quarterly 
Supplement of the NFA Greene launched a stinging attack on the Department of
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Agriculture and by implication the other farming organisations:
By default, in failing to produce from our own ranks many years ago 
a vocational unified voice for agriculture, we ourselves forced our 
Department to play a role in farming matters it was never designed to 
take. Further to this, with the development of a multiplicity of 
uncoordinated and often contradictory voices speaking on behalf of the 
farmer, our Department was further forced to the all-powerful position 
of sole arbiter, ultimately developing into a closed shop mentality. For 
very many years the impression created in the public mind has been 
that of the farmers and their own State Department in a state of 
continuous rebellion and constantly at each others throats. Anything 
less conducive to rational development of the industry could hardly be 
imagined.25
Stating that the NFA were well aware of the difficulties between the department and 
itself Greene claimed that he was anxious that people in other quarters would become 
aware of it. This was taken in the department to be some sort of veiled threat and, 
if anything, made the government, and Smith in particular, more obdurate in their 
dealings with the NFA.26 The NFA insisted, however, that they were determined to 
reach their self imposed targets because if they were not to be regarded as partners 
responsible to the industry ’it would continue to remain a house divided against itself 
and might be as well written off as having no important place in the affairs of our 
country’.27 The implication was that the department were wilfully ignoring the NFA 
and had offered no response to approaches from it. Greene went so far as to suggest 
that it was interesting that no other vocational group was so obviously out of tune 
with the relevant state department than the farming organisations.
The response of Agriculture
For their part Agriculture felt that, ever since its formation in January 1955, the NFA 
had adopted a consistent policy of attempting to ’denigrate and besmirch the
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department’.28 At departmental level the complaints of the NFA were treated
cautiously but there was a feeling that the association was engaged in a policy of
trying to usurp the smaller farmer organisations, and were attacking the department
to show their strength.29 At ministerial level however things were not so
circumspect. Smith replied to Greene’s complaints in a handwritten letter just over
a week later and resolutely defended his department’s and his own record while
launching a savage attack on the behaviour of the NFA. Claiming that there was
absolutely no justification for all the NFA’s criticism, Smith recalled that there had
been 41 meetings between the department and the NFA in the past year alone.
Furthermore, many of these meetings had been convened on the initiative of the
department and some even at Smith’s own behest:
some members of the NFA may take the line that such meetings are 
no use as the Minister has his mind made up beforehand. But it is just 
not true that reasonable recommendations and constructive criticisms 
are ignored by my Department or myself and I can give you a lot of 
examples of this if you wish. I can even remember a scheme which I 
accepted against my better judgement, shortly after becoming Minister, 
merely because discussions between my officials and the NFA which 
had been going on a long time were approaching final agreement.30
A point made by both Smith and J.C. Nagle regarding the NFA’s grievances was that
the department had many aspects to consider and weigh which the NFA did not have
to concern themselves with but which were the government’s duty to examine.31 As
Nagle pointed out to the author:
in practice some clashes between the government and farming 
organisations have to a varying extent been inevitable, given the 
natural preoccupation of the latter with acquiring power to enable them 
to influence policy decisions by dint of continuing criticism without 
detailed and objective examination of the probable cost of their 
proposals to taxpayers. This is not to question the right of an 
organisation to use lawful means in pursuit of legitimate objectives, but 
it must remain a matter of opinion how far such rights should be
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tempered by reference to the public interest.32
Smith’s belief that his protestations ’should be taken in good part and not used for the 
purpose of misrepresentation and abusive attacks in The Farmers Journal and 
elsewhere’ was somewhat overoptimistic as the NFA did not always see it this way 
and were not totally convinced by the department’s protestations of putting the 
country first.33 As Louis Smith remarked: ’all we were ever told at our meetings 
with the department was that they had to think about the country as well as 
agricultural policy. The point was that the NFA had become a serious threat to the 
department because we were putting forward policies and wanted serious reform. The 
department could not handle such independent thinking’.34 Paddy Smith also accused 
the NFA of using their contacts with the department for purely propaganda purposes 
and ’purely misleading propaganda at that’ and complained that ’while we have on 
several occasions been complimented and thanked privately by your organisation for 
various actions and services, I find it hard to remember occasions on which any 
public acknowledgement was bestowed on us’.35 His annoyance stemmed from a 
number of policy clashes with the NFA.
Shortly after becoming minister in 1957 Smith discovered that illegally imported 
landrace pigs were flourishing in many parts of the country with the full support of 
many members of the NFA. There was even talk of a ’landrace martyr’ when one 
farmer was prosecuted for what was in effect breaking the law of the land. He then 
proceeded to legalise imports as there was then no other valid alternative. This, 
however, meant that a decision based on a full consideration of the merits of the case
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was ruled out and ultimately the indiscriminate smuggling introduced much inferior
breeding stock into the country:
no doubt the smuggling offered the prospects of large profits to 
individuals, but I don’t think many farmers would now disagree with 
me that it would have been far better for the country if a decision on 
import could have been reached by the normal process of a reasoned 
appraisal of the merits of the case.36
Yet the NFA saw this policy as outdated. As Louis Smith has since commented: ’The 
department wanted to cut the throat of any landrace pig that got into the country. The 
Danes were completely the opposite, that was the mentality of the department at the 
time, completely troglodyte’.37 Paddy Smith’s troubles with the NFA over this issue 
did not end with the legalising of imports. Once this had been introduced a 
determined effort was made by some members of the NFA to obstruct the 
department’s arrangements for a national herdbook. To the minister this behaviour 
bespoke a want of the sense of responsibility which he claimed should be the first 
essential in an organisation before it could be entrusted with powers of any kind.
Bovine TB was another area of conflict between the parties. Arrangements which had 
taken many months to work out between Agriculture and the various vocational 
bodies had been damned with ’faint praise’ once they appeared. The bovine question 
was also a source of dispute and tension within the farm organisations. The ICMSA 
which represented 80,000 dairy farmers complained that the bovine scheme was being 
implemented while simultaneously the price of milk was being reduced. Its deputy- 
president John Feely complained ’it was not surprising that the NFA would like to 
have the ICMSA operate the bovine scheme, because as the NFA stood for big cattle 
breeders and exporters, it would be to their great advantage to have TB free cattle.
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Now that the price of milk was to be reduced by Id per gallon the dairy farmer could
not pay for the bovine TB scheme’.38 While Feely was anxious to have the country
free of infected cattle in the ’national interest’, his argument was based on the
premise that it was dairy fanners who produced the young stock and it was dairy
farmers who would have to pay for it. At this stage the ICMSA was threatening
militant action on the milk price issue. Its president C.H. Fletcher insisted that
our agitation for an increase in price of milk is fair and we will have 
to be ruthless to get our just demands. Already my organisation has 
threatened to go slow on Bovine TB ... A cool £1 million has been 
plucked out of milk producers pockets. For the first time in 25 years 
milk has been reduced in price. This unexpected and unwarranted 
pilferage of the dairy farmers income ill behooves any government 
which wants to keep farmers on the land.39
While the ICMSA were combative in their approach, they did not resort to the strike 
method which they had pursued in 1953. They continued to assert their independence 
from the NFA vigorously and campaigned robustly to have their policies enacted. It 
was the NFA, however, with whom the government had most trouble.
During 1959 the NFA initiated a campaign which Smith claimed was calculated to 
shake faith in the 14 days test for cattle. The inspiration for this, he maintained, was 
’a shortsighted attempt to get acceptance for one method of selling cattle as against 
another without any apparent regard for the country’s long term interest’. The NFA 
had brought over farmers from Britain in support of their campaign which only 
served to incense Smith further. He accused the NFA of doing immense harm to the 
country and stated that it would be difficult in such circumstances to establish the kind 
of policy partnership that they desired. Smith furthermore accused the NFA of using 
their position in the Farmers Journal to put forward statements which had a ’strong
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political tinge’.40 This referred to a dispute over marketing for Donegal oats. The 
department issued a statement on the matter to the NFA but the issue appeared in the 
Fanners Journal under the guise of a mystery being cleared up and referred to 
misrepresentations and half truths coming from the minister. To Smith, the NFA and 
by implication the Farmers Journal were behaving as pawns of Fine Gael in 
agricultural matters. However there were inconsistencies in his stance on this 
position. He later informed Greene that he was not the first agricultural minister to 
encounter such problems with the NFA. Yet the only other agricultural minister to 
have had any substantial dealings with the NFA since its foundation was Fine Gael’s 
James Dillon. While both Sean Moylan and Frank Aiken briefly held the ministry of 
agriculture prior to Smith’s appointment, neither man made any impression in the 
department. In truth the NFA as a body were only interested in one thing, the 
betterment of their members’ livelihoods, and could not really be described as being 
anyone’s pawns. Whether it was a Fianna Fail government or an inter-party 
government they were going to press their demands with as much strength and resolve 
as they could muster.
At this stage relations between the NFA and the government were very tense. Smith, 
however, claimed that his grievances against the NFA were valid and that the 
organisation was open to criticism on many scores. He acknowledged that the NFA 
must be seen to criticise when the occasion demanded but argued that it should stick 
to the facts as otherwise relations were bound to deteriorate. It is difficult to imagine 
relations being any worse than they were at this point. Smith seemed intent on letting 
the NFA know that they were approaching bottom point with his department.
Relations, he proclaimed, had been 90 per cent destructive between the two and he 
left no doubt as to where he considered the blame lay. He attacked the NFA’s own 
record as a vocational group, claiming that there was not a great deal of evidence of 
them taking on independently ’many functions which they could perform and which 
we would be delighted to see them perform’.41 This is a moot point as various 
farmers’ organisations were taking on and developing a number of policy initiatives 
in a whole range of farming issues. The department, however, were not so keen on 
some of the proposals put forward. Smith, it would appear, was trying to have it both 
ways: condemning the farmers on issues of policy and their methods of trying to 
achieve their implementation, while excoriating them for not carrying out unnamed 
independent functions. Ultimately the department, and Smith in particular, believed 
that there was too much of a tendency within the farmers’ organisations to make any 
action they took themselves conditional either on undue support from the state or too 
high a degree of regimentation of other citizens. While asserting their willingness to 
encourage and assist the farmers to develop in their work the department argued that 
they could not aspire to such arrangements as existed in Britain for a comprehensive 
annual price review supplemented by taxation. Britain at this stage was a wealthy 
industrial country which imported something close to half its food. Ireland, however, 
was an agricultural country dependent on food exports to a competitive market for her 
livelihood, and thus was not in a position to support farm incomes at the expense of 
the rest of society.
The problem for the NFA, however, as Smith and his officials recognised, was that 
there were a number of other organisations which claimed to speak for the farmer.
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Thus the association had to seek the maximum of publicity.42 What was not 
acceptable to the department was the use of ’"stunt" methods which do not make any 
positive contributions to our problems but follow the easy way of contemptuous 
treatment of existing institutions’.43 As Smith himself acknowledged, the NFA’s 
leaders were not going to be able to remedy overnight all of the defects to which he 
had referred. In actual fact it was very unlikely that the NFA would be prepared to 
admit that Smith’s assessment of their position was justified. Indeed some years later 
Smith, still the minister, explained to the Taoiseach, Sean Lemass, that he had invited 
Greene to publish his letter and use it ’unconditionally in any way you may think 
useful and proper’. Greene did not, however, accept Smith’s invitation to make their 
correspondence public.44 Whether this was because he considered Smith’s criticisms 
to be valid is uncertain; what is clear, however, is that this correspondence did not 
deter the NFA from aggressively pursuing their agenda. They attempted to build up 
closer contacts with their European colleagues, and began applying with success to 
the department for funding to attend various agricultural conferences in such places 
as Italy, India and Yugoslavia.45 Louis Smith claims that it was Lemass who cleared 
the way for the NFA to receive financial assistance and that Paddy Smith was ’not 
one bit pleased with it’. He furthermore argues that the department themselves had 
no real wish to attend international agricultural gatherings but rather relied on the 
British to keep them informed.46 This was the beginning of a concerted effort by the 
farmers to gain entry into new markets for their produce. Their prime target was to 
be the EEC.
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The NFA and the EEC
By early 1960 the Irish farming community were very much alive to the benefits of 
participation in an EEC Common Agricultural Policy [CAP]. In July of that year the 
NFA issued a statement asking the government to consider becoming a partner in the 
EEC. This move was provoked by their disappointment at the failure to improve the 
position of Irish farming during the review of the Anglo-Irish trade agreement of 
April 1960. The secretaries of Finance and of Agriculture at the time have conceded 
that this agreement was somewhat of a disappointment, though both insist that it was 
the best that could have been achieved.47 The NFA, however, certainly did not take 
the same view. Not only did they urge consideration of the EEC option, they also 
suggested that Ireland should join before Britain and pursue its application whether 
Britain was admitted or not. The NFA considered that the historic trading link with 
Britain had been weakened and that its advantage to Irish farmers had been eroded. 
The CAP offered guaranteed high prices, access to an expanded consumer market and 
new trading opportunities. The NFA also suggested that Irish industry would be no 
worse off inside the EEC than was currently the case with respect to EFT A or the 
EEC.48 In fact, as Brian Girvin points out, what the farming lobby was interested 
in was maintaining its own income without consideration of other aspects of economic 
policy.49 There were two serious flaws in the NFA’s argument. The first was central 
to the question of when and on what terms Ireland would join the EEC. Ireland’s 
accession to the EEC would almost certainly be followed immediately by the 
abrogation of the Anglo-Irish trade agreements and the consequential elimination of 
the preferences, both industrial and agricultural, which Ireland enjoyed in the British 
market. The acquisition of any corresponding preferences in the EEC would only be
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achieved gradually over a transitional period which might be as long as ten years. 
Thus the intervening period would be fraught with difficulty, particularly for Irish 
industry.
Secondly there was the certainty that if Ireland joined the common market and raised 
a common external tariff against Britain, then industrial exports to Britain would be 
penalised in a way that could not easily be compensated for through increased exports 
to the six. For their part the NFA could only see two possible disadvantages to 
joining the EEC. Primarily there was the traditional and close trading relations 
between Ireland and Britain. The failure of the Anglo-Irish trade agreement to offer 
due recognition to Irish agriculture, despite Ireland’s almost complete dependence on 
this sector of the economy, made this special relationship redundant in the eyes of the 
NFA. Secondly there was the problem that joining the EEC could mean that British 
industrial supremacy, valued at about £100 million a year, in the Irish market might 
be replaced by the EEC, but at no greater cost.50 The NFA, however, believed that 
returns from agriculture and other exports to other EEC countries would benefit 
substantially both in volume and in value. Thus entry to the EEC would offset any 
setbacks incurred by the loss of the British market. The farming lobby was strong 
throughout Europe at the time and J.C. Nagle has speculated that the NFA were 
emulating their European counterparts in advocating entry to the EEC as a means of 
harmonising access to the European market for all farmers.51
In response to the NFA statement the Department of Agriculture statement warned 
the government that there were disadvantages, which were more serious than the NFA
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had intimated, as well as advantages to joining the EEC. Among advantages for Irish
farmers was the price support mechanism offered by the EEC to protect farm prices
from world competition, as well as the general principle that farm income would be
maintained at specified levels. This would benefit Irish farmers as their price levels
were lower than those prevailing within the community. In specific areas, Irish
farmers could hope to benefit from price adjustment elsewhere; Irish dairy produce
might be competitive given price, but this would have to be considered in the context
of surplus production within the EEC. In contrast to these advantages, the department
suggested that Irish beef would be placed at a disadvantage in the British market and
that the British might not continue the favourable payments agreed for Irish cattle,
while continental markets were unlikely to absorb the surplus beef from Ireland.
Entry to the EEC would also affect policy making, as the bilateral aspects of the
relationship with Britain would end, to be substituted by an expanded EEC within
which the Irish government would be much weaker. There were also social problems
to consider, as there was every likelihood that the migration of labour from
agriculture would continue if not accelerate under the EEC. The department
concluded on a rather pessimistic note:
In the absence of a large and growing home market, what is necessary 
from the farmer’s point of view is to become associated with an 
industrial economy strong enough to give agricultural incomes the 
necessary degree of support and stability. It seems unrealistic to 
suppose that this can be achieved in the absence of some special 
economic understanding with Britain, whatever solution may ultimately 
be found for the Six-Seven problem.52
The department were not, however, content to leave things as they stood and were 
favourable towards entry as long as Britain entered as well.53 While the government 
refused to be drawn on the question of its position if Britain did not secure
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membership, it is clear that the farming organisations were of the opinion that Ireland 
should nevertheless continue its application. The department most certainly did not 
take such a view. To it, the arguments which the NFA advanced for joining a 
common market could be applied with equal force to entering into a common market 
type arrangement with Britain. It was this appraisal of the economic situation which 
led the department in April 1959 to put forward the proposal for closer relations with 
Britain which were designed to tie Irish agriculture to British supported prices over 
a wider front.
The NFA, guided by similar considerations, were opting for integration with the
EEC. This was because to them it had so far proved impracticable to get from Britain
the kind of arrangement which Irish agriculture needed. For the department it was
appropriate in the circumstances that they should look to the country which took
eighty percent of Irish exports for such an arrangement.54 Fundamentally the NFA
agreed with the department’s point that what agriculture required was to ’become
associated with an industrial economy strong enough to give agricultural incomes the
necessary degree of support and stability’. The essential difference between them was
the economy they wanted to be associated with. Once again the department displayed
a cautious nature, declaring:
there are little grounds for hoping that any worthwhile expansion of 
our agriculture can take place on the basis of compromise solutions 
between the six and seven which would not provide for a large degree 
of incorporation of our agriculture in the support arrangements of 
Britain or the Common Market. Tariff quotas or marginal increases in 
trade at world prices, even if they could be obtained, might be helpful 
but would not alter the fundamental situation of our agriculture.55
The NFA, however, were much more insistent that the common market was the place
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to be. Greene told the Institute of Public Administration’s annual conference on
higher administration studies that
one is left with the impression that without becoming a partner in a 
larger, viable economic unit, that will seek to cater for agriculture in 
its wider community, there is little to be optimistic about for our 
agriculture over the next ten years. At all costs we must avoid the 
Common Market being used and becoming a fashion as the cure-all for 
our agricultural ills; there is no utopia for agriculture in the Common 
Market. All that can be said is that the Common Market will provide 
us with a greater opportunity ... I think I would be right in saying that 
without the advent of the Common Market, the prospect facing Irish 
agriculture over the next ten years is pretty hopeless.56
A crucial meeting was held in the Taoiseach’s office in December 1960 between the 
Departments of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce and the Taoiseach, and the 
NFA, which was represented by Greene and Louis Smith, the organisation’s chief 
economic advisor. The aim of this encounter was to try to formulate a coherent 
position between the government and the country’s main farming organisation on the 
issue of the EEC. For the NFA Greene felt that the ideal position for Ireland would 
be some sort of close agricultural association with Britain which would ensure that 
a worthwhile market was provided for all that was produced. This was clearly a 
utopian dream and completely unrealisable. The 1960 trade agreement with Britain 
did not bring any substantive change in agricultural relations and Britain seemed 
committed to a cheap food policy with high price supports for her farmers. Thus to 
the NFA there was no future in Ireland selling its agricultural surplus to Britain at a 
low price and it was clear that the Irish government could not afford the level of 
agricultural price support which was maintained in Britain. To the NFA the situation 
was clearcut:
Agricultural incomes in Ireland were falling, costs were rising, and a
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number of farmers including big ones were selling out. By contrast 
agricultural output in Northern Ireland had increased very substantially 
... As Britain had refused to give us a reasonable agricultural deal we 
would be better off in the EEC where we could participate in all the 
benefits of the CAP which was based on the idea of equalising incomes 
of farmers with those of other sectors. Furthermore this would give us 
a strong bargaining position in relation to Britain.57
When questioned by the Taoiseach as to the seriousness of this proposal, Greene 
replied that it was a very serious and well thought out proposition on which the 
farming lobby were united. Lemass, for his part, spelled out the problems that EEC 
membership without the accession of Britain would have for the country. He said that 
he saw no reason why greater agricultural efficiency should not be developed in the 
country, and that while reasonable prices were important they were not the only 
factor for improving the economic position of farmers. Paddy Smith pointed out that 
the government had not ’cried halt’ to increases in production, and they had not said 
the limit of subsidisation had been reached. The NFA were not convinced about these 
propositions, with Louis Smith claiming that the National Farm Survey for 1960 
showed that 60 per cent of farmers’ expenses went on labour of one kind or 
another.58 This, he argued, was a figure farmers simply could not afford. What they 
needed was greater subsidisation and an expanded market, the EEC.
The differences in economic emphasis for Ireland between Britain and the EEC were 
highlighted by Industry and Commerce. In 1959 exports to Britain were worth £96.5 
million to the Irish economy. Agriculture accounted for £54.2 million while non 
agricultural exports reached £42.3 million. In contrast total exports to the common 
market amounted to only £7.25 million, of which agricultural products were worth 
£4 million. These products were principally cattle, horses, beef and other meat
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commodities. The adoption of a common external tariff which would have to be 
applied to British goods would put the British at a disadvantage in the Irish market 
as compared with EEC countries. Thus it would be foolhardy to expect that Britain 
would continue to give trade advantages, agricultural or industrial, to Ireland in those 
circumstances. Action of the kind that Britain might be expected to take, Industry and 
Commerce pointed out, would result firstly in a loss of value of exports and secondly 
in a fall of volume. The prospects of making good these losses by trade in the EEC, 
they continued, were not bright. Factors such as Ireland’s peripheral position and lack 
of indigenous raw materials, they argued, would ’always tend to expose competitive 
disadvantages on our industries exporting to the continent’.59 For Industry and 
Commerce the principle of adequate protection for Irish industry, including special 
consideration for industries not yet fully established which was enshrined in the 
existing trade agreement with Britain, was paramount. It was a sign of the stagnant 
thinking in that department that they could see no benefit whatsoever in joining the 
EEC. To them protectionism was sacrosanct. As for agricultural matters they 
concurred with the views of the Department of Agriculture but added that there could 
be no expectation of any substantial market for produce such as cattle, milk, pigs, 
eggs, wheat and feeding barley in which the Six were already self sufficient. Thus 
they contended that the country could find itself in an economic community with 
attractive prices but only for a very small quantity of particular produce. Moreover 
in the political field Irish influence on the other six members would be very limited. 
Industry and Commerce concluded by noting that it should be remembered that the 
final objective of the six was political integration. What the country first required, 
however, was a combination of reasonable long-term price stability in agriculture and
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a very substantial expansion in productivity.
At this point, however, the key economic emphasis for Ireland remained agriculture
despite the 1958 commitment to industrial development in the First Programme for
Economic Expansion. This point was made both internationally and at home. When
the government formally applied for membership in January 1962 it proclaimed that
’for Ireland agriculture will always be of major importance. We are naturally anxious
that through membership of the European Economic Community, Ireland should be
able to look forward to a balanced development of agriculture and industry’.60
Lemass had also made this point over a year earlier when he told the Dail:
It is important to have it fully appreciated that the government have 
never treated, and do not now treat, the interests of manufacturing 
industry as the predominant consideration in their approach to the 
question of association with either of the European trading groups, or 
in their trading policy generally, in the sense of having failed to attach 
due importance to agricultural interests.61
While industry was constantly discussed at official level, the main objective of policy 
in the early 1960s was to obtain favourable membership to the EEC and to secure, 
if possible, continuing access to the British market for agricultural exports. The 
British market and agricultural exports as we have seen remained the key focus of 
Irish policy at this time, with industry being of secondary consideration. This was 
made explicit in Lemass’s statement to the Council of Ministers of the EEC in 
January 1962:
Because of the close inter-relationship of the economy of Ireland and 
that of the United Kingdom, and the vital interest of Ireland in 
agricultural trade, the Irish government would wish to have the 
discussions for the admission of Ireland to the Community completed 
at the same time as those for the United Kingdom.62
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In June 1961 the Irish government published a White paper on membership of the
EEC which prepared public opinion for the application the following month. As
Dermot Keogh observes, Ireland found that it could not postpone a decision on
applying for membership of the EEC once it had been learned through diplomatic
channels the previous April that Britain proposed to seek immediate entry.63 The
economic argument for joining was paramount. As Whitaker put it:
We have applied for membership of the EEC because it would be 
economic disaster for us to be outside of the community if Britain is 
in it. We cannot afford to have our advantageous position in the British 
market turned into one of exclusion by a tariff wall, particularly as our 
chief competitors would be inside the wall.64
While the NFA disagreed with the government over the reason for applying they were 
pleased once the government decided to press ahead with its application. The main 
question for the NFA and indeed the government was to what extent would the 
agricultural advantages which they looked forward to be whittled away by concessions 
to British and Commonwealth agriculture. The NFA had been notified by the 
department of this danger. For their part the NFA urged the government to ’keep an 
open mind’ as to what to do if the British negotiations failed.65 They held firm to 
the notion that Ireland should go ahead and join separately. For the government, 
however, should the British negotiations fail ’a new and changed position will have 
arisen and we cannot say what our reaction to it will be’.66
Prior to a meeting in Brussels where Lemass was to outline the Irish position to the 
community, he and Paddy Smith met the farming organisations to discuss the 
questions involved for agriculture. The main concern of the government, according 
to Lemass, was the terms on which the British might gain entry. As Britain were
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looking for a twelve to fifteen year transitional period, this would have a considerable 
impact on Ireland. The farming organisations were undoubtedly anxious that the 
agricultural sector receive the full benefits of membership. Raymond Crotty, later to 
become one of the most fervent critics of such membership, as an ICMSA 
representative supported the government, on the grounds that ’nothing could be worse 
than the present position’ ,67 He also intimated that minimum concessions should be 
sought for other sectors of the economy, and that a liberal industrial import policy be 
pursued. The government refused to be drawn on the question of its position if Britain 
did not secure membership, though it is clear that the farming organisations were of 
the opinion that Ireland should nevertheless continue its application.
Crotty, however, was a cautious advocate of the policy as he later wrote with a
certain disdain of ’the prospect particularly of membership of the EEC and the very
high prices that that held ensured the enthusiastic support of the Irish farming interest
for the ... policy of export promotion’.68 The whole European question and the
option of entry to a trading bloc worried Crotty. He later recalled that it was ’more
clear than ever in 1959 that this country of mine was in dire trouble and was being
set on a course that was bound to immerse it deeper and deeper’.69 In hindsight
Crotty maintained that without a more efficient mobilization of the state’s
considerable agricultural resources, there was no prospect of development. Crotty,
although an agricultural economist, was merely reflecting the views of farmers
countrywide when he later declared:
Whatever temporary benefits were secured by the Whitaker expedient 
would of their nature be transient and would leave the economy 
weaker and poorer in the long run. It seemed clear that if government 
could not cope with the old but elementary problem of making Irish
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agriculture a little less inefficient, it was poppycock to think that it 
could cope any better with the new task it was setting itself, to launch 
the country into sustained, competitive manufacturing for export.70
Within Crotty’s arguments one can see the real insecurity of the farming community. 
While they were enthusiastic supporters of Irish entry to the EEC, they still feared 
that within such a body, industry would supersede their dominant position within the 
Irish body politic. Nowhere is this argument put forward more strongly than in the 
contradictory writings of Raymond Crotty.
The case for redistribution
For the NFA entry to the EEC would alleviate the discrepancies between industrial
and agricultural incomes in Ireland, and ensure a rise in living standards both in rural
and urban Ireland. To Rickard Deasy, who had become the second president of the
NFA in January 1962, the balancing of incomes between agriculture and industry in
the early 1960s was a matter of ’dominant urgency’.71 He claimed that it was
irrational to ignore, as the government were doing, the fact that
the prosperity of the nearly 40 per cent of our population who are 
engaged in agriculture is a major factor in determining the buoyancy 
of the home market for all our products both industrial and 
agricultural. It is absurd to pretend - against a background of falling 
prices for almost all agricultural products, round after round of wage 
increases and shorter working hours awarded to other sections - that 
this does not inevitably worsen the relative position of our greatest 
industry - farming.72
He calculated that it would take an £83 million subsidy from the government to 
restore agriculture to its 1953 relationship with other sectors of the economic 
community. The agricultural lobby were worried by the eighth round of wage 
increases which had been concluded in December 1961 by the government, ICTU and
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the FUE. They feared that agricultural incomes would fall further behind the rest of
the community and complained to the government that every class in the community
was getting some improvement in income except the farmers. They felt that the trade
union movement had usurped their position in negotiating a further round of wage
increases with the government before they had an opportunity to advance a claim for
greater state subsidisation. Moreover the NFA were deeply suspicious of Lemass who
had spent all his political life in Industry and Commerce, was Dublin city born and
bred and who they regarded as being no friend of the agricultural community. As
Todd Andrews points out,
he had little real rapport with rural Ireland and, considering the 
amount of travelling he did when building up the Fianna Fail 
organisation, he had surprisingly little intimate knowledge of the 
countryside and its people. He was essentially the Dublin Jackeen with 
the ready wit and derisive humour so common in the city.73
The NFA’s demand for an £83 million subsidy gave rise to indignation in parts of the
civil service. A Department of Finance memorandum argued:
it might even be said that the NFA claim goes beyond the socialistic 
doctrine "from each according to his ability, to each according to his 
needs" and is based on a false notion of what is morally justifiable to 
transfer from one section of the community to another,74
while the Central Statistics Office maintained that ’the Irish farmer is no worse off 
as compared with non farm income than Belgian farmers and a lot better off than 
United States farmers’.75 Even the Department of Agriculture, who were 
theoretically in favour of a larger share of national income for agriculture,76 made 
it clear that ’the NFA analysis of the situation is very faulty indeed, and that their 
requests are most extravagant’.77 Industry and Commerce declared that it would
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be a pity to assume that any large scale transfer of present burdens 
from the agricultural to the non-agricultural sector could be achieved 
without detriment to our industries. Such a transfer would involve 
higher taxation and higher living costs, with their concomitant higher 
wages. Already it is clear that many of our industries will have a 
struggle to survive if we enter the Common Market.78
External Affairs were worried that if the government assumed that it had an
obligation to ensure that the level of income of the different sections of the
community must be more or less equal, it would involve ’transforming our economy
into something approaching a totalitarian system where the State is all-powerful and
the individual secondary’. At an economic level External Affairs were critical of the
NFA for postulating that the EEC represented
as it were, an El Dorado and that the farming community here is 
entitled to claim all the advantages which any member of the 
Community may at present give to its farmers. This is quite a serious 
matter and unless the NFA quickly realise the fact that they must face 
keen and probably ruthless competition within the Community, their 
members are likely to suffer grave consequences.79
Lemass in response accepted that developments adverse to farmers had taken place. 
He argued at a meeting with the NFA in March 1962, however, that some of these 
could be countered by increased productivity. He did offer the farmers something of 
an olive branch by stating that the government would review the provisions made for 
the farming community in light of the overall financial situation. This would ascertain 
whether productivity could be increased and whether its direction could, with 
advantage, be changed. The NFA claimed in reply that their call for an £83 million 
subsidy was formulated at the time of the electricians strike in September 1961 in the 
hope that their demand would be seen as a restraining influence on other sectors 
contemplating claims for higher monetary incomes. This, however, was not the case
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and the NFA while sticking to their figure of £83 million accepted that indiscriminate 
price support was not a practicable position.80 At this meeting the NFA also raised 
the subject of relations with the Department of Agriculture. They bluntly told Lemass 
that they deplored the unsatisfactory relations which existed and felt keenly that this 
should be remedied. As they visualised it, the department and the NFA ought to pull 
together in harness and the individual farmer should be convinced that the department 
was doing its best for him even though he might not be satisfied with the result at any 
particular time. Notwithstanding the fact that Lemass was city born and bred he was 
staunchly protective of the Department of Agriculture, and said that any suggestion 
that the department was not pulling its full weight in the interest of the agricultural 
sector was entirely without foundation. The Irish Press put the case for the 
government:
to be sure the government can always be counted on to give the 
farmers’ case a sympathetic hearing but then they have to think of the 
health of the economy as a whole. But for the protection given to 
agriculture in the home market, the cost of living would be 
considerably lower. In farming as in everything else, we must aim at 
greater productivity. Protection has served the Irish farmer a very 
valuable home market but for any real increase in agricultural 
productivity the farmers must look beyond their own shores.81
The NFA were unlikely to be assuaged by this argument. They did indeed want to
expand their markets by entering the EEC but until this became a reality they were
looking to the government to subsidise them through increased price support. Lemass,
however, explicitly warned the NFA that if in pursuit of their aims they intended to
disrupt public services, the government would take appropriate action:
if the NFA had in mind the staging of a political strike designed by 
economic pressure on the public, to secure concessions from the 
government, they could take it that the government would feel obliged, 
in the public interest, to take strong measures. Apart from the question
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whether the NFA case had merits or not, it would be contrary to the 
public interest that political strikes, which had not hitherto been 
resorted to in this country should be tolerated.82
This related to reports in the media and specifically to an interview with Deasy in The
Irish Times two days previous where he floated the idea that the NFA might have to
look to new forms of protest in their conflicts with the government.83 Lemass’s
warning can be interpreted as a sign of deep dissatisfaction within the government as
a whole with the threats emanating from the NFA. There was a feeling that the
agricultural lobby could not be pleased on any issue of policy. Lemass echoed this
when he wrote to Paddy Smith about the NFA’s demand for greater price support:
There is a question whether any decision on which the government 
may decide for the further assistance of agriculture should be 
announced and brought into effect separately or altogether. I suppose 
this will depend to some extent on the character of our decisions, but 
rather than appear to relate our decisions to the impractical totals of 
the NFA proposals, I think it would be preferable to announce and 
apply them separately. We will get no credit from the NFA no matter 
what we d o u  [my italics]
The government had since September 1961 accepted the principle that the farmers as 
well as other sections of society should share equitably in increases in the national 
income. Throughout 1962, however, the NFA saw no sign of their members gaining 
such an increase and increased their attacks on government agricultural policy. 
Lemass for his part, as we have seen, was of the opinion that the agricultural lobby 
would never be satisfied.
The NFA arrived at their figure of £83 million through a combination of two factors. 
Primarily they wanted the restoration at least of the agricultural position in 1960 to 
its relative position in 1953. This would account for £44 million. Secondly they
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demanded the allocation to people working on the land of an increased income
commensurate with that allocated (apparently in 1961) to industrial workers. This they
calculated would reach £39 million. To the NFA the situation in relation to
agricultural incomes at the time had not been created by the farmers themselves. The
failure of agricultural incomes to keep pace with other sectors of the community was
not due to inefficiency as Lemass had tentatively suggested when he declared that
farmers could increase productivity. What infuriated Lemass and the government as
a whole, particularly Paddy Smith and his officials, was that the NFA never made any
reference to or acknowledgement of the extensive state aid already given to
agriculture. This aid had increased from less than £5 million in 1938/39 to £13
million in 1953/54 to £26 million in 1960/61 and was estimated to reach £37 million
in 1962/63. The department calculated that assistance in one way or another, by way
of price support and other forms of guarantees, covered about 75 per cent of
agricultural sales. Furthermore, exchequer subsidies on final produce for the year
1961 represented over 20 per cent of the value of exports of the commodities
concerned. This, the department claimed, was a very high price to pay for whatever
increase in production was thereby generated.85 On the question of whether by the
end of 1961 incomes in other sectors had improved or not relative to agriculture,
different conclusions could be drawn depending on the starting years taken for the
purpose of comparison. Lemass himself also made reference to state support for
agriculture, stating:
the various aids and services provided for Irish agriculture already cost 
a great deal of money. In relation to national income, the Irish state 
supports its agriculture to a much greater extent than other European 
countries, even though the support rests on a smaller industrial base. 
Nevertheless it is unlikely that our taxpayers will not wish to support 
intelligent measures to raise small farm productivity and, in that way,
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to make them less dependent on public support. The problem of the 
small farm areas is one which has to be resolved before all our aims 
of national development are secured.86
Equating the ailments of the small farm sector to the aims of national development 
was quintessential Fianna Fail. Yet it was the rhetoric of the Fianna Fail of de 
Valera, not the rhetoric of Lemass the industrialiser. Whatever the merits of Lemass’s 
sympathies towards agricultural concerns there is little doubt that he was acutely 
aware of the electoral support given to Fianna Fail by this sector and would seek to 
assuage their fears when addressing them. It is doubtful however if he believed his 
own oratory on this occasion. Entry to the EEC, he presumed, would harness 
Ireland’s national development by offering its industries and productive agriculture 
greater opportunities in an enlarged market. It would not lessen the social and 
economic problems associated with the small farm.
The NFA, however, were in no doubt that agricultural incomes still lagged well
behind those of other sectors and continued to predict that farmer unrest would grow
unless the government took proper action to alleviate the plight of farmers. The
association’s general secretary Sean Healy asserted that
average incomes in Irish agriculture had consistently been below 
incomes in other occupations for at least half a century and at the 
present time farmers the world over -a few excepted - had lower 
incomes than their non farming counterparts.87
To Rickard Deasy there were four main reasons for such farmer unrest. These were 
the increasing rates burden, a persistent decline in farm incomes, a bleak future 
outlook and most importantly a general lack of attention to the fundamental task of 
planning agricultural development more coherently:
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successive governments have dealt with industrial development with 
vigour and enthusiasm. Although we can expect to face in a few years, 
in conditions of free competition, the highly developed agricultural 
systems of continental countries as well as the United Kingdom we 
have as yet not begun to assess and plan our agriculture. These plans 
must be comprehensive and embrace production, processing, marketing 
and trade policy. Farmers have been conscious of these planning 
deficiencies. They have for years been clamouring without avail for a 
fresh approach to the agricultural problem. It is precisely because 
nothing so far has been achieved and because there is little time left to 
achieve anything, that they have decided to make these deficiencies a 
major issue.88
Paddy Smith refuted Deasy’s charges that the government were inactive on behalf of
farmers and claimed that the adverse farm income trends were, in large measure, due
to international protectionist policies and artificially depressed prices in Britain,
developments over which he had no control. The Irish Independent attempted to try
to find the middle ground between the two and concluded that both could do better:
The Common Market may provide a remedy to this problem by 
opening continental markets to Irish farm produce. But if this 
brightened prospect is to be adequately availed of, much more than at 
present will need to be done as regards research, particularly in 
marketing, and in improving quality standards. A more energetic 
approach to these aspects of farm policy is long overdue. Money spent 
this way will provide a real long term improvement rather than a 
temporary stop gap to the erosion of farm incomes.89
This was a point James Dillon, leader of Fine Gael, noted when he argued that
the constant nightmare of farmers is that if they increase their 
production they will not be able to sell it. It should be the duty of 
marketing boards to find and develop markets for bacon, milk products 
and other agricultural products, and I am convinced that this can be 
done if the job is undertaken with the same resolution as Coras 
Trachtala has shown in the expansion of markets for industrial 
products.90
There was a perception within the farming community as a whole that the government 
was placing industrial development at the top of its economic agenda and that farmers
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campaigning for a redistribution of incomes. In fact the farming lobby had been
worried for quite a number of years about the question of industry superseding
agriculture as the main focus of government policy. For instance the report of the
Commission for Emigration, published in July 1954, included a minority report by
the Bishop of Cork, Dr. Cornelius Lucey, in which he maintained that ’the neglect
of agriculture for industry in recent decades is not only socially and morally
indefensible but demographically unjustifiable as well’.91 Some eight years later, in
November 1962, Bishop Lucey was playing the same tune, maintaining that ’small
farmers are the backbone of the rural community’ and charging that an atmosphere
hostile to them was being created by ’economists, industrialists, and lineal
descendants of the landlord class’.92 Yet while the agricultural industry had its
defenders amongst the hierarchy, there were some in the clergy, like James
Kavanagh, who lectured in social policy in UCD, who bemoaned the fact that
our farmers’ organisations spend most of their time appealing to the 
state. How many of these organisations have done anything really 
worthwhile to foster co-operation to enable our small farmers to 
survive? How many have sent representatives abroad to seek new 
markets? What has been done about the better marketing of our 
products?93
While the clergy as a whole did actively promote the idea of the agricultural sector 
as the heartbeat of society there was a belief within quarters of the church that the 
agricultural lobby should stop demanding from the state things they could do 
themselves. Yet the whole area of state interference in respect of agriculture was a 
confusing one. Bishop William Philbin of Clonfert, for instance, had supported the 
idea of state intervention in certain cases calling, in 1959, for the state to intervene
were being left in a policy vacuum. It was within this context that they were
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more actively in the land market, so as to buy out inefficient farmers.94
The NFA were unmoved by such indications of episcopal unease. Greene, at a
meeting with the government in April 1962, told Lemass that small farmers were
putting pressure on the leadership over what they perceived to be a declining standard
of living. He added that there was no political motivation behind any campaign that
might develop and agreed that it would be undesirable that political strikes should be
introduced. He did not rule this course of action out, however:
feelings of frustration and injustice were being built up and unless 
some concessions were made in the budget there might be local 
disturbances which the NFA might not be able to control... apart from 
the merits of the case for some concessions to the farmers, it would be 
in the national interest to prevent anything which would tend to destroy 
the country’s name abroad fo r  political stability.95 [my italics]
Whether Lemass perceived what might be called Greene’s advice as a threat is not 
clear. Yet there can be little doubt that that is what it was. The subtext of concessions 
for fanners in the budget was that the NFA would use their considerable power to 
ensure that none of their members would strike. With the government in the middle 
of delicate negotiations regarding accession to the EEC, the last thing it would have 
needed would be a farmers’ strike. Yet Greene’s logic is somewhat confusing. A 
strike by farmers, although it might hurt the government in its negotiations with the 
EEC, would serve only to damage the main lobbying group for EEC membership for 
Ireland, the farmers. Whatever the implications of Greene’s comments, what is clear 
is that the budget delivered four days later contained some concessions in rates and 
the abandonment of the proposed one pence levy on milk delivered at creameries. 
The Irish Press reported the reaction of the NFA that ’the budget was a victory in
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principle for the case presented by the NFA on behalf of organised farmers’.96 By 
the late summer of 1962 the Connacht Tribune was able to proclaim that relations 
between the government and the NFA had improved considerably, with the 
government being able to look upon the position of the farmers as ’reasonably 
satisfactory’ .97
Putting negotiations on a formal footing
January 1963 saw the collapse of Ireland’s negotiations to enter the EEC. The
farming community was deeply disappointed. Their hopes of increasing prosperity in
the larger common market were dashed. Once the government failed in 1963 to get
inside protected continental markets through the EEC, the decade of the 1960s would
become a decade of increased farmer militancy as farmers protested at what they
perceived as their increasingly disadvantaged situation.98 Relations with the
government soon deteriorated to their previous level. In September of the same year
the department was strongly critical of the farming lobby for leaking details of a
confidential meeting to the Farmers Journal, which in turn had accused it of lecturing
to the various farming organisations.99 To the department, however, it was a case
of misrepresentation of their position once more:
The Department’s representatives ... gave the fullest possible 
information and invited the fullest and freest discussion of the matters 
in question. The meeting lasted over two hours but one of the five 
representatives of farm organisations left nearly an hour before it 
ended and this may explain how you got the wrong end of the story in 
this case also. Incidentally the fact that a confidential meeting of this 
kind cannot be held without leakage and public misrepresentation 
obviously raises doubts as to how far such consultation can be 
continued.100
Serious differences between the government and the NFA also arose in late 1963 over
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of the NFA. For Lemass if the NFA were involved in illegal activities, the
government would be compelled to take whatever measures the situation required. He
told Deasy that the NFA could not expect ’to ride two horses at once and that a wish
for closer cooperation with the Department of Agriculture could not be reconciled
with a course of action which would make conflict with the government
inevitable’.101 In many ways the withholding of rates in Kilkenny mirrored events
of less than three decades earlier. Kilkenny was a strong farmers country and had
been one of the Blueshirts’ strongholds in the early 1930s. Indeed the very first
appearance in public of the ’blueshirt’ came in Kilkenny in April 1933.102 Moreover
Kilkenny was at the heart of an anti rates campaign in the summer and autumn of
1934, where the county council had a strong anti-Fianna Fail majority and refused to
co-operate fully in the collection of rates. This resulted in the county council being
dissolved by order of the Minister for Local Government.103 Lemass and Smith
would, in all probability, not have forgotten such incidents. Thus Lemass declared
that a campaign of this kind, struck at the very roots of representative government:
If agitation of this kind could succeed in any degree whatever, or even 
seem to succeed, or even so develop as being capable of being 
represented as having succeeded, it could bring the whole 
administration of local and central government into disorder. This is 
the road to anarchy and I want to make the Government’s position in 
this regard clear beyond any possibility of misunderstanding. We will 
not allow it to happen.104
Gibbons, although he incorrectly records that the strike occurred in 1962, is 
undoubtedly right in saying that it received enormous support amongst farmers. What 
is important in his discussion of the issue is its conclusion. Gibbons claims that Deasy 
turned the issue into one of principle and states that it was only resolved after ’Deasy
the withholding of rates in Kilkenny by a proportion of farmers who had the support
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negotiated the calling off of the rates strike on the secret promise of Lemass that the 
NFA would be granted permission to engage in an annual pre-budget review of the 
agricultural sector’.105
Gibbons may be correct here as entering 1964 the Kilkenny rates controversy had still
to be resolved. Yet by this time the government were in the process of redefining
their relations with the agricultural lobby. The NFA were to receive formal
government recognition: in future the government would welcome regular and full
discussions and consultation with them in the formulation of agricultural policy, both
broad and specific. For Paddy Smith the government’s difficulty had been in finding
a ’basis for fruitful cooperation while the NFA reserve the right to be destructively
critical of every move made by me to help farmers, and to use meetings with me and
my officials as the basis of biased attacks on us and on government policy’.106 He
thus considered that the government might as well be dealing with the NFA on a
formal footing in the future. He was of the opinion that a well organised farmers’
organisation had a really valuable job to do and that it was in his own interests to
work with them and give a fair hearing to any proposal of a constructive nature that
they might put before him. On 28 January 1964 Lemass sent a memorandum to the
NFA stating that while the government was concerned at the lack of unity and
cohesion amongst farmers’ organisations they did recognise that
the NFA are interested in all branches of agriculture, and they 
welcome the prospect of regular and comprehensive discussions with 
the NFA in connection with the formulation of agricultural policy in 
the broadest sense, as well as their practical co-operation in respect of 
specific areas of agriculture. ... It will be the ordinary practice of the 
Minister for Agriculture to inform the NFA about pending changes in 
his Department, proposed new schemes ... and to consider any 
representations they may wish to make to him in this regard.107
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We recognise that the NFA has a special status amongst farming 
organisations insofar as it is interested in all branches of Agriculture 
and we made it clear to them that we welcome the prospect of regular 
comprehensive consultations and discussions with them in connection 
with the formulation of agricultural policies in the broad sense as well 
as their practical co-operation in respect of the different aspects of 
agriculture. This special status will be taken into account by us in 
appointing farmers’ representatives on boards and so on.108
In the Dail Lemass repeated his official recognition of the NFA:
While the NFA received formal government recognition, Smith was disturbed at the
whole thrust of Lemass’s economic policies. After Lemass took over as Taoiseach in
1959, Smith had found it increasingly difficult to accommodate himself to Lemass’s
economic and social viewpoints. As Joseph Robins notes,
Smith, the archetypal countryman, had shared de Valera’s conservative 
vision of Ireland as a largely pastoral society based on traditional 
values which would withstand excessive inroads from socialist notions 
likely to promote a more dependent and less harmonious society’.109
Fundamental to Lemass’s approach, however, was, as we have seen, the development 
of an important industrial sector, a questioning of the efficiency and merits of existing 
industries, and a closer relationship between the government and the trade unions in 
the interests of economic progress. Indeed Lemass’s coopting of the farmers into a 
formal negotiating stance with the government is mirrored in his attitudes to the 
unions. Smith, however, saw the courting of the unions as sacrificing rural to urban 
interests. By this time it would appear that Smith was a friend of no one. His trials 
with the NFA had taken their toll on him and he launched a series of bitter attacks 
on the trade union movement. He objected to Lemass’s efforts to settle an eight-week 
long building strike as indicative of the place of urban interests in the Lemass 
government. The implication was that agriculture was having to take a back seat.
Thus on 7 October 1964 he offered his resignation, the first Fianna Fail minister to
do so on a policy issue. His resignation letter is littered with attacks on trade union
leaders, describing them as ’dishonest’ and ’incompetent’ and their case for a 40 hour
week as ’tyranny’.110 Lemass gladly accepted Smith’s resignation, reportedly
announcing it to the press before Smith could do so himself. He subsequently
appointed Charles Haughey, his son in law, to replace Smith. Smith’s views were
those of the farming community in general. As Gearoid O’ Tuathaigh has pointed out,
once the trade union movement began to move to centre-stage in the new debates on
Irish economic and social development
it began to seem to many farmers that they were in danger of being 
relegated, if not exactly to the margins of Irish politics, at least to a 
more secondary role than they had traditionally enjoyed. Predictably, 
they felt threatened, and resolved to remind the government of Sean 
Lemass that they were still a formidable power in the land.111
Thus one can see the protests of the NFA in the light of the growing strength of the 
unions’ influence on the Lemass government. While one can see both Lemass’s 
courting of the unions and his formalising relations with the NFA as the beginnings 
of a corporatist-style approach to government in the early 1960s, in that a formal 
political structure was put in place which integrated the NFA and Congress as socio­
economic groups through a system of representation with the government, the 
farmers’ organisations and the farming community in general were extremely wary 
of Lemass.
As 1963 drew to a close, state-farmer relations were at a low ebb. The farming 
lobby’s disappointment at losing out on entry to the enlarged market of the EEC had 
only made them more determined to advance their cause by every means possible.
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The government, however, continued to find it difficult to maintain harmonious
relations with the farming bodies. An increase in government subventions, in 1963
such that the cost of these agricultural supports to the taxpayer for the first time
exceeded £40 million, did not satisfy the NFA. Moreover they proclaimed that the
increase was entirely due to them. Lemass echoed the frustrations of the government:
Notwithstanding the dimensions of this support to agriculture, 
notwithstanding the substantial increase in the volume of this support 
in recent years, the Government were getting very little thanks from 
the professional spokesmen of farmers’ organisations. I want to make 
it clear that we are not looking for thanks ... But I want to say that I, 
and all the members of the Government party, are becoming 
completely fed up with the constant propaganda which is being 
circulated among farmers that these provisions were made, this 
assistance given, and these new schemes of aid to agriculture devised 
not because we wanted to do so but because we were forced into 
giving them by reason of pressure and agitation. This is not true; it 
was never true and it never will be.112
He also claimed that ordinary farmers in the community had a very lively 
appreciation of what the government had done and was striving to do to improve the 
situation for them. His quarrel was with the NFA, not ordinary farmers.
Yet there can be little doubt that ordinary farmers looked to their respective 
organisations for leadership and indeed blamed the government for what they saw as 
their increasing difficulties. Both the NFA and the ICMSA were mobilised from the 
bottom upwards.113 Any improvement in the general position of agriculture would 
be credited to their leadership, not to the government. Thus it was in an atmosphere 
of mistrust and suspicion that state - farmer relations were conducted in this period, 
a time when the government were attempting to broaden Ireland’s industrial base and 
in which the farming community feared they would be left behind as industry boomed
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in a rising tide of prosperity. Yet this period also saw the formal recognition by 
government of the role of farmer organisations in the formulation of policy. It was 
perhaps naive of Lemass to expect that, having invited the farmers to sit at the policy 
table, they should abandon the confrontational approach that had in their eyes won 
them that approach. For all their Blueshirt antecedents, by the early 1960s the NFA 
had come to be seen by Fianna Fail ministers as a troublesome but essentially 
apolitical grouping: ten years earlier they regarded them simply as Fine Gaelers on 
tractors. The depoliticisation of interest group politics, as seen in the formalisation 
of relations between the Fianna Fail government and the NFA can, be viewed as an 
example of how far Lemass had gone in attempting to create new political 
relationships and structures in the Ireland of the early 1960s.
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Chapter Five 
Ireland and a Wider Europe; The EFTA negotiations 1957-1961
Looking at EFTA
This chapter deals explicitly with the Irish government’s negotiations to join EFTA, 
thus its chronology deliberately reverts back to 1957 when the initial steps were take 
to set up such a free trade area. In February 1957 the Council of the Organisation for 
European Economic Cooperation [OEEC] initiated negotiations to establish a free 
trade area in Europe. Its objective was to establish a region within which there would 
be no tariff barriers or other restrictions to trade, although the already existing EEC 
and each of the other countries within the proposed trading bloc would maintain 
protective defences against the rest of the world.
As a member of the OEEC since 1948 Ireland participated in the negotiations during 
1957 and 1958. Two points were of particular importance to the Irish. These were 
the future of tariffs on agricultural products, and the proposals to give special 
treatment to underdeveloped countries (later known as countries in course of 
economic development) by extending the period in which tariffs might be eliminated 
and by providing financial assistance if required.1 Originally these countries were to 
be Greece and Turkey; the Irish government, however, also hoped to be included in 
this category. The prospect of a European free trade area embracing the member 
countries of the OEEC was not viewed by Irish policy makers with any great 
enthusiasm given that the dismantling of protection was seen as a serious threat to 
Irish industry. Furthermore the removal of barriers to imports into Britain would
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eliminate Ireland’s preferential position in that market vis-a-vis other OEEC
countries.2 Yet the weakness and instability of the Irish economy after a generation
of self-government and the evident failure of traditional policies to achieve their
declared objective led many to question the validity of these policies and to seek
effective alternatives. As Garret FitzGerald pointed out at the time:
The emergence of the Free Trade Area Plan, and its presentation to the 
Irish public, could scarcely have been more opportune ... and the 
interest, even excitement which this proposal has aroused throughout 
the country provides remarkable evidence of the existence of this new 
and receptive climate of opinion.3
Three working parties were set up by the council of the OEEC in March 1957:
Working Party 21 which would deal with the general constitution of the proposed free
trade area, Working Party 22 dealing with the special position of agriculture, and
Working Party 23 to deal with the position of countries in course of economic
development. It was to the latter that the Irish government turned their attention. At
a meeting held on 9 October 1956 the second inter-party government decided that,
acting under the direction of the Taoiseach, the secretaries of External 
Affairs, Industry and Commerce, Agriculture, Finance and the 
Taoiseach should examine the probable effects on Ireland’s interests of 
an association between the proposed Customs and Economic Union and 
the other member countries of the OEEC in a Free Trade Area.4
This was the genesis of the four secretaries group which was to play the key role in
moving Irish economic policy from a protectionist framework to one where
interdependence with other European economies was assumed. Seven meetings were
held before a memorandum was issued on 18 January 1957. The report pointed out
that in considering the question of Ireland’s participation in a free trade area, the
government had to take into account not only the economic considerations arising but
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also general considerations of national policy affecting Ireland’s participation in a
movement towards closer association of the countries of Western Europe. As T.K.
Whitaker has pointed out,
it was taken as granted by Irish policy makers from an early stage that 
economics and politics were mixed in a European context. We realised 
that serious issues had to be faced on both fronts when we first debated 
entering EFT A.5
At this stage, however, economic considerations were still paramount and it was these 
which took up the majority of the memorandum. While acknowledging that the 
establishment of the free trade area was intended to secure the economic benefits of 
a unified market of 250 million people, providing the opportunity for specialisation, 
lower cost production, more productive investment and constantly growing output of 
goods and services and rising real incomes, the memorandum noted that this of itself 
would not ensure that individual countries would share proportionately in the expected 
benefits. It was also uncertain as to whether investment and réadaptation funds would 
be established for the purpose of assisting any member countries which would 
otherwise suffer through having to fulfil the obligations of membership. Whether 
Ireland joined or not, the formation of a free trade area and the emergence of an 
integrated Western European market of 250 million people were developments which 
would have profound implications for the Irish economy, necessitating a fundamental 
reappraisal of economic plans and policies. Thus the government was forced to 
consider not merely the effects, favourable and unfavourable, on the economy as it 
then stood on the advent of a free trade area, but also the question of whether 
participation in such an area, or the adoption of some different policy, would best 
promote the expansion of the economy in the future.6 Amongst the specific
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considerations the government was concerned with were the effects of assuming an 
obligation to remove existing protection progressively over a period of years and of 
foregoing the right to impose further protection against countries within the area. It 
advocated the possibility of the inclusion in the agreement of provisions for escape 
clauses related, for example, to balance of payments difficulties, special arrangements 
modifying the obligations in favour of member countries like Ireland whose 
economies were not fully developed, measures to avoid unfair competition, for 
instance dumping, and investment and réadaptation funds.
After a lengthy analysis of the major sectors of the economy it became clear that
Industry and Commerce and Agriculture were the most fearful regarding Ireland’s
position. Industry and Commerce came to the following conclusion:
As regards a large section of existing industries, the Department of 
Industry and Commerce can see no prospect of their survival, even as 
suppliers of the home market, except with permanent protection. The 
Department of Industry and Commerce can see no prospect of a 
significant expansion of industrial exports from Ireland to the 
Continental part of the Free Trade Area even if we were members of 
the Area and could thus enter this market without any tariff barriers.7
The Department of Agriculture saw events in much the same light and saw Tittle 
prospect of a significant expansion of agriculture exports from Ireland to the 
Continental part of the Free Trade Area even if we were members of the Area and 
agricultural products were freely traded by all members other than Britain’.8
Industry and Commerce submitted an appendix to the report reinforcing its case, 
citing the main reasons why protection should continue. It claimed that without 
protection, 60 per cent of industrial employment would disappear and estimated that
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100,000 jobs would be directly lost, to say nothing of the consequential falls in
employment that could be expected in other sectors. This objection was recognised
in the report and a cautious approach was advised. Agriculture also recommended that
a definite stand should not be taken, claiming that our ’final attitude should be
determined in the light of the results of the proposed negotiations with Britain due to
be held later in 1957’. Ultimately the report drew attention to the dangers inherent
in the state of the economy:
Ireland has reason not merely to be worried about the setting up of a 
Free Trade Area but about her future economic and political prospects 
generally. It is obvious that we can avoid economic stagnation and 
continuous loss of population only by making the most strenuous and 
urgent efforts to raise the efficiency and volume of production both in 
agriculture and in industry. If a Free Trade Area is established and we 
had to accept from the start the full obligations of membership, those 
existing industries which need permanent protection (and therefore 
could not adjust themselves over the transitional period) would go to 
the wall. Few new industries could be established in the absence of a 
protective shield and a guaranteed home market.9
This report has come in for scathing historical criticism. Girvin asserts that, produced 
at the height of the recession, it ’reflects the stagnancy in policy formation by this 
time. It is surprising that such a report makes no attempt to offer positive proposals 
but continues to assert the primacy of traditional policy’.10 Lee is equally harsh, 
claiming that both Industry and Commerce and Agriculture appear as ’virtually 
burned out volcanoes, clinging to recipes that had failed to deliver the goods and the 
jobs in recent years, whatever degree of success they may have achieved in earlier 
decades’.11 Furthermore, as Garret FitzGerald pointed out at the time, Ireland had 
a labour force of 1,225,000 of which about 100,000 were employed in industries 
manufacturing or processing goods that were protected. Of this figure about half had
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been employed in these industries in 1926, before protection was introduced, and the
direct influence of protection on the level of employment could not therefore be
assessed at more than 40,000 - 50,000 additional jobs even if one assumed that there
would have been no increase in industrial employment during those previous thirty
years.12 This was most unlikely. The existence of a tariff protecting a particular
commodity did not necessarily imply that all the manufacturers engaged in producing
that item required the protection or would be unable to operate profitably without it.
In some instances tariffs protected the less efficient producers only and the elimination
of such tariffs could well have had no effect on their more efficient competitors,
except, perhaps, to bring them more business as the weaker firms were eliminated.
This, however, was something Irish firms did not have in their psyche. As Domhnall
McCullough has pointed out:
Irish firms at the time were not really interested in trying to gain 
business from their competitors. If a rival firm went bust there was a 
feeling of sadness, because these were usually people you knew well 
and dealt with.13
Whether firms who were operating at less than maximum efficiency simply because
they could earn a profit with methods aided by tariff and quota protection would
’bestir themselves to improve their efficiency and so stay in business if tariffs and
quotas were gradually to be withdrawn’14 is a moot point. Irish industry was stuck
in the mindset of protectionism. As Louden Ryan pointed out in 1955:
the fact that a finished product was being imported in quantity was 
taken as sufficient reason why its production in the Irish Republic 
should be encouraged. The size of the import duty that was imposed 
seems to have been determined by what an existing or prospective 
firm thought necessary to ensure its production here. There is no 
evidence that producers had to prove their efficiency before protection 
was granted. Nor is there evidence that the size of the tariff imposed 
was related to what an efficiently organised firm would require to
204
render its operations reasonably profitable.15
Thus haphazard and indiscriminate protection became the norm with the result that 
industries which had been developed since the 1930s made only a negligible 
contribution to the country’s exports. Yet policy makers, particularly within Industry 
and Commerce, were most reluctant to tamper with any aspect of protection.
After considering the report the government as a whole showed a similar lack of 
ambition and foresight when it contended that no commitment to join the proposed 
area should be entered into until every possibility had been explored into securing 
adequate safeguards as a country in the process of economic development. No 
initiatives were to be taken until it became clear that special arrangements, which 
would enable Ireland to enter the area, were conceded. J.C. Nagle has defended the 
position taken by Agriculture as ’the only one practicable at the time. We were in a 
very difficult situation. Britain was our predominant market and we had to consider 
all aspects of policy with that in mind’.16
The negotiation process
That was the position the Irish delegation were to take at the meeting of the council 
of the OEEC fixed for 12 February 1957. It is worth noting that at this stage the 
Department of Finance was counselling against any approach which assumed that the 
Irish economy was static and that the country was prepared to give up all 
opportunities of further economic expansion.17 Its new secretary, T.K. Whitaker, 
questioned the wisdom of backing a policy of sheltering permanently behind a 
protectionist blockade. For the dynamic Whitaker it was not simply a matter of
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economic theory but something that bore directly on the hopes of future development.
Rather than dwelling on the difficulties inherent in dismantling protection, he looked
towards ’the undoubted adverse consequences of being left stranded on a high and
narrow protectionist plateau on which acceptable living standards could be provided
only temporarily and for a diminishing number of our people’.18 At a Cabinet
meeting on 8 February 1957, it was decide to issue a formal statement voicing
general approval of the idea of a free trade area:
In accordance with her general attitude to movements by European 
countries towards closer economic association, Ireland welcomes the 
proposal to form a European Free Trade Area. While her attitude to 
the question of participating in an area will, as in the case of other 
countries, be determined in the light of consideration of her own 
national interests, Ireland views with sympathy this latest movement 
towards closer association among European countries and wishes the 
proposal every success.19
J.J. McElligott, at this stage Governor of the Central Bank, supported Whitaker’s
stand and in early 1957, on behalf of the board of the Central Bank, he went on
record in favour of Ireland joining EFT A:
taking the long view the board was one of the opinion that it would not 
be in the best interests of this country to remain aloof from the main 
stream of European economic development and that the disadvantages 
which would result from failure to join the proposed Free Trade Area 
were likely to outweigh the temporary adjustments necessary in our 
economy consequent on a decision.20
McElligott, legendary for his adamantine refusal to contemplate government 
intervention in the market, noted that serious consideration would have to be given 
to the impact of the area on the Irish economy and so was of the opinion that it would 
be more advantageous for the government to be inside rather than outside it. While 
this cannot be interpreted as a Pauline conversion to Keynesianism by McElligott, it
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is significant that at this stage even he was of the opinion that the country could not
operate economically in isolation. McElligott, although always a free trader in the
abstract sense, had overseen the preeminence of protection in his role as secretary
between 1927 and 1953. Sean Cromien notes that McElligott’s support for EFT A can
in many ways be linked to the fact that
he was a sponsor of Whitaker and he was open to ideas like EFT A as 
philosophically he would have seen it as a classic free trade idea. I 
think also he had reached the conclusion that protectionism had had its 
day and a new economic philosophy had to be put into place.21
Whitaker emphasised the need for closer association with some larger economic unit, 
arguing that
it would be a sad commentary on our industrial and agricultural policy 
over the last thirty years if we could now choose only between two 
alternatives of (a) continuing to fall behind other countries in material 
progress, with an unabated outflow of emigrants, or (b) economic 
reintegration with the United Kingdom. Whatever difficulties it may 
involve, the European free trade area offers us a better prospect than 
either of those alternatives and we should hesitate long before we 
would decide to stay out. At the moment it was obviously the right 
policy to try to secure the most favourable terms of membership.22
At the first meeting of Working Party 23, held on 18 March 1957, Ireland indicated
that she would be submitting a claim for special treatment. This was to be based on
the belief that the aim of EFT A should be to establish conditions which would enable
every member of the OEEC to enter the area without fear of serious damage to its
economic fabric. This Ireland would be unable to do unless she received special
treatment in the area. In the meantime a vigourous debate was going on within the
principle departments about the route to be taken. Agriculture in a memorandum to
the government in April maintained that
as Britain will continue to be the predominant market for our 
agriculture generally, our policy with regard to the free trade area and
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the common market should be coordinated with a policy of ensuring, 
on the one hand that any special advantages we have in the British 
market should be preserved and developed, and on the other hand, 
that any trading difficulties are alleviated. In this context the ultimate 
fate of Britain’s trade preferences in the Irish market would appear to 
be a consideration of much importance, which should not be left out 
of account in taking final decisions regarding membership of the free 
trade area.23
A month previous Industry and Commerce advanced the view that they
might agree that we could offer to submit ourselves for examination 
(say in three years time and at successive three year intervals) and to 
accept the results of such examinations. It was also possible that in the 
last resort we might be able to agree to make an initial reduction of 
say 10 per cent in our tariffs, subject to exemption for certain sensitive 
industries, provided the choice was left to us.24
This was significant in that it showed that Industry and Commerce were themselves
not content to let things drift in the policy area. Although MacCarthy’s tone is
hesitant and a number of years later he would argue bitterly with Whitaker about
protection, nevertheless he also realised that association with some sort of trading
bloc might have some benefit for Irish industry. In April the government decided to
submit a memorandum to Working Party 23 which would include:
an intimation to the effect that Ireland is willing to submit herself to 
independent examination, at suitable intervals, by the appropriate 
institutions of the Free Trade Area and to assume obligations of 
membership when it has been established, as a result of such 
examination, that her economy has attained a better relationship with 
the economies of those member countries of the Area which are at 
present more highly industrialised than Ireland.25
The Irish Ambassador in Paris, William Fay, who was chairman of Working Party 
23, however, urged the government to present its submission in a more ’optimistic’ 
fashion. He suggested the application should note that Ireland welcomed the idea of
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the creation of a large free market, which might at last provide a solid basis for the 
development of Irish industry through exports for which the government was anxious. 
He argued that the submission should declare that such development was ’up to now 
frustrated by the limits of the small home market’ but that the creation of a free trade 
area would enable the government ’to compete with the best in Europe and thus make 
a substantial contribution to the success of the free trade area’.26
Eventually the theme of Ireland’s memorandum submitted to the working party in 
May was that she could not hope to share in the benefits of a free trade area unless 
the obligations of membership were modified so as not to deprive the country of its 
freedom to protect its industries over an extended transitional period.27 As The 
Statist pointed out some months later when negotiations were still ongoing, ’there is 
no doubt that entry into a free trade area on a basis of equal responsibility with 
partners vastly better developed industrially would strike a death blow to the Irish 
economy’.28 While Whitaker undoubtedly realised this, he wanted to see a situation 
develop where Ireland would one day be able to compete with these partners. It was 
with this in mind that in March 1957 he had produced a memorandum on the state 
of the economy where he declared that something would have to be done 
economically or the achievement of national independence would prove to have been 
a futility:
In the political field the primary national objective is the re-unification 
of the country. Until that is achieved, however, and no doubt after it 
has been achieved, the principal economic problem of the Irish 
Government will continue to be the safeguarding of political 
independence by ensuring economic vitality. Without a sound and 
progressive economy, political independence would be a crumbling 
facade.29
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It was with this memorandum in mind that the official application to EFT A was 
drafted. In essence it was an analysis of the Irish economy. It began by outlining the 
late start Ireland had made in the industrial field, ’as prior to independence no 
autonomous policy for the development of Irish industry existed’. It added that a lack 
of industrial tradition, managerial skill, adequate risk capital and native raw materials 
coupled with her proximity to such a heavily industrialised country as Britain, and 
Ireland’s insular position, made the new state’s task of establishing Irish industries 
particularly difficult.30 The memorandum pointed out that for most nations joining 
it, EFTA would have the attraction of helping them to expand their exports. This, 
however, would not be the case, in the short term at least, for Ireland. In contrast, 
the setting up of the free trade area would gradually remove the advantages, duty-free 
entry to the British market had hitherto conferred on Irish exports. Ireland was 
entitled to this benefit under the provisions of the Anglo-Irish trade agreements of 
1938 and 1948. This, it declared, would mean that our ’industrial exports to Britain 
are bound to be reduced. And this, be it noted, will happen whether Ireland joins the 
Free Trade Area or not. Thus the establishment of the Area will strike a serious 
blow at this country’s industry against which no counter-action is possible’.31 What 
worried the Irish government was that entry to the area on the basis of the assumption 
of the general obligations of membership would mean gradually dismantling 
protection and exposing Irish industries to outside competition at the same time as 
they were trying to adjust themselves to the loss of the special position they enjoyed 
in the British market. They accepted the argument that the protected sector could not 
stand up to such a test. As Whitaker has since commented,
while I was arguing very strongly that we could not go on simply as
we had been, I realised, as did others, that a gradual reduction in
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protectionism was what was important. Industrialists and the 
Department of Industry and Commerce had been so used to 
protectionism that the very thought of its removal made them 
shudder.32
In their memorandum the Irish government recognised that there was an urgent need 
to develop an industrial sector comparable to that of other Western European 
countries. There was a lack of balance between agriculture and industry with only 
15.3 per cent of the labour force engaged in manufacturing industry. Furthermore a 
high level of unemployment, aggravated by the degree of underemployment on the 
land and the scale of emigration which was higher than the natural increase in the 
population, highlighted the importance of Ireland securing industrial economic 
growth. The government’s prime economic objective at this stage was outlined in the 
memorandum:
If the home market could be preserved by the maintenance of 
protective measures, Irish enterprises would become more attractive as 
an investment proposition to our people at home and to the investor 
from abroad. According as capital was forthcoming through the growth 
of the habit of investment among our people, and through the 
attraction of money, technical skill and enterprise from outside, 
development could be expected to proceed on the pattern of other 
European countries and in a measurable time to reach a point when the 
assumption of the obligations of membership of the Free Trade Area 
would become a practical proposition.33
The measurable time the Irish government had in mind was twenty five years, within 
which Ireland would be prepared to submit to independent examination her economic 
position at suitable intervals. Once Ireland’s economy had attained a satisfactory 
relationship with the economies of other member countries, the government would 
assume obligations of membership to the extent justified by such an improvement. As 
Maher points out, the presentation of the Irish case for special treatment is
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noteworthy in two respects. Primarily it marks some softening of the hard-line 
attitude previously adopted by Industry and Commerce in that it was accepted that 
there must be a time limit to protection. Secondly the proposal was silent on the 
treatment of agriculture in the Free Trade Area.34 The government was prepared to 
accept the Department of Agriculture’s view that the best option for Irish agriculture 
lay in exploiting bilateral arrangements with Britain. In April 1957, as we have seen, 
Agriculture had maintained that as Britain would continue to be the predominant 
market for Irish agriculture generally, the policy with regard to the Free Trade Area 
and any common market should be co-ordinated with a policy of ensuring that any 
special advantage Ireland had in the British market should be preserved and developed 
and that any trading difficulties should be alleviated.35
In this context the ultimate fate of Britain’s trade preference in the Irish market would 
be a consideration of much importance which could not be left out of account in 
taking final decisions regarding membership of EFTA. This is a significant point. 
Ireland’s potential free trade area status was most profoundly influenced by its 
relations with its main trading partner, Britain, which absorbed almost 80 per cent of 
Irish exports. Although most of this was in the form of cattle and dairy produce, 
about 13 per cent consisted of industrial products through which the Irish government 
hoped, eventually, to diversify their economic structures. Of these no less than two 
thirds enjoyed preferential margins in Britain which would be eroded over the period 
of British tariff dismantling. Reciprocally, Britain enjoyed preferential access on about 
a quarter of its exports to Ireland, namely fuel, textiles, iron and steel, clothing, 
paper and chemicals. If Ireland stayed out of EFTA and agriculture was excluded, as
212
the British were insisting it should be, Britain would be able to keep these 
arrangements because it could maintain the Irish preferences on agricultural exports 
to Britain. For the Irish to stay out made sense to British policy makers.36 It also 
made sense to Industry and Commerce and Agriculture since they would be able to 
continue to keep domestic industry behind high tariff walls. For example many items 
of clothing carried a duty of 75 per cent. Thus for Ireland to join the free trade area 
on equal terms was a non starter. In addition to the inevitable loss of the British 
industrial export market, it would have to jettison its option of abandoning industrial 
protection on the domestic market as well. Neither was it in Irish interests to insist 
upon the inclusion of agriculture since to do so would be to sacrifice Ireland’s 
privileged position on the British market, with precious little chance of finding 
compensation elsewhere in the face of Danish and Dutch competition. Thus, as we 
have seen, Agriculture advised caution and a preservation of existing links with 
Britain. In respect of this link with Britain, what the Irish government would be 
unable to do, if it were a member of EFTA, would be to grant Britain a continuation 
of its industrial preference. This is an important point in that British exports to 
Ireland at this stage were not much smaller than those to West Germany. Britain, in 
the shape of the President of the Board of Trade, Reginald Maudling, urged the Irish 
government not to make hasty decisions in relation to entrance of EFTA. It was 
British fear of losing the Irish market which prompted this action.37
The Irish case was considered at a meeting of the working party in Paris on 28 May 
1957, at which certain supplementary information was given orally by J.C.B. 
MacCarthy of Industry and Commerce, in support of the submission. The majority
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of the various delegations of OEEC countries took a sympathetic attitude to Ireland’s 
submission, although some nations felt that the Irish case was unduly pessimistic.38 
Accepting that the Irish presentation was very much an outline one, the working party 
sent a delegation to Dublin in June 1957. Its principal objective was to gain further 
information on the issues of tariffs, agriculture and capital. In the first instance the 
delegation wanted to know whether tariffs would be taken off during the 25 year 
period mentioned in the Irish memorandum and if so would this be done on a global 
or on a selective basis? Furthermore they questioned whether Ireland was proposing 
to wait until after the examination by the Free Trade Area organisation before making 
tariff reductions or would it agree in advance to a tariff reduction scheme? They 
asked what was the government’s position in relation to preferential tariffs? The 
delegation wondered whether existing practices by other countries were harmful to 
Ireland’s agricultural exports? Finally, under the heading of external capital they 
wanted to know whether external finance was needed for industrial development.39
Before the government formally replied with a memorandum dated 13 July 1957, 
MacCarthy had informed Fay that Ireland could not guarantee in advance to have 
removed all quotas after a twenty five year period although that was its aim: ’I did 
not say that the government would undertake not to reduce existing quotas. What I 
did say was that they would not impose new quotas. ... I do not want you to think 
from what I have said that in practice we will reduce existing quotas’.40 While this 
made MacCarthy’s position clear the report of a meeting of the committee of 
secretaries on 12 June noted that ’the Government would wish that the discussions 
with the working party delegation and negotiations generally with the OEEC should
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proceed on the assumption that Ireland will go into the Free Trade Area if at all 
possible’. It was with this view in mind that the memorandum dealt comprehensively 
with the tariff question and advanced several supplementary proposals:41 It argued 
that Ireland be exempted from any obligations to effect automatic tariff reductions for 
a period of ten years following the coming into effect of the first series of tariff 
reductions made by the other member countries. Furthermore during that period it 
argued that Ireland should be free to impose new tariffs or increase existing tariffs, 
on condition that no tariff imposed or increased during the period would exceed 50 
per cent ad valorem. Moreover it maintained that Ireland would embark at the end 
of the period on an automatic scale of tariff reductions at an annual rate of 5 per cent 
of each tariff rate then in operation. These reductions would then continue, subject 
to appropriate escape clauses, until all tariffs were eliminated. The memorandum then 
advocated that on the coming into operation of the first series of tariff reductions in 
member countries, Ireland would make a reduction of 5 per cent of the rate of duty 
then operative on all high ad valorem tariffs, i.e. tariffs of 50 per cent or over. It was 
estimated that some 150 tariffs representing approximately half of the total number 
of Irish tariffs would be involved in these reductions. In relation to tariff preference 
in favour of British goods, the government merely stated that at that stage nothing 
could be said on the subject and added that ’the provisions relating to these 
preferences constitute an integral part of a bilateral trade agreement’.42
In respect of agriculture, the government outlined three obstacles in expanding 
agricultural exports to member countries. These were the promotion of home 
production of commodities to a point where import requirements became unduly
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compressed, the high and frequently changing tariffs in most countries which was 
making it impracticable to organise exports on a rational and continuing basis and 
administrative regulations in continental countries which made economic marketing 
much more difficult. The memorandum pointed out that the first difficulty applied to 
most European countries which purchased Irish exports, but that the other difficulties 
did not apply to Britain on account of Ireland’s special arrangements with her. An 
expansion of Ireland’s agricultural exports to member countries generally, it was 
hoped, would involve the removal of such difficulties.
The government made it clear that it was ’most anxious to avail of external capital
for the financing of national development’ and confirmed its interest in any proposals
that would be formulated for the creation of finance institutions in the free trade
area.43 It hoped to be given the opportunity of availing of any capital funds made
available through such institutions. The government ended their case for special
treatment with an assurance that more than adequate measures were being taken to
obtain increased investment. They attached an extract from the Minister for Finance’s
budget speech of 8 May 1957, which spelled out the economic objectives of the
government and its commitment to attaining them:
The examination of our affairs which we have been pursuing in 
connection with the European Free Trade Area proposals will 
undoubtedly show up defects in our economy and should guide us in 
making the improvements so urgently needed. The direction and rate 
of our future advance will depend on the decisions we take now. There 
are no easy expedients by which our difficulties can solved.44
This speech also claimed that the government had full confidence in the inherent 
soundness of the economy and its ability to provide higher living standards for an
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expanding population on the firm basis of an increase in production and exports. Dr. 
James Ryan, the Minister for Finance, who had considerable business experience in 
his native Wexford, believed that the relaxation of restrictions and the assurance of 
new reliefs, together with the maintenance of the State capital programme at a high 
level and the prospects of a continuing improvement in exports, should strengthen 
business confidence and stimulate production. He asserted that the resultant growth 
of opportunities for work should effect a marked improvement in the unemployment 
situation and check the outflow of people from the country.45
When Fianna Fail returned to office in 1957, Lemass recognised that existing
investment and output were not sufficient to maintain the level of demand he believed
necessary to obtain full employment. He believed that the promotion of industrial
exports was the best way to achieve export led growth. The evidence available to him
suggested that indigenous industry could not fulfil this objective.46 He therefore
proposed to amend the Control of Manufactures Acts and use other available
institutional devices to attract foreign investment to Ireland. In the Dail he put
forward a strong case for reconsidering these Acts and announced that export led
growth could only be achieved if foreign industry contributed capital, technology and
experience to Irish industry. As Tadhg O’Cearbhaill has pointed out of Lemass:
He was a fair minded, unprejudiced man. I mean that if you could show that 
schemes brought up were useful, or that old schemes and ideas were 
redundant, he would go with the new. To some extent that was the case with 
the Control of Manufactures Acts.47
Lemass was careful to point out, however, that the main fulcrum for change would 
remain indigenous industry.48 This may well have been to satisfy those within the
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Fianna Fail party. How he proposed to resolve this conundrum is unclear. Indigenous
Irish industry was, as the government themselves had made clear, extremely weak
and suffered from both a lack of entrepreneurship and adequate risk capital.
Furthermore protectionism had given industrialists a particular mindset, which
however hard Lemass was trying to shake off would prove extremely difficult. Colm
Barnes, one of the more dynamic industrialists of the period, has talked of the
difficulties Lemass experienced with industry:
Looking at it from the vantage point of our company, Glen Abbey, for 
example, we had predictable, secure markets, sometimes we were even 
short of workers at particular times. What Lemass was trying to 
change in many ways that state of mind of being comfortable. 
Companies had great security and quite acceptable profit. But it wasn’t 
a large enough economy, it wasn’t and Lemass knew that well.49
Thus, while Industry and Commerce in mid 1957 was advocating strong protection 
for Irish industry and a bleak future, Lemass, back as minister, was contemplating 
new strategies with Europe being to the forefront. He was prepared to remove all 
restrictions on inward investment if companies exported most of their production. Yet 
most companies as we have seen were not thinking along the same lines. 
Theoretically Lemass might have wanted to bring industry with him in his efforts to 
attract outside industry and make indigenous industry begin exporting; in practice it 
was an undertaking of colossal proportions as in effect it was an attempt to 
completely overhaul industrial policy since the beginning of the state.
Ireland’s claim to membership
In mid-October 1957, the chairman of Working Party 23, William Fay, submitted his 
initial report.50 He noted that some points of fundamental importance had emerged
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as common in the submission or the four countries (Ireland, Iceland, Greece and 
Turkey). These related to the fact that all sought a transitional period wherein 
provisions would permit the less developed countries to maintain a greater degree of 
tariff protection than was to be allowed in the treaty establishing the free trade area. 
There was also agreement that within the institutional framework of EFT A, financial 
resources should be available for assisting the economic development of the less 
developed countries so that they would attain quickly a position in which they would 
be able to undertake the full obligations of EFT A. The four countries of working 
party 23 then combined to work out a common agenda for the purpose of harmonising 
their respective positions. Iceland left soon afterwards mainly because her exports 
consisted almost entirely of one product, fish. This was an area in which European 
protectionism was rampant and fish was not an industrial product.51 Thus Iceland 
could only secure markets on a bilateral basis, which meant she had to guarantee 
reciprocal purchases of industrial imports. This would have been impossible without 
the use of trade controls which would eventually have been outlawed in a free trade 
area. Ireland, Greece and Turkey advanced with the preparation of a common 
document. Ireland submitted a discussion document to the OEEC on 19 December 
1957, under the heading ’Special Financial Arrangement For Countries in process of 
Economic Development’.52 It sought capital under two headings: réadaptation of the 
existing protected industries to enable them to meet the new conditions created by the 
area and the establishment of new industries to form the basis on which Ireland could 
eventually assume the full obligations of membership. The government saw no way 
of resolving this dual problem without the assistance of the more developed countries 
in the area. It thus advocated the setting up of an investment bank to make medium
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and long term loans and guarantees, on a commercial but non profit-making basis, to 
meet the capital requirements of manufacturing industries, be they for réadaptation 
or for expansion, in the developing countries. The government also sought assistance 
in the financing of basic infrastructure in developing countries.
Prior to this meeting the government held a number of meetings with the British on
the proposed area. At the initial meeting Lemass, the chief Irish negotiator, outlined
the government’s position and advance the reasons why Ireland had asked for a
special regime in Working Party 23. The Irish government he argued
did not see any substantial prospects for increasing either industrial or 
agricultural exports to the Continent in the context of a Free Trade 
Area. On the other hand, Irish industrial exports to Britain would in 
due course lose the preferences which they at present enjoy and this 
would be a serious set-back to the Government’s development plans.
... The Irish Government considered that an increased rate of 
economic expansion was vitally necessary and it was vitally necessary 
that the loss on industrial exports to Britain should be made good in 
the agricultural sector.53
At a subsequent meeting on agricultural matters the Irish ambassador Con Cremin
maintained that the government ’could not see a prospect of selling much more on the
continent’. He argued that while ’in time there would be some spilling over of Free
Trade Prosperity. We could foresee a loss in industrial exports to Britain’.54 Such
a loss would, of course be disastrous for the Irish economy. Later J.C. Nagle, at this
stage, deputy secretary at Agriculture wrote to Lewis Croome of the British ministry
of agriculture, fisheries and food on the proposals for agriculture in the free trade
area and voiced more concerns:
We note that the general tenor of the Agreement is in the direction of 
a more liberal regime for agricultural products and, as an agricultural 
exporting country, we welcome this approach. Our particular concern, 
however, is that there should be nothing in the Agreement which
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would prevent the continuance and development of the existing special 
trading agreements between the two countries.55
While it had been agreed at recent ministerial talks that such continuance should be
the objective it is noteworthy that Agriculture were worried that the British draft
proposals for agriculture was not expressed sufficiently ’as to cover obligations under
our bilateral Agreement with you’. At this stage the government were worried that
within EFT A, ’there were no great prospects for agricultural trade and discrimination
by the Six seemed inevitable’ with Nagle arguing that while agriculturalists welcomed
the diversification of the economy: ’as a result of the Free Trade Area they would
suffer considerable losses in this trade.56 Lemass did tell the British, however, that
as far as industry was concerned the government did realise that ’in the Free Trade
Area protection would ultimately have to go’. The government was hopeful, however,
that improved standards of living in Europe would in time lead to an expansion of
demand for manufactured goods which would be a stimulus to economic activity
’even in fringe countries like Ireland’. He intimated that such a "spill-over" process
would not materialise until the more highly developed centres in Europe ’where
activity was already concentrated were further developed to the point at which factors
like labour shortages made it necessary for industrial promoters to consider outlying
areas’. It was with this in mind that the government was asking for time to
consolidate existing home industry before asking it to stand up to tariff cuts.57
Basically the government were looking to achieve a number of objectives from their
negotiations with the British. Its principal position was that
the British should be asked to support, in the negotiations concerning 
the Free Trade Area, the proposition that there should be a recognition 
of a special economic relationship between this country and Britain - 
particularly as far as trade in agricultural products -, that such
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relationships must continue in the Free Trade Area and that any 
bilateral arrangements made by virtue of it should not be regarded as 
being incompatible with the rules of the Area.58
The result of these various negotiations with the British was a visit by Maudling to 
Dublin in January 1958 for which the government set out the above objective. Of 
paramount importance also, however, was the support of Britain, as of yet uncoming, 
for Ireland’s case of special treatment as a country in the process of economic 
development.59
On the industrial front a substantial proportion of capital formation in Ireland had 
consisted of basic infrastructure and this seemed likely to continue for the immediate 
future. The government’s argument was that the availability of external funds for 
infrastructural projects would release funds for the financing of competitive industries 
thus providing further and wider opportunities of employment. These proposals were 
underwritten by a government strategy to attract investment into the country. The 
IDA had embarked on an active campaign to secure the establishment in Ireland of 
factories based on external financial and technical participation. A delegation had 
been sent to the United States and to a number of European countries and the 
government spoke of its taxation and other incentives towards industrial expansion 
which had been recently introduced and which were available to foreign industrialists 
who established industries in Ireland.60 Thus the government strongly supported the 
Greek proposal that facilities and incentives should be provided in the advanced 
countries for the purpose of positively encouraging business enterprises towards 
countries in the process of development. Resulting from this report, a joint note by
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the Greek, Irish and Turkish delegations was circulated to Working Party 23, 
detailing the harmonisation of their respective submissions.61 It stated that acceptable 
solutions had to be found in regard to agriculture and fisheries, a European 
Development Authority providing long term loans for infrastructure, a European 
Investment Bank to be operated on a commercial basis, and a réadaptation fund from 
which free-grants would be made. These would enable the provision of investments 
for the stimulation of capital investment from other member countries. Once these 
agreements were in place the three delegations would accept initially a ’reduction of 
5 percent of all the existing ad valorem tariffs exceeding 50 per cent, to be made in 
the first year of the first phase of the transition period, or by the end of the first 
phase’. Furthermore they demanded an exemption from any obligations to effect 
further tariff reductions for at least 10 years from the completion of the reductions 
or until the commencement of the third phase of the standard transition period. 
Finally they insisted that they be given the freedom to impose new tariffs for new 
industries or to protect existing industries which could find themselves in difficulty 
during the exemption period, and to increase during the same period existing tariffs 
provided ’that in no case would a tariff be imposed exceeding 50 percent ad valorem 
or an existing tariff be increased above that rate’.62
These proposals were considered by the OEEC and, at the request of other countries, 
the common formula of the Greek, Irish and Turkish delegations was subjected to 
various revisions. By the autumn of 1958, the effect of the changes made was 
fivefold. It was agreed that the extended transitional period for underdeveloped 
countries should be twice as long as that for developed countries subject to a
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maximum of thirty years. There would be an initial exemption period which would
be twice as long as the first stage for developed countries or ten years, whichever was
the longest. During the exemption period reductions would be made in tariffs
exceeding 50 percent by 5 per cent of the rate in the first year and 5 percent in the
sixth year. There would be a principle of review by the member countries wherein
recommendations would not be binding but would be considered ’with the utmost
attention’ by the country concerned. Finally action against ’abnormal imports’ would
be taken only within the framework of whatever general provision would be made in
the Free Trade Area Convention for dealing with dumping.63 Some officials involved
in the OEEC had doubts about the wisdom of Ireland categorising itself with Greece
and Turkey. J.F. Cahan, Secretary- General of the OEEC, told an audience at UCD
in May 1958 that Ireland was not underdeveloped in the sense that Greece and Turkey
were. He went on to castigate the pessimistic mindset that prevailed in Ireland:
I have heard a certain amount of rather pessimistic comment since I 
arrived. People who say that Ireland can never develop; that there is 
no hope. I think that it is desirable, from time to time that one should 
sit down and count one’s blessings before abandoning oneself to this 
kind of black despair.64
For Cahan the free trade area offered a challenge to the less developed countries. 
Ireland, he argued was not underdeveloped but less developed. He contended that 
Ireland should draft itself a programme ’of what it is that you think you ought to 
achieve in the way of development, in the next five or next ten years’. It is interesting 
to note that this lecture was delivered at a time when Whitaker was in the final throes 
of completing Economic Development. It served to reinforce Whitaker’s belief that 
the development of Irish economic policy needed a radical shakeup.65 Cahan 
explicitly proclaimed that Irish policy makers should attempt to foresee progress, set
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themselves targets, judge as time advanced how near these targets were to being
achieved and not leave it to the ’Good God or the whim of the moment’ in deciding
how development was to take place. Cahan went on to argue that the Irish
government should look to Europe in its search for economic progress, within which
the OEEC would do all in its power to help. This help, however, would have to be
linked with indigenous growth:
you will get nowhere if you merely rely upon the help of others. The 
foundation of your development must be produced here by you, 
yourselves. We, who are outsiders, can give you help, but it will be 
useless unless you put your own backs into it as well.66
Moreover some British policy makers were asking if it was worth including such 
underdeveloped countries as Ireland at all with R.W. Clarke of the Treasury, later to 
become Sir Otto Clarke, maintaining that they ’would be more trouble than they were 
worth’.67 Indeed the placing of Ireland, Greece and Turkey in their own working 
party from the start of the negotiations could well be taken as a sign of their 
importance, or more correctly their lack of importance, in the whole structure of 
thinking in EFT A.
Irish ambitions to enter such an area received a dent from a different source when in 
late 1958 events took a dramatic turn as the negotiations for a free trade area were 
suspended after a French veto. The French, suspicious of British motives from the 
outset in excluding agriculture, declared through their Minister of Information Jacques 
Soustelle that
it was not possible to create a free trade area as had been wished by 
the British, that is to say, by having free trade between the six 
countries of the Common Market and the eleven other countries of the 
O.E.E.C., without a common customs tariff, and without
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harmonisation in the economic and social spheres.68
Almost immediately after this failure, seven members of the OEEC started secret 
negotiations to form a free trade area among themselves. In June 1959, these talks 
came into the open and six months later the Stockholm Convention establishing EFTA 
was ready for signing.69
The Irish government was not invited to the preliminary discussions held in February 
1959, probably because the seven nations did not want to be encumbered with the 
kind of problems associated with Ireland during the OEEC negotiations. In Ireland 
the prospect of isolation gave cause for concern in some official circles, particularly 
within Finance. Economic Development had proclaimed in its first chapter that 
’Sooner or later, protection will have to go and the challenge of free trade be 
accepted. There is really no other choice for a country wishing to keep pace 
materially with the rest of Europe’.70 Now the European offer seemed less attainable 
than ever.
Finance’s emphasis was on the dismantling of protection and the evolution of an 
external economic policy which would be export led. Thus, the thought of being 
outside any of the major European trading block was anathema to them. At this 
junction the Irish government had two alternatives in its quest to protect its interests. 
One was to seek participation in EFTA and thus secure a seat at subsequent 
negotiations. The other course was to work for closer economic relations with Britain. 
The second was adopted in recognition of the preponderant place occupied by Britain 
in Ireland’s external trading relations. As Whitaker has maintained: ’at that stage
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considering so much of our exports went to Britain, it was really the only substantive 
option we could take’.71 The government decided that since three-quarters of Irish 
exports were going to Britain and Northern Ireland, it should seek to explore the 
possibility of building on the preferential arrangements of 1938 and 1948 before 
turning to Europe in its efforts to expand Irish exports and develop the economy.72
In the spring of 1959, the committee of secretaries, of the four departments mainly 
involved, Finance, Industry and Commerce, Agriculture and External Affairs, 
undertook an indepth review of economic relations with Britain to examine how those 
relations might be changed in order to gain the maximum benefit for the future 
development of the economy. This committee, under the chairmanship of Whitaker, 
carried out studies for the cabinet committee of these departments and reported to it. 
Lemass and Maudling, President of the Board of Trade, met in London while this 
review was in preparation on 26 May. Lemass bluntly told Maudling that Ireland had 
little interest in joining a free trade area of the seven because it saw little prospect of 
developing trade with members of the seven other than Great Britain and if Ireland 
did join, it would stand to lose far more than it would gain.73 He reckoned that 
Britain would also lose if Ireland joined. The main hope for the smaller economies, 
argued Lemass, was economic association with larger groups but, if Ireland was to 
enter any group, it would have to be a group including Britain. The real fear for 
Lemass and the government was that Ireland would undergo appreciable losses, both 
industrially and agriculturally, as a result of the formation of the seven, while at the 
same time, Irish markets in the countries of the EEC would diminish as a result of 
the protectionist policy of the community. Maudling’s response was lukewarm. He
agreed with Lemass’s summation on to the position of smaller economic entities, but 
he felt there was bound to be an OEEC solution sooner or later, and the British view 
was that they could make it sooner by forming the block of seven. What the British 
had in mind was ’to form two blocs with the objective of securing a seventeen 
member area later on’. This disturbed Lemass who ’felt that there was a case for a 
joint look of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, with a view to seeing what were the 
prospects of increasing trade’.74 At the end of the meeting both sides decided to 
prepare an analysis of the position so that an exchange of views could then be 
arranged through the Commonwealth Relations Office. While this meeting held out 
little hope of significant changes in Anglo-Irish trading relations, the Irish government 
intended to press ahead with their initiatives. After consulting with Finance, 
Agriculture and External Affairs, it was Industry and Commerce which drafted the 
governments response. Two weeks after the initial meeting the government presented 
a memorandum to the British authorities on the likely loss of industrial trade due to 
the proposed free market of the seven. The memorandum argued that participation by 
Britain in an industrial free market of the seven, involving the early elimination of 
trade barriers to the importation of industrial goods from her partners in the 
arrangement, would result in an expected significant contraction of exports of Irish 
industrial goods to Britain, such loss would be unavoidable even if any tariffs 
applicable to Irish goods were reduced ’pro tanto’ with reductions made by Britain 
on corresponding goods from their partners in the new free market. Stress was also 
laid on the fact that the bulk of Irish agricultural exports were in competition with 
those from countries which might become members of the free market of the seven, 
and that in the then state of the international market for agricultural products any
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concessions to exporters inside the seven would almost certainly have serious
repercussions on Irish agriculture and on the Irish economy as a whole. Furthermore
on the industrial front
a reduction in industrial exports to Britain would be a matter of the 
most serious concern ... They have confidently looked forward to a 
continuation of the steady expansion of these exports according as 
sound industrial projects with capacity in excess of home markets 
requirements are established and developed. Instead of any such 
expansion, however, Irish industry is now faced with the prospect of 
contraction,75
For the government such a result would have disastrous consequences, adding to the 
already serious problems of under-industrialisation and would in all probability 
seriously interfere with the efforts of Irish manufacturers to achieve and maintain 
economic production, as the establishment of exclusive trading blocs on the continent 
would tend to preclude the diversion to other European markets of goods which 
would have been exported to Britain. Moreover such a contraction would reduce 
Ireland’s capacity to import and would thus adversely affect a market in which British 
goods enjoyed preferential treatment. The British made no specific response to this 
memorandum but both governments had already arranged to consider the possible 
effects on Anglo-Irish trade arising out of the EFTA negotiations for which further 
talks would be held as necessary.
In any event the report of the committee of secretaries was submitted by the Minister 
of Finance, Dr. Ryan, for consideration by the government on 8 July 1959.76 It 
attempted to give future economic relations with Britain a new angle. It recommended 
that any review of the Anglo Irish trade agreements should not be confined to seeking 
concessions within the frameworks of existing agreements, merely to compensate for
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losses arising out of whatever new trading relations Britain might build up with 
Europe. It argued that what was needed was a different and wider approach which 
would have as its objective a substantial and significant improvement in general 
economic relations with Britain. Ultimately it called for an improvement in such 
relations, claiming that ’it is necessary for further economic expansion if we are to 
retain the market outlets we already enjoy, secure the improved outlets necessary for 
further economic expansion and avoid being squeezed between the emergent trading 
blocs in Europe’.77
Ultimately the report looked towards acceptance by the two countries of joint 
responsibility for development in their mutual interest. This would involve the 
mobilisation of the resources of the two countries to encourage British investment in 
Ireland. In short the primary objective would be to give effect to agreed measures 
designed to take account of, and remedy, Ireland’s less developed position. This 
memorandum which strongly bore the imprint of Whitaker saw the gradual 
elimination of protection as a necessary condition for the creation of a healthy 
industrial sector. As Maher has concluded, it was all to the good if such a policy 
could be used in a bilateral context to gain additional trading advantages.78 Industry 
and Commerce did not concur with the Finance view and declared that the 
consequences of reducing protection could be extremely serious for Irish industry. 
Taking this objection on board, the government decided on 10 July 1959 to initiate 
discussions at ministerial level with Britain, to seek a re-examination of the basis of 
the trade arrangements between the two countries and the establishment between them 
of a closer economic association. The government sought:
1) an assurance of expanding markets in Britain for Irish agricultural 
products of reasonable and stable prices
2) the preservation, to the utmost extent that may be practicable, of 
preferential treatment for Irish products, other than agricultural 
products, in the British market.
3) the grant, in consideration of the arrangements on the lines at 1 and 
2, of a greater degree of preferential treatment for British industrial 
products in the Irish market.79
As can be seen, this fell some way short of Finance’s concept of joint responsibility.
Two days before the government’s decision, Britain and Denmark entered into a 
bilateral agreement providing for the reduction of customs duties on imports into 
Britain of certain Danish agricultural products. This was a setback for the Irish 
government as one of its principal aims was to secure improved trading relations with 
Britain before Britain entered into any agreements with its partners among the seven. 
The implication of this agreement, as The Statist noted, was that within two years the 
ten per cent tariff on Danish bacon imports would have been removed with the result 
that ’imports of Irish bacon, already small, will be further reduced or eliminated 
unless they become more competitive in price and, more particularly, unless urgent 
steps are taken to improve the quality and uniformity of the Irish product’.80 
Ultimately any provision for opening the British market more widely to imports of 
farm produce and food from continental Europe would reduce the value to Ireland of 
her free entry facilities unless she was able to produce and market her goods more 
competitively. As freer trade developed within Europe the Irish were afraid that there 
would be a weakening of the special trading relationship with Britain as other
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European countries, primarily in EFTA but possibly in a wider trading association, 
gradually achieved parity with Ireland in gaining free entry to the British market.
Negotiations with the British
At a meeting of the Foreign Trade Committee, of which Lemass was chairman, in 
June 1959 the whole question of foreign trade was discussed. Lemass succinctly 
summed up the problems of Ireland’s weak bargaining position in relation to EFTA: 
’because of the liberal Irish import regime there is virtually nothing to offer to the 
other side’.81 Industry and Commerce then prepared a preliminary study on this 
matter which was circulated to Agriculture, External Affairs and Finance. In the 
meantime, with this in mind representatives of the British and Irish governments met 
on 13 July 1959, with Lemass and Maudling heading the negotiating teams. The 
British were reluctant to embark on talks along the lines suggested by the Irish 
representatives, pointing to the difficulty of according to Ireland more favourable 
treatment than that granted to the commonwealth. For their part any new Anglo-Irish 
trading relations would have to coincide with their obligations to the commonwealth. 
Over the ensuing months various documents were exchanged between the two sides. 
The Irish government’s ultimate position was that they would be prepared, on a sector 
by sector analysis, to negotiate such progressive reductions in the prevailing rates of 
duty on British products as would give British suppliers full opportunity of reasonable 
competition while affording Irish industries such protection as might be necessary for 
their progress.82 This measure represented a substantial concession which would 
virtually guarantee to British goods an increasing share of the Irish market. After this 
meeting Agriculture maintained that ’we cannot afford to stay outside a regional
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grouping and that in particular we should strengthen and develop our relations with 
our most important trade customer Britain’.83 This attitude was supported by the 
other departments and was the strategy which Lemass pursued in his dealings 
henceforth with the British. Early in 1960 Whitaker made it clear in a memorandum 
on Ireland’s position in relation to free trade in Europe that the government’s 
’immediate concern is to redress and improve the balance in her trade relations with 
Britain’.84
At a meeting between Lemass and Maudling on 12 February 1960 the British made 
it clear that they would not be able to take any positive steps to steer investment into 
Irish industry. With regard to agriculture it was decided that further negotiations 
should take place in order to conclude a trade agreement. This agreement was 
produced on 13 April 1960, and saw the British government state that they would not 
reduce or eliminate any preferential margins on Irish agricultural produce without 
consultation with the Irish government. The Irish government undertook to initiate 
another review of protective duties and other import restrictions on British goods. The 
government retained the power, subject to consultation, to impose additional duties 
or other import restrictions where it was satisfied that a reduction of protection 
following a review was in danger of causing material injury to an established Irish 
industry. Finally, provision was made for further yearly meetings to discuss trading 
relations and views on agricultural policies.85 The Anglo-Irish Trade Agreement was 
the result of a concerted effort by the Irish government to inaugurate a movement 
towards closer economic ties and some sort of free trade initiative with the British. 
While the resultant outcome was modest enough it was a start to the way Finance
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wanted the Irish government to pursue its economic policies. Tadhg O’Cearbhaill has 
maintained that the Anglo-Irish free trade agreement was ’seen as a half-way house 
by the government and was very much a preparation for entry to the Common 
Market’86 and in this context the agreement can be seen as another step on a winding 
route to some form of economic association with Europe.
Formulating a definitive position
As the details of Anglo-Irish trade were being discussed, Lemass wanted to formulate 
an Irish position on EFTA. He had four questions he wanted answered on the free 
trade area. Primarily he wanted to know the short and long term implications of 
joining EFTA on the Portuguese terms: Portugal had obtained terms which allowed 
tariff reductions to be spread over twenty years and secured the right to introduce 
new tariffs up to 1972 as long as they were removed by 1980. Secondly there was the 
minimum agricultural concessions required from Britain for entry. Thirdly, he 
wondered would it be more advantageous to seek a free trade area with Britain alone; 
and finally there was the question of the compatibility of an Anglo-Irish free trade 
area with Britain’s obligations to EFTA.87
Finance, Industry and Commerce, Agriculture and External Affairs coalesced to 
present a memorandum to the Taoiseach on 8 February 1960 outlining a response to 
these questions.88 Opposing views were taken by Finance and Industry and 
Commerce regarding protection. Industry and Commerce considered it essential to 
have some arrangement under which the government would be free to maintain 
protection and to take whatever steps would be necessary to promote industrial
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development and exports. Only when Irish industry in general had reached a point 
where tariff reductions and quota dismantlement could be adopted without too much 
risk to Irish industry could some sort of free trade development be adopted. Thus the 
principle of a free trading period during which tariffs would be maintained was 
crucial to Industry and Commerce. Entering a free trade area would in effect be a 
betrayal of indigenous Irish industry.
Finance, however, argued that economic expansion depended on greater industrial 
efficiency, reflected in lower costs and better quality. Failure to achieve this objective 
would jeopardise the future of Irish industry and the employment it bought, whether 
Ireland participated in a free trade area or not. It opposed the view that it was 
necessary to obtain a period of freedom from undertaking any obligations to reduce 
protection. Finance, furthermore, maintained that participation in some form of free 
trade arrangement was the most advantageous context in which to effect a gradual 
reduction in tariffs which would be necessary to ensure progress in industrial 
efficiency. Thus they favoured entry on the Portuguese terms, but did not want a free 
trading period which they believed would be a psychological as well as an economic 
mistake. In a European setting, an external commitment, provided it was not too 
severe, would be more effective and beneficial than a system operated entirely at the 
discretion of the domestic government. External Affairs supported Finance’s view. 
Agriculture, however, saw little benefit in joining EFTA unless it would be possible 
to secure agricultural arrangements with Britain which would be substantially better 
than those operating between Britain and the other members of the seven. This 
memorandum addressed the question of whether it would be more in Ireland’s interest
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to seek ’free trade’ arrangements with Britain alone than with EFTA as a whole.
Agriculture gave a positive response. Finance and External Affairs agreed that it
could be possible to gain substantially better agricultural advantages from a free trade
agreement with Britain alone. They were both, however, still anxious for Ireland in
the long term to associate itself with EFTA. Industry and Commerce was consistent
in its opposition in that it maintained that much the same industrial risks would be
present in a free trade area with Britain alone as there would be in one with EFTA.
One former official of that department maintains that there was nothing unusual in
this negative approach from Industry and Commerce:
Nobody in the department was willing to question the very essence of 
protection. The whole European question was one they did not want 
to face, so they answered no in all their memoranda on the issue. In 
many ways it was a state of mind for them.89
Officials from other departments are not so harsh on Industry and Commerce. Charles
Murray, Whitaker’s chief assistant in the preparation of Economic Development, has
argued that the position of Industry and Commerce in relation to protection was
’understandable enough when you consider that it had been the mainstay of that
department for so long’.90 Tadhg O ’Cearbhaill maintains that
Industry and Commerce regarded itself as the protector of Irish 
industry. In a way it was like a lawyer with a brief and their brief was 
to protect Irish employment. That was the strongest aspect in their 
thinking. If foreign goods were to flood the market as they feared, 
then Irish jobs were at risk. They felt it was their job to draw attention 
to this scenario and they did so in strong language. This was in order 
to discourage the Department of Finance from advising the government 
on taking what Industry and Commerce would have regarded as 
precipital steps.91
In essence between 1958 and 1960 Ireland’s external trading position had changed 
greatly. The creation of the two trading blocs in Europe and the rapid progress 
towards freer trade had forced the government and the policy making community in
general to reconsider the whole economic future of the country. It was within this
context that the Irish government entered into trade talks with the British in 1959.
Ireland, as The Statist pointed out, faced a two-fold task in the light of such new
trading conditions in Europe:
She must first produce food at increasingly competitive prices if she 
is to retain her position in the British market. Secondly, she must seek 
markets outside Britain on the European Continent and elsewhere for 
the increasing surplus of foodstuffs she must produce if she is to attain 
economic prosperity.92
Whether Ireland joined EFTA or not the government still had to expect that they
would suffer a certain weakening of their preferential position in the British market
due to the reduction of British tariffs vis a vis other EFTA members. Yet by joining
EFTA Ireland would not necessarily be in a position where rapid dismantling of her
own tariff barriers would be called for. Portugal had been accepted for membership
of EFTA on quite indulgent conditions, and Irish policy makers could expect to
secure membership on equally favourable grounds. Moreover EFTA itself had been
set up ’essentially as a bridge building step between itself and the EEC’.93 If an
alignment between the two could be secured, Ireland’s interests would best be served
by being at the conference table. As Desmond Fisher in The Statist put it:
If the process of linking the Six and Seven achieved success - and even 
the most pessimistic would hope for some progress eventually - it is 
a safe guess that a bit of further give-and-take not only in the industrial 
but in the agricultural field will be necessary. In this regard it is vital 
for Ireland to be in at the start. Otherwise undertakings to the other 
European food exporting countries may be such as to leave very little 
scope for entry by Ireland into Continental markets.94
Looking at the development of Europe from this perspective it did seem quite logical 
for Ireland to be a member of EFTA. At this stage it appeared undesirable for Ireland 
to be isolated from European developments. Any country that was not in either of the
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two trading blocs would find itself out in the cold when decisions concerning the 
development between EFTA and the EEC were being discussed.
The question of protection
The main consequence of Ireland joining EFTA would be the necessity of a
methodical reduction in tariff barriers. Most of Ireland’s industries set up since the
1930s had failed to develop any export capacity and it was questionable whether some
of them would be able to justify their existence in a free trade environment. Yet
whether Ireland joined EFTA or not it had become abundantly clear to most of the
policy community that some step towards dismantling or at least reducing tariff
barriers was essential. Lemass had pointed this out many times since becoming
Taoiseach. A unilateral tariff reduction would, however, bring with it strong internal
political tensions thus some were arguing that it would be more palatable to undertake
the exercise within the context of a formal undertaking inside a European grouping,
where there would at least be some compensating advantages and Ireland would be
able to exert at least some nominal influence on decision making. If Ireland joined no
trading bloc then her tariff reductions and quota increases would have to be unilateral.
If she joined EFTA, however, then the effect upon Irish industries of the removal of
trade barriers would be at least partially offset by the new markets opened up for
Irish products. As Garret FitzGerald, who at this stage was Chairman of the
Executive Committee of the Irish Council of the European Movement, declared:
While the potential markets for our goods in the Continental Little
Free Trade Area countries may not be of first importance they are
certainly better than nothing - and may indeed prove a good deal more 
valuable than is at present supposed. Current estimates of the value of 
these markets to us tend to be based on the assumption that the 
efficiency of our industries, and the vigour of our export drive will be
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no greater in the future than they are today whereas current trends in 
Irish industry, if reinforced by the spur of the gradual removal of 
protection, may before long transform the scene, and greatly enhance 
the value to us of free access to new foreign markets.95
Moreover the Irish European Movement argued that if Ireland did not become a 
member of EFTA, the government could well find it difficult to put across a 
programme of unilateral tariff reductions. This failure to move ahead with the 
dismantling of protective tariff barriers at a time when public opinion had to an extent 
been prepared for such a development, they argued, could well have adverse 
consequences for the economy: ’increased pressure on industry to improve efficiency 
and to become even more ’export-conscious’ will be needed if we are not to fall 
behind in the very early stages of the European economic race’.96
With the opening up of markets and the possibility that Ireland would enter a 
European trading bloc, some in industry were in favour of joining such a group. In 
June 1957 the president of the Cork regional group of the FIM maintained that 
Ireland would have to join EFTA because ’within a very short time it will be 
economic suicide to stay out’.97 However Irish Industry, the journal of the FIM, 
which was an ardent advocate of indigenous industry, insisted in one if its editorials 
that if the government pursued its European agenda ’the country is being allowed the 
option to commit economic suicide’.98 They did bemoan the fact, however, that 
there seemed to be a lack of awareness among industrialists as to the importance of 
the free trade issue. There did seem to be a recognition that there would be a net 
benefit to Irish entrance of a European trading bloc, although it was understood that 
huge tariff cuts could not be withstood by the majority of Irish companies. Looked
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some security by protection. This whole ethos was now being threatened. Ultimately
there was not a large enough economy to support firms who only wished to supply
the home market and a situation developed whereby industry split into two. As Colm
Barnes has pointed out: ’those manufacturers who felt they might survive had little
incentive to unite with firms that were likely to fold’." This was a point which had
been inferred by Jack Fitzpatrick of the FII when, writing in the Catholic journal
Christ us Rex in 1958, he declared that one could divide industry into two broad
categories, namely those which were efficient and economic and those which were
efficient but not economic. The first group, he argued, were exporting competitively
and selling their goods in world markets and their problem in regard to the free trade
proposals was whether they required a protected home market to enable them to
continue exporting. The second category, however, represented
industries which were set up under the post 1932 policy of 
protectionism, including industries which were established by sincere 
men and women who were willing to invest their savings in the best 
interests, as they saw them, of the community. ... It would obviously 
be unjust and immoral that these should be sacrificed without 
compensation. They must examine their position to see if they can 
survive, whether they could readapt their factories so as to make them 
competitive under such circumstances. ... The problem is vast and 
complex but one thing emerges clearly and that is that a free trade 
treaty which makes no provision for dealing with the problem of 
industries which are efficient but, through no fault of their own, not 
economic, will not have dealt fairly with all aspects of the 
problem.100
This was a point echoed by Tadhg O’Cearbhaill who, as we have seen, maintained 
that the Department of Industry and Commerce were very protective of those they had 
encouraged to enter industry in the first place and were therefore reluctant to sell 
them out to the orthodoxies of free trade.101
at from a global perspective Irish industry was relatively weak, but it had been given
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In any event by 1960 the FII were cautious about entering EFTA. Its then president 
J.C. Tonge, who had succeeded Fitzpatrick, argued that if the government were to 
enter the free trade area it would be necessary to safeguard the industries built up 
under the protective system. He acknowledged that industrialists would have to study 
ways and means of survival under what would be new conditions but stated that ’it 
will be extraordinarily difficult to adapt industry to Free Trade’.102 He maintained 
that this could only be done with the full co-operation of the government and the 
trade unions. The FII was asking the government to render special assistance during 
the transitional period while it needed the contribution of the trade union movement 
as large numbers of workers were involved in industries that might be affected and 
they would have to receive careful consideration to avoid hardship. In early 1960 the 
FII had advised its members to be prepared for a progressive reduction in protective 
customs duties, and asked each firm to consider its own position and that of its 
respective industry in conditions of free trade. They also carried out their own pilot 
survey in the weaving industry which suggested to them that while the concept of 
Europe was generally accepted to be fairly desirable, its consequences on Ireland 
could be disastrous. As Colm Barnes, who replaced Tonge as president in 1961, 
declared:
there was definitely a fear in the minds of the traditional industrialists 
in particular that a reduction in tariffs would see most of them going 
to the wall. While some saw the advent of EFTA as a challenge to be 
met head on, because after all businessmen are supposed to be free 
traders, most members of the FII were horrified by the prospect.103
This attitude was summed up by Tonge when he declared that ’in general Irish 
industry does not want Free Trade, but at the same time it realises that Ireland cannot 
live in complete isolation from the rest of Europe’. The FII were, however,
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with productivity and marketing receiving prime consideration. The FII saw a way
forward in Europe in the context of getting their member firms to specialise in certain
products with less variety than had hitherto been the case. If they could secure
markets for their products abroad they believed that they could make progress while
facing an era of reduced tariffs:
We are facing a challenge which should bring out the best, but if the 
best is not good enough the outlook for Irish industry, to say the least, 
will not be satisfactory. While not blaming our Government in any 
way for advocating a policy of reduction in tariffs, industry feels that 
the Government must bear full responsibility for the effects of any 
such reductions. Irish industry has confidence in the Government and 
is confident that its interests and indeed the interests of the country 
generally will be safeguarded in any difficult times that lay ahead in 
the EFT A era. Industrialists will endeavour to manage under Free 
Trade to the best of their ability, opposing no section but co-operating 
with all in the national interest.104
determined that Irish industry would become more efficient and more cost conscious
A problem for the FII, as Colm Barnes has since pointed out, was that it was a
comparatively weak body and although it might call on the government to safeguard
Irish industry, it did not do so from a position of strength:
In 1960 when there was a lot of debate about EFT A the FII was 
dominated by the textile and clothing industries, yet the federation 
itself was very weak, hardly representing a third of those who were 
industrially employed. It lacked resources, effective membership and 
was on the whole a pretty feeble organisation. If one read about it at 
the time in the newspapers you would have got the impression that it 
was a strong body but that was not the case. Behind that apparent 
strength lay a great weakness. The consequence of this was that the 
government of the day could do as it pleased within the industrial 
sector. It was only with the development of the CIO that the FII 
acquired more confidence and became more of an influence.105
Ultimately the FII, although evidently worried about free trade, were willing to go
along with the government’s strategy of gradually phasing out protection. Their fears
were based on the premise that membership of EFTA
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would bring Ireland few tangible trade advantages as this country 
already has free access to the British market for almost all goods 
produced in Ireland, while the other countries of the Little Free Trade 
Area are not substantial importers of Irish goods and are unlikely to 
become large importers even if tariff and quota restrictions on Irish 
products were to be removed during the years ahead.106
Irish membership of EFT A would entail the removal of tariff and quota restrictions
on imports from all the members of EFTA including the United Kingdom, although
it was likely that the government would be able to secure a gradual phasing out of
such restrictions, probably up to twenty years as in the case of Portugal. The FII
while wanting increased trade for their members were worried that their members
would go to the wall instead within the context of the free trade area. This problem
was exacerbated by the impact that foreign industry was having on home based
manufacturers of which the FII were acutely aware. An example of the anxiety felt
by individual members of the FII can be seen from a letter to the Taoiseach from a
pottery manufacturer in Wexford in early 1960:
I received through the post a large coloured advertisement exhorting 
me, as an Irish individual, to "invest in Ireland". Allow me to point 
out that this additional indignity has been offered to me by a 
Government, which has recently given a free capital grant of a quarter 
of a million pounds to an American firm in order to subsidise that firm 
in the manufacture of peat moss plant potteries at Birr, in direct 
competition with my old established native Irish concern. It is futile 
for the Government to attempt to maintain that the Birr factory has 
been subsidised for the "export market" because this is simply not so; 
the home market is already being very thoroughly canvassed in favour 
of Birr Potteries and what is more, the fact of the free Government 
grant is being used to suggest that only the new Birr factory has the 
confidence of the Government in the matter of peat potteries. This, of 
course, has every appearance of being true but for an Irish government 
to allow an American firm to use such propaganda in its competition 
with an Irish firm is rather strange. Furthermore when I applied for 
some small assistance to help me meet the threat of Government 
subsidised foreign competition I was told by An Foras Tionscal that 
free capital grants are available to foreigners but not to native Irish 
industry. Invest in Ireland indeed.107
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Thus by the early 1960s some in the FII were worried about the twin threats of free
trade and the in flux of foreign companies attempting to service the same markets.
Lemass, however was determined to bring the FII with him on the journey towards
free trade and increased competitiveness. He outlined the government’s views to the
national export conference of the FII in January 1961. He proclaimed that Ireland was
not a member of EFT A or the EEC
for the very good reason that there is no overall advantage to be 
gained at the present time by joining either group. In the case of the 
seven, Britain is by far the most important market for us and there we 
already have, under our bilateral agreement, for practically all our 
industrial goods, the trade advantages which membership of the group 
would confer. As far as the other countries of the seven are concerned 
the obligations which we would have to assume in joining the 
European Free Trade Area including the dismantlement of industrial 
protection, not only against imports from the six continental members, 
but against Britain as well, would outweigh any trade advantages 
which we could hope to get from these countries.108
While this speech suggested doubts about the EFTA option and reinforced the
importance of the British market for the Irish economy, the fact that there was intense
negotiations on a possible entry to such a free trading bloc implied that sooner or
later the government would indeed seek to find itself within a free trade association.
The decision not to apply
Whether Ireland joined EFTA or not, it seemed quite clear that her prosperity still 
depended on the agricultural economy. Membership of EFTA, although it would 
subject Irish manufacturers to unfettered competition, would provide new markets for 
farmers to sell their produce, although as we have seen their prime target was the 
EEC. Faced with the options of embarking on a process of accession to EFTA or of 
negotiating free trade agreements with Britain alone, the government came down in
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favour of the latter, when it turned its attention to the possibility of acceding to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT]. Lemass in May 1961 explained
why the EFTA negotiations were not pursued. Besides Britain, he remarked,
the other six members of the E.F.T.A. have not been important 
markets for us in the past and, while we must not of course neglect 
any market, it is doubtful whether the advantages we could hope to 
reap in those countries would satisfy acceptance of the Stockholm 
Convention, particularly as agriculture is expressly excluded from its 
provisions.109
Irish interest in the free trade area had naturally stemmed from the prospect of greatly 
expanded agricultural exports that might have been opened up by Irish participation 
The government had informed the council of the OEEC early in 1960 that its trade 
returns showed
our trade balance with non-sterling member countries is extremely 
unfavourable - in roughly the proportions of three to one. This position 
has recently become more serious by reason of the emergence among 
our partners in this Organisation of two trading groups, EFTA and the 
EEC.110
When agriculture was not going to be included in the EFTA context, Irish policy 
makers felt that they had no option but to revert to the old formula of negotiating 
independent trade agreements with Britain. Yet in many ways the negotiations had 
taken down one of the great psychological barriers impeding developmental progress. 
By these negotiations, ’an Ireland that had sought to define its identity since 
independence principally in terms of social patterns rooted in the country’s past was 
to seek to adapt itself to the prevailing capitalist values of the developed world’.111 
The last word on EFTA may be left to Tadhg O’Cearbhaill who as assistant secretary 
in the Department of the Taoiseach at the time was intimately involved in the EFTA 
negotiations:
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In the end we were not that enthusiastic as there was a feeling within 
government at the time that the whole concept of Europe would come 
right in the end and it was within a larger unified EEC that we wanted 
to be associated. Lemass was very much of that view. Policy was 
directed with that in mind.112
Thus the government suspended deliberations on EFT A and explored new avenues in
its quest for economic development. Its immediate aim was to seek membership of
the EEC. Within a month of Lemass’s speech on rejecting the EFTA option, the
government published a white paper on membership of the EEC which was to prepare
public opinion for the official application the following month. There were still many
in the administrative framework who doubted the wisdom of fully entering a
European trading bloc. Con Cremin, by this time Secretary of External Affairs saw
Ireland’s relationship with both European trading groups in June 1960 in the
following terms, when suggesting a Dail reply to the deputy secretary of Industry and
Commerce on Ireland’s refusal to join EFTA:
It is probable that in our circumstances association would be the most 
appropriate formula having regard particularly to the fact that we could 
not accept the full obligations of either instrument nor accord that 
degree of reciprocity which would be required for full membership.
The terms of association on our part with either group would have to 
safeguard the special trading relationship between this country and 
Britain which is provided for in the Anglo-Irish Trade Agreements.
Such association would be considered primarily as a means of enabling 
us to share in the benefits of a general European settlement of trade 
and economic relations on terms which would take account of our own 
economic circumstances.113
The premise that Ireland seek initially association rather than full membership of an 
economic group suggested that the EEC negotiations would be also be tortuous and 
it is to this application that we now turn.
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Chapter Six
The final move towards economic interdependence:
The EEC negotiations 1961-64
Looking at the EEC
Ireland’s application to join the EEC in 1961 was an ambitious move for a poor 
agricultural country on the European periphery. This was particularly true with 
respect to the difference in economic structure and society between Ireland and most 
other Western European states:
Table 4
Comparative Economic Growth
Per Capita Growth Total Growth
1913-1950 1950-1970 1950-1960 1960-1970
Austria 0.2 4.9 5.8 4.7
Denmark 1.1 3.3 3.3 4.8
Finland 1.3 4.3 5.0 5.1
Norway 1.8 3.2 3.2 5.0
Sweden 2.5 3.3 3.4 4.6
Switzerland 1.6 3.0 4.4 4.5
United Kingdom 0.8 2.2 2.7 2.8
Ireland 0.7 2.8 1.7 3.9
Western Europe 1.0 4.0 4.4 5.2
[Source: Brian Girvin, Economic Development and the politics of EC entry, p .5].
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Rapid economic growth was an objective shared by most market economies at the end
of World War Two. This was based on an appreciation that the goals of full
employment, a growing standard of living and a welfare state would not be easily
attainable if such growth was not present.1 Yet the Irish economy in terms of
economic growth lagged far behind its European neighbours. Girvin has argued that
this environment and the economic trends evident within it were reinforced by a
culture of contentment and isolationism. He maintains that in the first decade after the
war a strong sense of public complacency is apparent with Irish public opinion
believing that the depression, war and post war recovery justified the isolationist
policies which had been in place since 1932. This, he claims, enhanced the tendency
to isolationism, whether in economic, political or cultural matters. He cites Ireland’s
refusal to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation [NATO], GATT or other post
war multilateral institutions as a further reflection of isolationism, reinforcing the
conviction that national solutions were the most appropriate in Ireland’s case.2 Yet
while Ireland was only a reluctant participant in the OEEC, and later the Organisation
for European Cooperation and Development [OECD], and only accepted Marshall aid
in a perfunctory manner there was a growing sense within the policy community in
general that the country could not survive economically unless it shrugged off its
protective mentality. As Whitaker pointed out:
it was painfully obvious there was a lack of any meaningful future in 
our over reliance on the British market. Thus there was no 
complacency within the civil service. How could there be? Our 
independence was threatened. There was a restless discontent as we 
tried to get out of the dark night of the soul.3
There can be little doubt, however, that there was many industrialists, including some 
in the FII, as both Colm Barnes and Domhnall McCullough point out, who would
have been quite content to carry on trading in the rather stultifying atmosphere of the
protectionist shelter.4 Furthermore, the prospect of European economic integration
was not an explicit feature of either Economic Development or of the First
Programme for Economic Expansion which followed it, yet both documents
recognised that the country would have to engage substantially more with western
Europe in trade terms if it was to prosper economically. Though committed to
change, most policy makers continued to believe that for the immediate future the
country’s economic prospects rested on access to British markets. Nor did the
accession of Lemass to Taoiseach in 1959 mark a radical departure in this respect.
Although Whitaker has stated that Lemass was as early as 1947 convinced that
protectionism was outdated,5 nevertheless a distinction was drawn between the
movement to free trade and a decision to join any multilateral organisation once
Lemass was Taoiseach. The former policy was adopted towards the end of the 1950s,
but the latter was avoided until July 1961. Throughout 1960 and into 1961 Lemass
reiterated the view that it was not to Ireland’s advantage to join either the EEC or
EFTA. While examining the options, the conclusion drawn was that Ireland’s
economic development would not be significantly improved by membership of any
multilateral group.6 In essence the government’s and indeed the civil service’s
reluctance to embark on the European option can be traced to their belief that
international organisations such as GATT and the OEEC ’were not likely to succeed
in liberalising agricultural trade’:
the basic (income support, high prices, technological progress, high 
output and inelastic demand) all tend to operate against trade 
liberalisation in agriculture and it is to be feared that the most the 
international organisations can do is to try to moderate the influence 
tending inevitably to increase protection and restrict the growth of 
trade.7
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In theory the more interventionist minded but free trade led Department of Finance 
were all in favour of joining a trading bloc, but would only do so on terms favourable 
to Ireland.
Thus prior to July 1961, policy development had continued to move in a bi-lateral
direction on the grounds that this would provide the greatest advantage for Ireland.
Yet the decision to apply for membership of the EEC was not unexpected. As we
have seen there was a large debate within the policy community on whether the
country should enter EFTA. Once that option had been rejected, entry to the EEC
became a valid alternative. Yet many within the policy community were deeply
worried by the prospect of Irish entry to the EEC, without a simultaneous British
entry. Thus for Industry and Commerce entry to the EEC would result in the
withdrawal of preferential treatment given by Ireland to United 
Kingdom goods, but by requiring Ireland to adopt a common external 
tariff which would have to be applied to British goods, would put 
Britain at a disadvantage in the Irish market as compared with EEC 
countries. It would be foolhardy to expect the United Kingdom would 
continue to give trade advantages, agricultural or industrial, to this 
country in those circumstances.8
They argued, furthermore, that all measures of industrial protection would have to 
be eliminated, with wages and conditions of competition equated with those obtaining 
in the highly developed countries of the EEC: ’it should be noted that the principle 
of adequate protection for Irish industry, including special consideration for industries 
not fully established, is enshrined in the existing trade agreement with the United 
Kingdom’.9 This attitude reflects and reasserts the traditional gloomy outlook of 
Industry and Commerce to economic development within Ireland. They were not 
willing to look outside habitual arrangements with Britain to expand either Irish
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industry or agriculture. Yet Whitaker did recognise that Ireland could not really join 
unless Britain did so as well. He, however, unlike his counterparts in Industry and 
Commerce could see benefits to joining such an economic community.
Applying for membership
A White Paper on membership was eventually published in June 1961 which prepared
public opinion for the application the following month. This flurry of activity can be
attributed to one simple fact: the decision of Britain to apply. Once the government
became aware of the British decision to join, it quickly prepared its application and
forwarded it to Brussels to anticipate the British application. As Dermot Keogh has
shown this was for public consumption in order to claim that the Irish decision was
not a consequence of British pressure or example.10 While such behaviour might be
considered somewhat bizarre, the application itself made sense because Ireland could
not afford to be outside the community if Britain was in it. Lemass admitted that the
application was inevitable once Britain had decided to apply. He told The Economist
in February 1962:
It was Britain’s decision to apply for membership that opened the way 
for our own application. The predominant position of British trade on 
our economy, as a market for our exports, and the special character of 
the trading arrangements between the two countries, made it difficult 
to contemplate membership unless Britain were also to become a 
member.11
The EEC suggested to the Irish government in October 1961 that it should present irs 
case in Brussels the following January. While Lemass was primarily concerned about 
the economic implications of membership, he did realise the political ramifications 
of joining the EEC. He told the secretary of his department that he considered it
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declaration of Ireland’s attitude to the political aims of the Community’.12 While
Lemass noted that correctly that membership of NATO was not a prerequisite for
membership of the EEC, he voiced reasonable fears that
some countries or interests ... may be opposed, or at least indifferent, 
to our entry to the EEC, it would be prudent not to imply, by anything 
said prior to being accepted as a member that joining NATO (even 
with a reservation) is something we could not face in any 
circumstances. To do so might merely supply them with a test of 
membership which, as they might hope, would transfer from them to 
ourselves the responsibility of negativing our application.13
Lemass’s reasoning on NATO may have been influenced by a memorandum written
the previous day by Ireland’s ambassador to the community, Frank Biggar. He
reported that the British approach as outlined by Edward Heath to the community had
been received positively and while the British would encounter serious technical
problems in pursuing their application, Ireland could not expect to have any lesser
difficulty in this process. Indeed Ireland because she was a small neutral state could
well expect more serious problems when compared to Britain which was a major
European state. Biggar added that the draft memorandum for the January meeting
could well be seen as suspect by the Six in that Ireland might be viewed as indifferent
in its application and that the government would have to demonstrate that it was
applying without reservations of any kind if it were to make its application
convincing. He urged the government to redraft in a positive vein, warning that the
existing draft suffered
from a failure to emphasise sufficiently at the outset our appreciation 
of the fact that the EEC despite its title, is first and foremost a political 
concept and not merely an economic organisation with a few political 
ideas as an afterthought.14
’essential to the success of Ireland’s application to include in the draft statement a
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This was something Industry and Commerce had also warned about, though from a
different angle, when they argued that
it must be remembered that the final objective of the six is political 
integration. What we need in this country is a combination of 
reasonable long term price stability in agriculture, together with a very 
substantial expansion in activity.15
Implicit in this statement was that Industry and Commerce saw the political 
developments of the EEC impinging on Ireland’s economic development and her 
capability to make independent policy.
Biggar’s memorandum stressed the means by which the official application should 
proceed:
we fully realise what the community is and what it is seeking to 
achieve. This would involve a general expression of our belief in the 
vital and unique importance of Western Europe for the future of 
humanity and the conviction that it can only play its proper role if 
politically strong and economically prosperous, conditions for which 
political and economic unity are the essential prerequisites.16
Biggar’s memorandum did not, however, find favour with all in the civil service.
Nicholas O’Nuaillain, secretary of the Department of the Taoiseach, wrote to
Whitaker a number of days later:
We do not agree with all of his comment. In particular we here do not 
agree that it is essential that we "inflate" the sections concerning our 
acceptance of the political objectives. Any judgement on this point is, 
of course, largely subjective but it is our feeling that the sincerity of 
our professions in this regard will not be assessed by the six by 
reference to the length of what we say but rather by our making it 
clear that we know what we are talking about and do so in a direct and 
unambiguous fashion. Above all, we here would be somewhat nervous 
about appearing to "protest too much". I don’t think that the six 
generally and, in particular some of them (such as the French), would 
be impressed by what they might describe as "litterature". 17
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In between Biggar’s memorandum and O’Nuaillain’s rebuttal a revised draft of the 
application statement was circulated on 1 January 1962 and it contained a brief 
reference to political aspects. However the statement was careful to place Ireland’s 
application in the context of its Christian heritage and its commitment to Christian 
values in a European context: ’Indeed for some centuries after the break up of the 
Roman Empire, Ireland was a haven of spiritual and intellectual life in which the 
essence of the European tradition was preserved and from which it was brought back 
again to many continental lands’. The statement insisted that Ireland had favourably 
viewed the various movements towards European Union, but noted that while Ireland 
had actively participated in the OEEC and the Council of Europe it had not been able 
to join NATO:
The fact that we did not accede to the North Atlantic Treaty, despite 
our agreement with its aims, was due to special circumstances and is 
not an expression of any principle of neutrality nor does it qualify in 
any way our positive attitude towards the ideal of European unity.18
Two lines were suggested by the Department of External Affairs through its secretary 
Con Cremin. The first involved withdrawing the application if NATO membership 
proved to be a prerequisite for entry, the second was to insist that special 
circumstances were involved and that Ireland would join the organisation if partition 
was ended.19 Moreover Hugh MacCann, Ambassador in London, had reported to 
Cremin that ’Britain is not keen that EEC membership should be coterminous with 
NATO’ which might explain External Affairs’ attitude of attempting to avoid the 
NATO question.20 According to External Affairs the Taoiseach was in favour of the 
second approach. This led Finance to take a vigorous line on the application with the 
result that Cremin and External affairs were in the main ignored. External Affairs had
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to an extent been fudging on the application since late December 1961 with the result 
that Finance grabbed the initiative moving the application forward. Thus Finance took 
the lead in promoting the Irish application and its secretary played a central role in 
the background discussions in Dublin and subsequently in Brussels.21 As Whitaker 
has stated:
What was at stake was the economic independence of the country, thus 
we, in Finance, felt that we had to give the lead and take the strongest 
line possible in arguing for entry to the community. I felt really that 
it was the only way we could advance in an economic sense.22
Thus Finance insisted that joining the community was imperative if Ireland was to
survive economically. It had shrugged off its previous reticence regarding the
economic benefits of entry. With the British committed to entry, Finance now saw
the EEC as the only place to be. It was not open to Ireland to pick or choose the
circumstances under which it would join. Once the country had decided on full
membership it was then incumbent on the government to proceed with the application
with a committed verve. Whitaker insisted that it would be ’extremely unfortunate’
if the application were to be withdrawn on the issue of NATO membership. He wrote
a long memorandum to his minister, Dr. Ryan, early in January outlining the NATO
problem in relation to the EEC. It is worth quoting at some length:
Nobody has yet told us that this is a condition of a membership of the 
EEC. On the other hand, nobody so loves us as to want us in the EEC 
on our own terms. The Community have difficulties enough without 
adding those introduced by a "contrary" new member who will bring 
the Community no particular benefits but will inflict on it additional 
problems including (as they might well view it) this tiresome forty year 
old problem with Britain. ... It is well to remind ourselves that it is 
our own propaganda which has given such an artificial significance to 
NATO in relation to partition. There is, in fact, no necessary 
incompatibility between joining NATO and maintaining our stand on 
partition. ... We say we agree with the aims of the North Atlantic 
Treaty and are not ideologically neutral. But are these not in danger 
of being regarded as empty professions when effect is deliberately not
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given to them because of preoccupation with a national problem which 
we have lived with for Forty years? To others it may seem that we are 
treating a narrow national interest as being more important than unity 
and cooperation in the defence of Western civilisation.23
Whitaker also argued that the government should not press its neutral status in terms
of the Swiss or the Swedes who were ideological neutrals, and whose neutrality as
such ruled them out of membership of the EEC, even in an associate capacity.
Notwithstanding this critical approach, Whitaker advised Ryan that the government
should adopt a wait and see approach to the question of NATO, while insisting that
they should not ignore the real political and defence requirements which would in
time come with membership. The fact that much of the diplomatic wrangling about
political issues went through Whitaker is significant in that it shows how Finance had
taken on the crucial role in respect of membership. While it was External Affairs
which had played the key roles earlier in relation to Marshall aid and other European
commitments, it was Finance which now had the key input into decision making on
Europe even if these matters were not formally economic. External Affairs which had
harboured some doubts about the EEC was effectively sidelined as Lemass took
control of the debate and interacted more with Whitaker and Finance on the whole
issue of the EEC and Nato.24 Ultimately for Whitaker the economic and political
roles of membership were intertwined. He bluntly told his minister:
If we want to safeguard our economic future - and on this, basically, 
our independence and influence in the world rests - we should not 
ourselves raise obstacles to being admitted as members of the EEC. To 
say that we would withdraw our application if membership of NATO 
were insisted upon would be extremely unfortunate.25
The NATO question had to an extent dogged the application. This was even more
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true at a political level. Lemass had to accept that he would have to give some 
reassurances to the community on this question. On 5 February the Minister for 
Lands Michael Moran addressed the chamber of commerce in his native Castlebar, 
on the application. He pointed out that it would be unrealistic to ignore the fact that 
all members of the EEC were in NATO and that neutrality in the context of East - 
West divisions was something that had not been envisaged by the Irish people. He 
went on to argue that between communism and the free world ’neutrality ... is not a 
policy to which we would even wish to appear committed’.26 This speech caused 
quite a furore within both Fianna Fail and in the country at large. While the evidence 
is necessarily inferential, it would appear that Lemass was well informed as to what 
Moran would say. As a known cabinet disciplinarian, it does, as Tobin observes, 
seem inconceivable that Lemass would not have known and approved of Moran’s 
speech, hinting as it did at a fundamental change in Irish foreign policy.27 At a 
parliamentary party meeting, nine days later, Lemass ’gave a lengthy explanation to 
the party’ of Moran’s speech.28 While the minutes of this meeting are no clearer 
than that, it does appear that Lemass was able to convince his colleagues that the 
economic benefits of membership of the community were paramount and in any event 
there was no stipulation that entry to NATO was a prerequisite to joining the EEC. 
In the 1961 general election campaign he had vowed that a Fianna Fail government 
would bring Ireland into the EEC. It was the tangible benefits of economic expansion 
that brought about this vow and Lemass was not about to let the NATO question 
interfere with that. The point about political integration was also addressed within 
economic circles within the bureaucratic machine. At a meeting of department 
secretaries in March 1962 J.C. Nagle of Agriculture wondered whether the emphasis
that some countries were opposed to Irish entiy to the EEC on grounds other than
economic.29 Adding to this Frank Biggar, who was Irish ambassador to the
Community, claimed: ’I would not indeed think it impossible that, if we fail to
convince on the political side, our economic difficulties might be used as a device to
block our membership application’.30 Politically, Lemass recognised the extent to
which the EEC required assurances on a number of issues. In the area of foreign
policy Lemass stated that the government accepted its obligation in this field fully:
economic integration is not regarded as an end in itself but as a step 
towards political union, and is, of course, in itself a political 
development of major significance. Indeed the removal of all causes 
of economic conflict between the member states is a very great 
political achievement.31
What worried the government and Finance in particular was the possibility that 
political questions would impede Ireland’s entry and subsequently stifle her economic 
development.32
The Wider Reaction: Press, Priests and People
At a more basic level the official application also pointed out that
understanding of the community’s character and aims is not confined 
to the government but has come to be shared by the Irish people 
generally through debates in parliament, widespread press comment 
and a great deal of discussion by trade unions, employers 
organisations, farmers groups and similar bodies.33
It was true that there was a remarkable sense of homogeneity about the application. 
At the time of the 1961 general election the three major parties openly supported 
entry to the EEC leaving it to independent socialists Noel Browne and Jack
placed on NATO in some preliminary discussions was intended to convey the message
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McQuillan to be lone voices in the Dail in opposing the application. Raymond Crotty,
for one, bemoaned this fact noting: ’typically, there was little debate on the new
departure which easily gained virtually universal acceptance’.34 Furthermore the
major newspapers and interest groups were all notionally pro-European in outlook.
Nicholas Harman of The Economist noted such unanimity in an interview with
Lemass: ’Ireland’s application to the Common Market is a revolutionary step in Irish
history, yet it seems that Irishmen, irrespective of their political party, are almost
solidly behind the Government’.35 In fact there was very little anti-foreigner
sentiment in the country as a whole. A letter written to The Cork Examiner in 1959
calling for the country to deal exclusively with the British was indeed atypical:
we should buy more of our goods from them ... it is about time we 
closed some of the foreign embassies, sent home the representatives of 
countries who do not buy goods from us, and thus ensure a better 
balanced economy for our ’most distressful country’.36
For the most part the academic economic community was also in favour of Ireland 
joining the EEC. There was, however, one significant opponent. David O’Mahony, 
who succeeded John Busteed as Professor of Economics in University College, Cork 
in 1964 and published in the same year the first textbook on the Irish economy by a 
professional economist37 opposed entry on the grounds that Ireland would be as well 
off in GATT following free trade policies from within that organisation. He argued 
that there was nothing to stop Ireland staying out if Britain entered as in that case the 
British - Irish labour market would be broken up into two markets which would 
enable the country to stand a good chance of being able to turn improvements in 
productive efficiency into lower prices. This would also happen if Ireland entered and 
the British stayed out. In the latter case Irish products would not enjoy free entry into
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the common market, which would include Britain. But if Ireland pursued a free trade
policy there would be no obstacle to it becoming a member of GATT:
It should then be comparatively easy for us to make an agreement with 
the EEC within the framework of GATT providing for the free entry 
which its products would enjoy into this country by virtue of its free 
trade policy. Ultimately indeed such a course might perhaps be the 
most desirable one for this country to follow. It would probably be 
regarded in a very favourable light by the community which quite 
evidently is not over anxious to dilute its membership with the fringe 
countries of Europe.38
Others were more worried, however, by the whole approach taken by Lemass. A
commentator in Hibernia in late 1962 wondered whether there were alternatives to
full entry, claiming that although Lemass maintained that Ireland could undertake the
responsibilities of full membership
no man in Ireland is more painfully aware of the limitations of Irish 
industry - limitations of size, of management, of capital and of 
enterprise. ... Lemass may well be right in saying that Ireland can bear 
full membership but has he really counted the terrible cost?.39
More bizarrely, this writer declared that the majority of people in the country were
leaderless, and that a great opportunity existed for the Labour party to fight and win
the next election by running on an anti EEC platform. He accused Fianna Fail of
playing politics with the common market issue:
nothing could be more harmful to a democratic community than that 
a major segment of opinion, and perhaps even a majority of the 
electorate should be unable to find political expression, for their hopes 
and fears on an issue of such magnitude ... It would be a poor state of 
affairs if our people were to escape great and unnecessary hardship 
because the Europeans more conscientiously assessed our situation and 
our well being than our leaders to whom we had entrusted our 
affairs.40
It would appear, however, that this was a voice in the wilderness. The Labour party
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itself was not ideologically opposed to entry at this stage (although it did oppose the
later successful application in 1972). Furthermore the Catholic Church offered no
significant opposition to the application. One or two of its members, did, however,
warn of the dangers that could be inherent if the country did indeed join. E.J.
Hegarty in the January 1962 edition of Christus Rex, for instance, warned that
before we decide finally to enter the EEC we should fully consider its 
very far reaching obligations which entail a surrender of so much 
control over our own ’household’ and of independence of action in 
economic, social, and perhaps political fields. Also entering EEC will 
be like swimming out into the open sea from the former shelter of a 
bathing pool: unless our various branches of agriculture and industry 
can keep place with those in other countries they will certainly be 
submerged without any hole of ’protection’. Assuredly the Common 
Market is no ’gift on the silver salver’ but only an opportunity to be 
grasped with resolute energy - if at all.41
The important factor to note, however, was that this was just a note of caution,
nothing more. There was no resistance on the part of the Church to EEC
membership. Archbishop Joseph Cassidy, observed in a recent interview that
the hierarchy had no collective stance on the issue. While one or two 
of them had been outspoken on economic issues, most notably Bishop 
Lucey of Cork who was a strong defender of small farmers and Bishop 
William Philbin of Clonfert who wrote a lot of pamphlets dealing with 
social issues, and wrote an important article on Europe at the time of 
the application; as a group the hierarchy would not have commented 
on the EEC. To be sure they would probably have seen the community 
as being a bulwark against communism as that was a big fear and they 
were always worried about excessive state control, but no, I would say 
that the EEC did not really impinge on their consciousness at all.42
Indeed Lemass and Cardinal Conway both stressed in separate interviews in 1969 the 
limited role the Church had in influencing government policy, and it would appear 
that the Church offered no opposition to the application.43 The Catholic journals did 
offer some critical comment on the application with Studies and Christus Rex opening 
their pages for commentary. It was William Philbin, who as we have seen was one
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the application from the clergy in an address entitled ’The Irish and the New Europe’
reprinted in Studies. For Philbin, the challenge of the Common Market was ’above
everything else a moral challenge’. He noted that while it seemed to be commonly
accepted that Ireland would receive a trade advantage from membership, the benefits
of such would not just be confined to the field of international trade:
Our admission to the Common Market might well provide the stimulus 
we need, nationally and personally, to use our talents and resources 
generally to better account. The material factor might react favourably 
on the spiritual, making a two-way traffic as the body serves the soul. 
Enrichment in the field of human character is a better justification of 
the risks we are taking than any prospects of enhanced prosperity, 
because our personal qualities are, ultimately, the only possessions we 
need care about. Indeed personal improvement is the only adequate 
reason, in the last reckoning, for any corporate enterprise.44
In essence, the Common Market, as it appeared to Philbin, had formalised a pattern 
that was already implicit in the economic pattern of modern society. He thus called 
on the whole population to interest themselves in the industrial concerns of the 
country:
Unless Irish people in our present circumstances of combined 
opportunity and peril shoulder the responsibilities that modern social 
organisation is imposing among us, unless we are prepared to be a 
nation in the twentieth-century sense, we had better forget our 
European ambitions and settle for something much more primitive, and 
forget too our hopes of staunching the flow of our life-blood in 
emigration. ... And an essential condition for advance is that we 
should think and act as a nation in the economic field, regarding lesser 
loyalties as subsidiary to our general duty of citizenship.If individuals 
or groups that hold strong economic positions of one kind or another 
press their advantage to the detriment of the public good, they will 
make even the most enlightened national planning and even the most 
elaborate material provision quite futile.45
As we have seen both the farmers’ organisations, trade unions and industrial groups
of the more outspoken bishops of the time, who offered the most cogent analysis of
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was at hand. Ultimately Philbin was declaring that membership of the EEC was
decidedly a good thing for Ireland, but that sectional interests would have to take a
back seat to the overall good of society:
Leadership or planning will not be enough. We shall all be to blame 
if we fail or only half-succeed. ... Let us then, in the midst of all our 
detailed and technical preparation for the Common Market, not neglect 
to persuade ourselves about what it entails in terms of ordinary human 
character, of moral stamina. We are meeting in the current phase a 
moment of truth. Let us see and accept that a challenge faces us, 
simply as men and women, to prove what we are made of.46
Philbin’s lecture, originally titled ’The Moral Challenge of the Common Market’, is
the only substantive statement from a member of the hierarchy on the question of
membership and fundamentally it gave the government its support. Other clergy
writing on the application followed Philbin’s lead and urged the economic interest
groups to play a larger role in the policy process and not to leave everything to the
state. James Kavanagh of UCD, writing in Christus Rex, declared that ’looking to the
state is a national disease. Our industrialists - many of them - have been feather
bedded for too long and only a few of them are aware that management is expected
to be enterprising’.47 Thus those few catholic writers who did write on economic
issues were basically advocating a proto corporatist style approach to the economy
and called on government and the interest groups to work together.
The application in difficulties
While domestic discussion developed, a meeting was held on in Brussels on 18 
January 1962 to explore some of the questions raised by the Irish application. The 
Irish Press reported that Lemass was ’optimistic’, on his arrival, that full membership
were all pressing their claims with government when it seemed that entry to the EEC
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of the common market could be obtained,48 The European Commission were not 
convinced at first that Ireland could fulfil the obligations of membership. The 
Commission noted that Ireland had special problems in respect of membership, and 
that these had to be given serious consideration even prior to the opening of formal 
negotiations. Indeed the Irish government were worried that the Council of Ministers 
might separate the Irish application from that of Denmark and Britain, who had 
already been advised that agreement had been reached on the opening of 
negotiations.49 Balancing this, however, was the fact that the British government 
supported the Irish application. Christopher Audland, then a first secretary in the 
British delegation, has stated that the British supported the Irish application on two 
levels:
from a trade point of view it made sense to us that Ireland be included, 
considering that we had such a large stake in the Irish market, and the 
government also felt that if both countries were in the community, it 
could help to move to a solution on Ulster. That was something that 
was not in the public eye at the time but it was most definitely 
important to us.50
Lemass was told that in view of the existing commercial relations between Ireland and 
Britain, it would be difficult to begin negotiations with the Irish government until at 
least some progress had been made towards a community agreement with Britain. 
Lemass maintained after this meeting that he was ’satisfied with the results of his first 
contact with the commission’ and that the government would be pressing on with its 
application for full membership.51 A more ominous note was sounded by The 
Guardian in Britain when it declared: ’although the Irish application has been 
officially welcomed, there is no doubt that individuals, among the French delegation 
especially, have severe reservations about the application’.52
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The difficulties which the Irish government would encounter had been highlighted by 
an informal Irish delegation to the European Commission in April 1961, prior to 
Ireland’s decision to apply for full membership. The delegation were informed that 
association rather than full membership would well be the best method for developing 
Ireland’s relationship with the community. Full membership could follow in due 
course.53 The reason given for this was that Ireland was considered to be an 
underdeveloped economy and would require special consideration prior to full 
membership. This could best be described as an unfortunate outcome of the EFT A 
negotiations where it was well known throughout the community that the Irish 
government had applied on the basis that the country was underdeveloped 
economically. Whitaker was worried that the Irish application would be in doubt 
because of the approach taken previously and he advised Lemass to advance a positive 
line when discussing improvements in the Irish economy between the EFTA and EEC 
negotiations.54 However commission agricultural officials did not necessarily accept 
the view that Ireland was an underdeveloped economy in an agricultural sense, and 
the Irish delegation concluded that it was unlikely that special concessions would be 
granted. The delegation drew up a memorandum for the government, within which 
they made two observations. The first was that they believed that the official position 
of the Commission was that Ireland should apply for associate membership rather than 
full membership at this stage, and that the government should be careful before it 
decided to apply for full membership. The second was that Ireland might pursue a 
high risk strategy of applying for full membership in the hope that the Commission 
would offer concessions to make association more attractive. It was concluded that 
full membership carried considerable disadvantages for Ireland, especially for its
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industrial economy and the special relationship with Britain, but that association also 
carried the risk that Ireland would neither benefit from Commission programmes nor 
would it be in a position to influence the future development of the EEC itself.55 Yet 
some members of the European Commission saw merit in the Irish application. 
J.C.B. MacCarthy noted the reaction of the Belgian commissioner, Jean Rey, who 
saw the
clear principal danger lying in the field of agriculture. As regards 
industry there appeared to be no problem since we had accepted that 
protection must go by the end of the transitional. While there was 
difficulty over the question of a common external tariff ... he was very 
pleased that the Taoiseach had given such emphasis to political 
considerations.
MacCarthy also commented on the positive reaction of Signor Rosso, parliamentary 
secretary to the Italian minister for Finance, who ’saw no difficulty in our becoming 
a full member’. The Dutch were also favourable to the Irish application, reporting 
that Lemass’s speech was ’generally well received’.56
The memorandum prepared for Lemass prior to his departure for his key meeting in 
Brussels maintained that the fundamental economic emphasis for Ireland remained 
agriculture, despite the recent commitment to industrial development: ’for Ireland 
agriculture will always be of major importance. We are, naturally, anxious that, 
through membership of the European Economic Community, Ireland should be able 
to look forward to a balanced development of agriculture and industry’.57 Irish 
officials were aware of the consequence of entry for Irish agriculture. It was assumed 
that Britain would remain the focus for agricultural exports, though it was recognised 
that the special relationship would be eroded if not terminated by the Common
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Agricultural Policy.58 The farming community, as we have seen, had no doubts that, 
after the disappointment of the Anglo-Irish trade agreement, Irish agriculture would 
boom within the framework of the EEC.
In terms of industrial policy the Irish aim was to negotiate a protocol or special
agreement under which Irish tariffs would be dismantled over an agreed period of
time, while some recognition would be obtained for the difficulties which some
exposed industries might encounter. Industry and Commerce remained pessimistic
about Ireland’s industrial future without long term support, suggesting that protection
should be maintained beyond the 1970 transition date that had been put forward: ’the
protocol should provide for maintaining protection after the end of the transitional
period for any industries which might find it too difficult to comply with the general
rhythm [of tariff reduction]’.59 Industry and Commerce reiterated its customary
position that around 100,000 jobs could be threatened unless some form of protection
remained in place. This view while undoubtedly somewhat pessimistic had a basis in
reality as the initial CIO reports began to show that Irish industry was ill prepared for
competition. As Domhnall McCullough has commented,
when those reports came out first there was not a great deal of surprise 
among businessmen. Originally we were not conscious of any sort of 
competition and once it became known that the government was 
serious about pursuing the EEC option we realised that we were 
hopelessly ill equipped to cope with this new state of affairs.60
The CIO reports opened the eyes of many industrialists as a professional economist 
worked closely with the survey teams. This according to Colm Barnes ’was a 
complete new experience for us in the FII. We quickly got the message that we had 
to adapt or else go under’.61 The unexpected decision by the British to apply for
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membership accelerated the need for the Irish economy, and industry in particular, 
to modernise its structures and to be in a position to compete in an open market in 
the very near future. The CIO had found that with a few exceptions, Irish industry 
was ill prepared for such a change in approach. The majority of firms in Ireland were 
heavily protected and had no experience of international trading conditions. 
Furthermore, a majority of those employed in the industrial sector were in these 
protected areas. The government was working on the assumption that Ireland would 
enter the EEC early in 1963 and that all the transitional agreements would be 
completed by 1970. Technical decisions concerning the method by which tariffs might 
be reduced gave some scope for Ireland and Irish industry, but this in itself would be 
limited. This meant that Irish industry would have to meet the full force of 
competition by this latter date. It was in recognition of this threat that the government 
had established the CIO to assess the potential of Irish industry in a free trade 
environment.62
The CIO maintained that it would be unwise to assume that local patriotism, 
consumer ignorance, market frictions, permissible restrictive practices or any other 
consideration would modify the depressing conclusion that many Irish firms would 
not survive under free trade. Thus it advocated two courses of action: action to make 
industry competitive, which was termed preventative adaptation, and remedial 
adaptation. The former involved taking advance action ’in the light of the expectation 
or threat of injury before the injury actually occurs’. The changes required would be 
two-fold, one consisting of a short-term ’crash programme’ to bring the efficiency of 
Irish firms and industries as far as possible into line with those they would be
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competing against in the EEC. The second would consist of a longer term approach 
to improve technical training and occupational mobility: ’new institutions may be 
needed to effect these changes and existing bodies may have to have their functions 
modified or extended. In these circumstances, it must be expected that this second 
kind of preventative adaptation will take time’.63 Within this context one can see that 
new corporatist style structures, as defined in this thesis, were being urged on the 
government which reacted with approval. The CIO anticipated remedial adaptation 
once Ireland entered the EEC and Irish industries were exposed to competition and 
did not prove successful. The CIO activated a whole series of proposals for such 
remedial adaptation. These included recommending that legislation dealing with 
industrial grants be amended, to enable an industrial project to switch from one field 
of activity to another, and that grants from the Industrial Credit Company and Coras 
Trachtala be reviewed.
Thus the CIO had a dual function: one was to provide an assessment of Ireland’s 
likely trading position in a free trade environment; more importantly, the other 
involved incorporating the industrial interest groups into government structures. This 
strategy was, as we have seen, especially successful in drawing the trade unions 
closer to the government.64 Lemass urged trade unionists to accept that changes were 
already underway regarding Ireland’s relationship with the wider world, and that 
existing preferences with Britain were consequently already weakening. He implied, 
but did not state directly, that even in the absence of EEC membership, considerable 
changes in the Irish economy would be necessary. As Donal Nevin points out,
it had become pretty clear to the union movement that we would have
an important role to play in the development of the economy, whether
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we were in a European body or not. Our thinking on the European 
issue was along the lines of if it was good for workers, Congress 
would not oppose it.65
Lemass believed that ’we can avoid the prejudicial effects of having to face a tariff 
on entry into Britain by ourselves joining the EEC’.66 Ironically, he conceded that 
the negotiating strategy which had previously been adopted in respect of EFTA, 
insisting that Ireland was underdeveloped and identifying with Greece and Turkey, 
could now work to Ireland’s disadvantage. The most significant difference between 
EFTA and EEC entry was that in the former agriculture was not in question for 
Ireland, and therefore it had been government policy to pursue the effective protection 
of existing Irish industry. Considering the importance of agriculture within the EEC 
context the implication here undoubtedly, even for the urban Lemass, was that the 
main concern of Irish government policy was agriculture, with industry being a 
distant, if increasingly important, second.
The concern expressed about industry should not obscure the main objective for Irish 
policy makers and for the government, in the early 1960s, which was to obtain 
favourable entry terms to the Community and to secure, if possible, continuing access 
to the British market for agricultural exports. The British market and agricultural 
exports remained the key focus of Irish policy, with industry engaging only secondary 
consideration. The decision by Britain to apply for membership was the most 
important stimulus to Ireland’s application. In addition, the decision to apply for full 
membership was inevitable as the loss of Britain’s markets for Irish exports was 
threatened if the British entered and Ireland did not. An important secondary 
consideration, which had both political and economic implications was, as we have
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seen, the pressure from Irish farming organisations to join the EEC. Clearly the 
farmers’ organisations wanted a situation where the traditional links between the 
United Kingdom and the Commonwealth would be weakened to the advantage of the 
Irish.
Shortly before he went to Brussels, Lemass addressed the Fianna Fail ard fheis. He
had a number of objectives. The first was to assure the party membership of the
significance and value of what the government was trying to achieve. This was
important because one of the main effects of entry would be the dismantling of the
entire economic nationalist superstructure which had been established over the
previous thirty years. It was necessary to frame entry in a ’nationalist’ or patriotic
fashion. Some Fianna Fail supporters were worried about the application on the
grounds of sovereignty. As Aodogan O’Rahilly pointed out,
there were some of us, close to Lemass, who had our doubts about the 
approach he was taking. I was totally opposed. I did not believe that 
any EEC was going to help Ireland economically or otherwise and I 
told him that straight up.67
Lemass, however, was determined to push on and bring ’nationalist’ Fianna Fail with 
him. He wished to assure foreign observers of the conference that the government 
was fully committed to entry. Finally, he used the opportunity to develop a 
momentum of support for entry. The commitment to the community was overt and 
the statement in favour of entry was as clearly posed as was possible under the 
circumstances:
Membership of the Common Market is open to those nations which 
accept the political aims which inspired it. A movement to political 
confederation in some form, is indeed a natural and logical 
development of economic integration. Henceforth our national aims
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must conform to the emergence, in a political as well as in an 
economic sense, of a union of Western European States, not as a 
vague prospect of the distant future but as a living reality of our own 
times.68
As part of this reality Lemass maintained that the multilateral arrangements within the
EEC would be more to the advantage of Ireland than existing bilateral arrangements.
In addition, he reflected on the possibility that economic integration would remove
the basis for the partition of the country. This argument was based on the theory that
cooperation at transnational level would bring about the objective which had been
previously sought by economic nationalism. This can be seen as an attempt to appeal
to nationalist sentiment, and a way of bringing the national aim of unification into line
with European integration. Lemass also used the opportunity effectively to dismantle
the ideological commitment to economic nationalism. The end of protectionism could
also be presented in nationalist terms. Economic efficiency could thus be presented
in terms of patriotic endeavour: ’in the economic sphere, the task before the country
can be defined simply as that of becoming fully competitive in every respect. It is a
condition essential to our national survival’.69 O’Rahilly was not convinced:
the way I saw it the Europeans wanted us in to get control of our 
fishing and other stuff. How wrong can you be. While I was very 
strongly in favour of bringing in foreign capital I just could not picture 
us getting anything out it. As for partition I was of the opinion that we 
would be losing more control of our own actions if we joined. If 
anything I saw entry putting the national question back.70
While Lemass had not been able to bring all his colleagues along with the idea of 
entry, he went to Brussels with the ard-fheis and the majority of his party united 
behind him. A motion passed recording the ’approval of the manner in which the 
Government is handling the negotiations for Ireland’s entry into the EEC and on its
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approach to international affairs in general’ summed up the general mood of the 
Fianna Fail party as Lemass faced into what he considered to be vital negotiations.71 
Not all commentators were convinced. The Sunday Independent reported the 
following month that there was a ’Cabinet Split on Common Market Issues’.72 
Lemass, however, was quick to deny any such division maintaining: ’The person who 
invented that should be able to make a fortune writing fairy tales. I advise him to take 
it up. Hans Christian Andersen would only be trotting after him’.73
Lemass’s visit to Brussels and his presentation to the EEC went off well as far as the 
Irish delegation were concerned. Some commentators did not agree. An article by 
Jock Bruce-Gardyne in The Statist, entitled ’The Unwanted Suitor’, claimed that the 
Irish application had received a ’frigid reception’ and was being treated like a ’cold 
douche for a keen convert’.74 The government were appalled by the slant Gardyne, 
a notorious cynic about the EEC, had taken and considered the article important 
enough to lodge a protest with the journal. There had been a number of inter-journal 
conflicts between Gardyne and Desmond Fisher, who had written enthusiastically 
about Ireland’s application as to Ireland’s place in Europe. In essence it seemed that 
Bruce-Gardyne was reflecting French government sources, who continued to be 
dubious about the Irish application.75
In May 1962 a meeting was held in Brussels between the permanent representatives 
of the member states and a delegation from the Irish government. Questions 
concerning agriculture, horticulture, industry and tariffs were raised and discussed. 
While Ireland gave a commitment to abolish all quantitative and tariff restrictions, it
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also made the case that some sectors would warrant special attention but that these 
would not conflict with European regulations. In addition, a full commitment to 
dismantle all tariffs on industrial goods within the time span agreed by negotiation 
was given. In this area the only exception requested was for those industries which 
encountered difficulties during the transition, but had the capability to compete and 
whose difficulties were of a temporary nature. Ireland also sought assurances on 
dumping in the light of the small Irish market and the damage that such action could 
do if the response was not quick enough.76
While this meeting was largely of a technical nature, the Irish delegation believed that
it had made its economic case succinctly and effectively. By early July it appeared
that the permanent representatives would decide favourably for Ireland, allowing the
Irish application to be discussed at the meeting scheduled for 23 July. This may go
some way to explaining Lemass’s most outspoken remarks on NATO, when in the
same month he told The New York Times:
We recognise that a military commitment will be an inevitable 
consequence of our joining the Common Market and ultimately we 
would be prepared to yield even the technical label of neutrality. We 
are prepared to go into this integrated Europe without any reservations 
as to how far this will take us in the field of foreign policy and 
defence.77
It would appear from this that Lemass was convinced of the need to reassure the 
community that membership of NATO was not a problem for Ireland.
The Government’s objective, then, was to place its application on the same footing
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as that of Britain and Denmark. Notwithstanding this optimism, it was recognised that
negotiations, even if they began immediately, would not be completed before the
spring of 1963. Whitaker therefore suggested to his long time civil service adversary
J.C.B. MacCarthy that tariff cuts should begin from 1 January 1963 to prepare
industry for the future and to demonstrate Ireland’s willingness to complete its
transition period as quickly as possible.78 This optimism was to be disappointed as
consideration of the Irish application was further postponed, and the government
received no assurances over the summer period despite continuous attempts to
ascertain the EEC’s position. By September Whitaker admitted that the ’status of our
application is as yet undetermined’.79 Yet in the Dail two months later Lemass,
under hostile questioning as regards the status of the application from James Dillon
of Fine Gael and Brendan Corish of Labour, insisted that ’our application presents
no great difficulty’.80 He did admit that no date had been fixed for the resumption
of the Irish negotiations but he was adamant that the Irish application was not at the
’end of the queue’ and was on a par with Britain’s and Denmark’s. His officials were
not as convinced. Lemass did, however, reaffirm to the second Fianna Fail ard-fheis
of 1962 in November the importance of the application for both the party and the
country. He was again careful to frame the application in terms of the history of
Fianna Fail and the country, maintaining that there was no contradiction between
previous Fianna Fail economic policy and entry to the community:
we were always keenly conscious of the fact that winning of political 
independence would not mean that we had acquired economic 
independence in the same degree. We saw in the EEC a door opening 
to new economic opportunities not previously available to us and the 
prospect of a much more secure foundation for our future prosperity.
For a party with our philosophy and national background no other 
course was possible. The alternative course would condemn us in 
perpetuity to a position of economic inferiority, leave us a beggar
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amongst the nations, seeking to maintain a dying economy on the 
crumbs of charity from our wealthy neighbours. ... Membership of the 
EEC is, however, something very much more than a condition 
necessary to maintain our present level of economic activity: it is an 
opportunity for expansion greater than we have heretofore enjoyed.81
For Lemass entry to the EEC was but a natural progression of Fianna Fail policy in 
both economic and national policy. For him, and in essence the party, the political 
consequences of the application were welcome because ’we saw in this prospect a 
new source of national strength, an extension of our freedom, and a better opportunity 
of fulfilling our cultural, economic and social aims’. To Lemass the goals remained 
the same. He still wanted to see ’full employment’ which also meant ’the elimination 
of all economic causes of emigration and that also we see as a realistic objective in 
the early future’.82 The evidence in the Fianna Fail minutes on entry to the EEC is 
patchy. Yet it would appear that most deputies saw the prospect as appealing. George 
Colley even went so far as to table a motion calling for the party to ’consider and, 
if possible, to decide on, the question of our representatives joining one of the 
European Groups or parties represented in the Council of Europe and the European 
Parliament’. Lemass, however, intervened to say that it would probably be better not 
to take an early decision on this matter ’pending a decision on our application for 
membership of the EEC’.83 While the motion was then unanimously withdrawn, it 
is still indicative of the support that Lemass had managed to gamer within the party.
The failure of the application
Ireland’s application finally failed, not on any economic or political matter, but 
because of the intransigence of Charles de Gaulle.84 Once de Gaulle vetoed the 
British application on 14 January 1963 the Irish government suspended its application.
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A Finance memorandum outlined the dangers the suspension might bring:
There is a danger that, in the conditions of uncertainty that may 
prevail in the months ahead, the momentum that has been achieved in 
the preparations for entry to the EEC will be lost. Preoccupation with 
external events or with the short term discomforts of adjustment must 
not cause us to lose sight of our principal objective, namely, the 
reshaping of the economy to enable us to hold our place in a world 
that is moving towards freer trade and to maintain the rate of economic 
growth achieved in recent years.85
Finance were worried that this objective would not be achieved as long as resources 
of capital and labour were committed to non-competitive production which ’acts as 
a drag to the economy as a whole’. The CIO reports had clearly shown that there was 
an urgent need to redeploy resources in favour of production that could compete on 
world markets. The way Finance saw it, the very considerable sums that the 
consumer was contributing by way of higher prices for the protection of ’certain 
uneconomic industrial units’ would be better applied in financing industrial 
reconversion and expansion and the retraining and resettlement of workers.86 
Protection had proven to be a policy without a remedy for the problems of 
unemployment. Thus the primary emphasis had been deliberately shifted to direct 
development grants and fiscal incentives as a means of raising industrial capacity and 
employment and increasing production for export. In essence the Finance argument 
was that Irish industry could only provide jobs for those seeking a livelihood in 
Ireland by enlarging its sales in export markets. Furthermore while both management 
and labour had shown themselves to be appreciative of these arguments, there did 
remain a danger that the weaker elements in industry would waver and raise doubts 
about the need to reduce protectionism, particularly on a unilateral basis. Lemass did 
not need to be convinced of the strength of this argument.
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At a political level Lemass responded primarily by devoting a parliamentary party
meeting of Fianna Fail in late January 1963 to the suspension of the application,
where he dealt ’at some length’ with the implications for the government and the
country on the effective withdrawal.87 Some days later he made an important speech
to the Dail and dealt with a number of issues. He was determined not to let any
complacency slip back into the Irish industrial psyche, and made this clear in his
lengthy Dail statement:
The deadlock is, we hope, purely temporary. ... our desire is that a 
way will be found before long to enable all European countries which 
share the aims expressed in the Treaty of Rome to participate fully in 
a wider Community. The forces making for European unity which 
received such an impetus after the last World War, will, I feel sure, 
be strengthened as time goes on and must in the end prevail. The 
suspensions of the British negotiations should be viewed as a 
temporary setback and not as a final breach.88
Within this context he maintained that while for the present it was not practicable or
desirable for the government to pursue its application ’this decision will not of itself
make our position any worse than it has been for the last two years’.89 He was of
the opinion that the country had gained permanently from the measures taken to gear
up the economy for greater competition and maintained that these measures would
have to be reinforced and accelerated. Ireland, he declared, had become a stronger
economy due to the changes brought about since the late 1950s and would have to
strive to make the most rapid advances in the forthcoming years as this would
increase its capacity to benefit from eventual participation in a wider EEC. In an
important passage he argued that
the promotion of industrial efficiency by reduction of protection is not 
being initiated because of free trade principles, but because in the 
circumstances now prevailing in the world it is recognised to be 
necessary for economic and social progress. To remain efficient in
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only parts of the economy, with limited capacity to expand exports, is 
to condemn ourselves to inert dependence on the British market in 
which we may expect a progressive hardening of competitive 
conditions for our products.90
This was an important point, in that Fianna Fail could claim that there was no 
contradiction in their moving from protectionism to free trade as the latter could be 
framed in terms of the patriotic endeavour of doing what was best for the country. 
Lemass was setting the broad context within which this new economic policy, 
incorporated in the shift to Europe, was being situated. The social and political 
advancement of the nation, according to Lemass, could best be achieved by new 
methods which in themselves would secure the independence of the country which to 
some degree had been threatened by the country’s economic malaise.91 This volte 
face was too much for some of the opposition. Dillon attacked Lemass in blistering 
fashion:
One must plead for some measure of indulgence if one experiences 
consternation in listening to the Leader of the Fianna Fail Party 
speaking for an hour and a quarter on the subject of free trade and the 
vital importance of the British market to the Irish economy. If he had 
advanced either thesis to any member of his party during the past 20 
years, they would have gone as near to assassinating him as the law 
would allow, and I can assure him from my own position looking at 
the faces of his own backbenchers that it is a most stimulating 
experience. Whether it is the reaction to learning the truth or the 
discovery that they have been made fools of for so long I cannot quite 
delineate, but the general air of bewilderment that characterises them 
from the youngest to the most venerable is a stimulating experience for 
those of us on this side of the house. ... I am glad that the Taoiseach 
at least, and the Fianna Fail Party, I assume, have woken up to the 
fact of the vital importance to this country of the British market but 
they really ought to go for 40 days into the desert, fast and pray to 
purge themselves of their past history.92
While this can be seen as part of the normal cut and thrust of politics there was in 
Dillon’s castigation of Fianna Fail a serious charge they had to answer. Lemass’s
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arguments in favour of membership of the EEC was theoretically an anti-nationalist 
policy rooted firmly in free trade. But he had to frame it in nationalist terms of 
serving the country. The Minister for Industry and Commerce, Jack Lynch, 
reaffirmed the shift from an economic nationalism based on self sufficiency to an 
interdependent framework when he declared: ’we in this island could not continue in 
economic isolation. The world outside was moving towards freer trade even though 
it was doing so at the moment through blocs of states’.93 Lynch had no doubt that 
it was through entrance of one of these blocs that Ireland’s economic survival could 
be guaranteed, and maintained that the government’s main economic aim was to join 
the EEC as soon as was possible. Others who would have traditionally been opposed 
to Fianna Fail were willing to support Lemass in his strategy towards Europe. Garret 
FitzGerald considered Lemass the best Taoiseach available for the purpose of 
initiating what he regarded to be this long-overdue process of economic growth, and 
he even voted for Fianna Fail in the snap general election of 1961.94 That FitzGerald 
voted for Sean MacEntee, rather than one of the other Fianna Fail candidates was, 
nevertheless, rather odd because MacEntee was an old style Fianna Fail nationalist 
and could hardly be described as one of the leaders of the move towards 
interdependence with the EEC. Still it is interesting that FitzGerald felt it necessary, 
albeit ’reluctantly’, to vote for Fianna Fail considering that Fine Gael’s platform in 
the 1961 election mirrored Fianna Fail’s in terms of European policy. Speeches by 
all Fine Gael’s important figures such as Dillon, Sweetman, Richard Mulcahy, Liam 
Cosgrave, T.F. O’Higgins, Gerry L’Estrange, and Sean MacEoin emphasised in the 
campaign the need to develop policies conducive to benefitting from membership of 
the EEC and placed great emphasis on the need to prepare sufficiently to meet the
new challenges that membership would bring. Cosgrave at Dalkey, for instance, told
an audience what he considered to be the key issue of the campaign: ’this country is
facing a new era and that with developments in Europe conditions in the future will
be quite different’.95 Fine Gael, however, had to face up to the fact that the country
identified Lemass with the move towards Europe. As he reminded the November
1962 Fianna Fail ard-fheis:
During the general election campaign ... I spoke at every public 
meeting which I addressed about our application and endeavoured to 
explain its economic and political implications, making clear a Fianna 
Fail government would be committed to a policy of joining the 
EEC.96
Notwithstanding this association Lemass had been unable to convince the electorate 
to give him an overall majority and thus a mandate to pursue his economic agenda. 
He was, however, still able to form a minority government which proved quite stable 
for the next four years.
Ditching protectionism and the determination to reapply
Within this context Lemass argued for the systematic lowering of Irish tariffs and, 
more surprisingly, suggested that an alternative approach open to the government was 
membership of EFTA, something which he had dismissed out of hand a number of 
years earlier. This received critical comment, with the Irish Independent, in an 
editorial entitled "Ifs and Buts", commenting that entry to EFTA ’would be another 
somersault of Government policy, for up to now we have refused to join since EFTA 
did not provide for free trade in agriculture’.97 It was the anticipated dismantling of 
tariffs which received most comment, with the same paper arguing that ’this is a plain 
warning to industry that the Brussels breakdown provides a space not for breathing
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but for action’.98 This was something the FII had been telling their members to 
prepare for. Some industrialists, however, saw the hold up in the British application, 
before de Gaulle’s veto, as removing the sense of urgency about preparing for new 
trading conditions. This complacency was something the FII were trying to rid their 
members of. J.J. Stacey of the FII told Lemass that they ’were trying to bring home 
to their members that the delay in dealing with the British application did not mean 
that they could afford to slacken their efforts to get ready for entry to the 
Community’.99
In many ways the decision to apply for membership was unwelcome to the Irish 
government, in that Britain’s action in 1961 undermined its capacity to make policy 
in an independent fashion. It also challenged the traditional certainties on which 
policy had been based. Furthermore, Ireland remained dependent on the EEC decision 
in respect of Britain. To a large extent, Ireland’s position was marginal to the 
member states of the EEC. It contrasted sharply with the internal cohesion of the 
community itself, even were Britain and Denmark included.100 EEC entry was, 
however, part of a developmental strategy. Since 1958 and the production of 
Economic Development, the government and a civil service whose prime economic 
department had changed dramatically were searching for new avenues along which 
to lead the country into the ’promised land of economic prosperity’.101 While the 
immediate application was in a sense an emergency response to external changes over 
which the government had no control, this merely speeded up an evolutionary process 
the government had embarked on. As Miriam Hederman O’Brien has pointed out, 
’the decision to look for full membership was an act of faith in the Irish economy
which would have looked like lunacy only ten years earlier’.102 In essence there was
no reluctance about the application. The ultimate decision to apply did focus policy
makers’ attention on the need to restructure industry to meet the competitive challenge
of Europe. Policy makers had realised that Ireland could not develop as an
autonomous economic unit, if it wished to benefit from growth and trade expansion.
The application finally confirmed the view of those within and outside the government
who had argued that in an uncertain economic world it was better to be prepared for
uncertainty by being aligned rather than by standing alone. The collapse of the EEC
negotiations in 1963 provided the government with the motivation to move quickly
to reduce tariffs and to prepare for a second application. Lemass’s goal was to
transform the state into a modern entity able confidently to take its place amongst a
community of Western European nations. Ireland’s economic pursuits had taken on
a wider impact and he realised this. Thus after the collapse of the EEC negotiations,
he quickly signalled his intention to reapply and to continue his modernisation drive.
He outlined the government’s position in a speech in Limerick in May 1963:
If we are to realise the rate of expansion at which we are aiming - an 
average increase of 4 per cent per annum in the volume of national 
production - manufacturing industry must play the main role. 
Agriculture is, of course, our most important economic activity and 
will continue to be so. ... If we should be faced with a choice between 
accession to the EEC on terms which did not involve an extension to 
the transitional period and a desire to keep tariffs to meet the 
difficulties of industries which failed to get on with the tasks of 
reorganisation and adaption on which they should now be engaged, the 
choice will be fo r  accession.103 [italics mine]
The message was clear. Stragglers would not be tolerated. The cosy insular world 
that Irish industries and businesses had inhabited in the 1950s was gone. In its place 
was a leaner more competitive world in which indigenous Irish industry would have
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to compete with their fellow Europeans. Lemass was determined that Ireland would 
not be left behind the rest of Europe. He told an American audience that ’although 
Ireland was an ancient nation, she is a young state. The limited size of the Irish 
market means of necessity that our growth target must be realised through export 
trade’.104 For Lemass the time had come for Ireland to take her place economically 
with other nations in Europe and to compete on a par with them. Within this context 
he had included the various economic actors, and would take them with him as he 
journeyed on the road to free trade. As Whitaker told an OECD economic policy 
committee meeting: ’We inhabited the cellar ... Although the cellar proves to have 
been quite a respectable club, we were not happy there and wanted to break out into 
a more invigorating atmosphere’.105 Thus the era of self sufficiency and 
protectionism was put to rest and replaced by a more outward looking, confident, 
economically interdependent regime.
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Conclusion
The course of Irish economic policy formulation between 1948 and 1964 was 
determined largely by the political instability which plagued successive governments 
throughout the period. This instability can be put down to voter disenchantment with 
the economy. The elections of 1951, 1954 and 1957 were fought principally on 
economic issues. Yet economic issues did not register extremely high with the 
politicians themselves. While there was differing view points within both Fianna Fail 
and Fine Gael on the course economic policy should take, voters inevitably blamed 
the party in government for the stagnation in the economy. De Valera, although not 
a firm supporter in any sense of the new financial thinking which had taken root in 
Finance with the appointment of Whitaker, nevertheless realised that old remedies had 
not helped Fianna Fail politically. By the time-Fianna Fail had lost power for the 
second time in six years in 1954, de Valera was remote from much of the economic 
debate raging within the party and the country at large. He was, however, politically 
astute enough to know that economic retrenchment as associated with Fianna Fail 
when they went to the country in 1948 and 1954 had been rejected by the electorate. 
Fine Gael, for their part, were as divided as Fianna Fail. In such circumstances the 
original dynamic for change in the Irish economy came from two sources; factions 
within the main political parties and within the civil service. Within this governmental 
arena, both politically and administratively, financial ideology reared its head. 
Supporters of both an activist approach and of the traditional retrenchment approach 
to economic policy existed in both camps and the story of the development of 
economic policy in this era is one of a struggle fought out between these two groups
at a number of levels.
The introduction of Keynesian economic policies by the first inter-party government 
was the first concrete change in economic policy for a generation. It had its dynamic 
within both administrative and political frameworks. The driving force behind the 
introduction of this policy lay originally in the political field. McGilligan, MacBride 
and Dillon all propagated a change in the prevailing financial ideology within which 
Irish governments pursued policy. On the opposite side of the political fence Lemass, 
who by this time had seen that protectionism had run its course, can be said in theory 
to have supported this departure, though in the tribal nature of Irish political discourse 
he opposed most of that government’s economic and industrial policies, the creation 
of the IDA being a notable example. The first inter-party government saw some 
intrinsic opposition to this about turn in economic policy from within the civil service. 
Both the Central Bank and Finance took the view that such Keynesian policies would 
bankrupt the nation. Yet within the civil service, some key individuals, most 
markedly the young Paddy Lynch, were avid enthusiasts of the pursuit of a Keynesian 
agenda. A new generation of civil servants who were advancing up the administrative 
ladder were looking farther afield in their quest to develop the Irish economy. Men 
like Whitaker, Nagle, Lynch, Murray, Barrington and O’Cearbhaill interested 
themselves in the economic workings of other states and took on wider tasks than 
those usually associated with the civil service. Whitaker, for instance, though a 
staunch defender of traditional Finance policy during the first inter-party government, 
actively studied economic policy formulation in other countries and used this wider 
experience once he eventually became secretary in 1956. The first inter-party
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government can be seen as a prime example of the primacy of politics over economics 
within a governmental framework. The hegemony of Finance and the Central Bank 
was to some extent dissipated by active political leadership of government 
departments.
The administrative side of government regained control once Fianna Fail resumed 
office in 1951. The appointment of MacEntee to Finance was the signal for Finance 
in particular to reassert itself. This reassertion must be viewed, however, in terms of 
Finance stressing the age old solutions for economic problems that were associated 
with that department since the early 1920s. MacEntee was a classic deflationist. He 
was a firm believer in the market and abhorred the Keynesian policies of his 
predecessor. With McElligott still at the helm at Finance, MacEntee set about placing 
financial policy back on the straight and narrow path of deflationary virtue. Fine 
Gael, back in opposition, lost their collective nerve, leaving it to the Lemass wing of 
Fianna Fail to provide the active opposition to such traditional thinking. The minutes 
of the Fianna Fail parliamentary party show quite clearly how wide this dispute was. 
Lemass could not afford to leave MacEntee with a clear run and control of economic 
policy: There was no guarantee that Lemass would automatically replace de Valera, 
once ’the chief’ retired. Lemass could not leave the economic assert its primacy over 
the political within the administrative framework of government at this time. Thus his 
disputes with MacEntee over the whole thrust of economic policy can be seen in these 
terms. While de Valera sided with Lemass on some issues, Lemass realised that these 
were not necessarily signs of approval from ’the chief’ in terms of a leadership 
struggle. Moreover notwithstanding some expansionary schemes, Fianna Fail would
go to the country in 1954 defending a strictly conservative economic record.
It is in these terms that one can see Lemass’s courtship of the various economic 
interest groups in the period. He instinctively knew that the development of the 
country in economic terms necessarily revolved around a corporatist style 
arrangement with the government leading these groups in a new economic 
partnership. For that to happen, Lemass realised that government in its political form 
would have to be the hegemonic player in the administrative system. Of even more 
importance was that he be at the head of such a system and for that to happen he 
would have to devise a long term economic strategy that would return Fianna Fail to 
government. While he bemoaned the fact that civil servants did not do enough 
independent thinking, he was firmly of the belief that it was political government 
which should lead. It is in these terms that one can see the evolution in the process 
of the formulation of public policy towards a more conscious and overt corporatist 
set of arrangements. Within these parameters, the political interests, particularly in 
the form of Lemass, would lead, but it was intrinsic on individual interest groups to 
play a full and active role. Thus the formalisation of the identities of the major 
interest groups; farmers; business; and unions; began. Moreover aspects of the civil 
service became more active as the 1950s continued. Ultimately Whitaker’s Economic 
Development was the culmination of a major strand of activism within parts of the 
higher echelons of the civil service. A decade earlier there was no one saying that 
civil servants had a long term policy planning role in economic and social affairs. 
While it is true that many decision makers in the civil service were happy to take a 
back seat and perform their tasks as they had always done, there was a vigorous band
within administrative circles who believed that it was not just the job of the senior 
civil servant to advise, but it was also imperative that they do some independent 
thinking which could then be presented to their political masters. Although the period 
of the second inter-party government was a time when traditional economy was in the 
ascendent as the policies pursued by that government mirrored the previous 
administration, once Fianna Fail regained power in 1957 the civil service, or more 
correctly some sections of it, should be seen as part of any tripartite arrangement 
between Lemass and the various economic partners.
There was a gradual maturation of relations between the emerging interest groups and 
the government in the policy realm. While clearly the farmers remained the most 
overtly selfish and sectional group, even they came to take some heed of the 
’national’ as distinct from the purely agricultural interest. Moreover the vision of 
ICTU is really quite striking in that they were able to take a dispassionate and long 
term view of the country’s economic prospects in addition to attempting to advance 
the sectional interest of their members. In many ways the business leadership is quite 
similar to the unions as the debates about entry to Europe gathered pace in the late 
1950s and early 1960s. While there was two distinct views about any proposed entry 
of a trading bloc within the business community, it is clear that they realised that the 
country’s economic fortunes and those of their members was interlinked.
When Fianna Fail regained office in 1957, de Valera crucially relegated MacEntee 
from Finance. In essence this left Lemass with the scope to reshape economic 
relations in the way he wanted. This was principally due to the electoral fortunes of
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Fianna Fail, and not to any great shift in financial ideology. De Valera, although he 
can have had little stomach for it himself, undoubtedly realised that in the electorally 
fluid 1950s, economic expansion could well mean political success. Lemass, now the 
undisputed prime economic player in government, embarked on a programme to haul 
the Irish economy out of the dark ages of financial austerity, mass emigration and 
inadequate employment. In essence Lemass did this by setting out to establish a 
broadly European style proto-corporatist social democracy, involving all the key 
players collectively in responsible decision making. He had a long range vision for 
the Irish economy and realised that age old methods had not worked in the past and 
were most unlikely to do so in the future. His relations with the Congress and the 
NFA are categoric examples of his attempts to build such a social democracy. The 
emergence of both players as recognised elements in national policy making is the 
crucial sign in Lemass’s attempts to build what we might call the broad based church 
of economic interest groups. It was essential that both farmers and unions be involved 
as well as business. While Lemass’s views did not please everyone in Fianna Fail as 
witnessed particularly by the resignation of Paddy Smith, the Fianna Fail of the early 
1960s was a distinctly different party to that which had lost power in 1948. A new 
generation of politicians, influenced greatly by Lemass, were comfortable with the 
innovative direction of economic policy that had Europe as its ultimate goal and left 
behind outmoded theories of self sufficiency. By the early 1960s Europe was in fact 
the goal of the majority of politicians and interest groups, with even the Catholic 
Church voicing no overt protest. By the time of the application to the EEC all the 
interest groups that Lemass had co-opted in his quest to make Ireland a more 
competitive economy were advocates of entry. Policy was to be formulated with the
interest groups in mind.
Thus Lemass resolved that the state would have to show the way. His opportunity 
presented itself out of an economic disquiet in the country and he was determined not 
to waste it. The government of which he was all but nominally in charge from 1957 
would pursue policies of economic expansion and would engage with the economic 
interests to see its aims succeed. Ultimately it was politics which had reasserted itself. 
Yet Lemass still faced opposition form his old stomping ground of Industry and 
Commerce. While it was Whitaker who convinced Lemass that free trade had to be 
taken on board it was Lemass who had to ensure that Industry and Commerce left 
their protectionist mentality behind. He did this to such an extent that by 1963 
Industry and Commerce were maintaining that they ’wholeheartedly’ supported a 
phased cut in tariffs. While European economic integration was not an explicit feature 
of either Economic Development or the First Programme for Economic Expansion, 
developments within the country’s economic superstructure had shown policy makers 
that they could not exist independently of the free trading blocs that had emerged in 
Europe from the 1950s onwards. This was particularly true once Britain decided that 
she could also no longer ignore these developments. Whitaker was the main instigator 
in Ireland’s move towards economic interdependence with western Europe. Lemass 
took some convincing, but once persuaded, he became the most enthusiastic advocate 
of entry to such a bloc, in Ireland’s case the EEC, since Britain had applied to join 
that body, and used his political power to ensure that some of the more reluctant civil 
service departments supported him. Ireland’s economic needs had taken on a new 
agenda. An activist Taoiseach, who had brought his party with him, and in the
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process had fundamentally changed their economic philosophy, with a more dynamic 
civil service had embarked on a route that assumed interdependence with other 
economies and engaged in meaningful and formal dialogue with economic interest 
groups. By 1964 the primacy of the political process was fully recognised. 
Administrative civil servants and the economic interests had a vital role to play, but 
it was Lemass who was in charge of economic development.
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Note on Primary Sources
This thesis is based on extensive research in documentary sources. The primary focus 
for historical research into economic policy formulation lies in the cabinet records of 
the Department of the Taoiseach in the National Archives. These are exhaustive in 
their detail of most aspects of policy. Memoranda which passes to other departments 
ends up in the cabinet records with the thoughts of those departments recorded. Thus 
official government records form the necessary base from which this thesis is written. 
Other departments are not as well served as the Taoiseach’s when it comes to 
documentation. The files of the Department of Foreign Affairs, detailed in their 
analysis of diplomatic events, are not nearly so comprehensive when it comes to 
economic issues and the negotiations to join EFTA and the EEC. The Department of 
External Affairs was, for historical reasons, particularly small at the beginning of the 
period covered in this thesis. De Valera had built up the department with an emphasis 
on its diplomatic role. Thus little provision was made for trade or economic 
representation. Although the department gained in stature with the appointment of 
Sean MacBride as Minister in 1948, it still mainly concentrated on its diplomatic role. 
Thus the department’s files reveal little that is useful. It is from within the cabinet 
files that the views of External Affairs emerge in detail.
In many ways the Department of Industry and Commerce is even less well served. 
Its files reveal a department which made little comment on the evolution of industrial 
policy. The files of the trade and industry division, for instance, are littered with 
applications from manufacturers requesting more protection from the department and
293
the government as the 1950s progressed. A former secretary of the department has 
told the author that the files of the department during this period are indicative of the 
mentality of the department. It was a department that was not proactive in its policy 
formulation, and thus little in the way of policy appears in its files.
The files of the Department of Agriculture are only available in the National 
Archives, at the time of writing, for consultation up to 1950. A National Archives 
official has informed the author that little in the way of policy exists in the files post­
dating 1950. This is certainly true of the years 1948-1950. Again it is mainly from 
within the cabinet files that the views of the department materialises, particularly in 
its dealings with the NFA, and on other policy matters.
The files of the Department of Finance are only available in the National Archives 
up to 1942. This, a Department of Finance official has informed the author, is due 
simply to problems of space as the documents are ready to be transferred from 
Finance. He presumes that this is the case in Agriculture also. The author was, 
however, able to consult some Finance files still held in the Department. These files 
show a department changing radically during the years analysed in this thesis. The 
appointment of Whitaker as secretary sees the files of the department increase 
dramatically in content. These files are particularly useful for their portrayal of the 
ultimate move from protectionism to economic interdependence, and of the attempts 
by Finance to bring Industry and Commerce on board in this journey. Overall 
departmental sources are crucial to a study such as this as they bring to life the policy 
making process behind the decisions made by the various departments and the
government as a whole.
Departmental records, however, only tell part of the story. They need to be 
supplemented by other sources. The archives of the economic interest groups who 
were active at the time are patchy. ICTU archives are available in the National 
Archives. They reveal more than Donal Nevin, in a talk with the author, assumed 
they would. They are particularly useful for their portrayal of the Congress’s stance 
on economic issues in the early 1950s and on the possible entry of a European trading 
bloc. These records have not been widely used by other researchers. This writer has 
been less fortunate in respect of records of the other groups. John Gibbons, for 
example, has analysed the files of the NFA and as such wrote his Ph.D. from them, 
but these are not now open to research. The cabinet files are, however, very 
comprehensive in their treatment of state-farmer relations and these together with 
Gibbons’s thesis cover the main ground of agricultural policy making in the period. 
Examination of the business community also created difficulties in that the author was 
unable to see records of the FII and FUE. The cabinet files are not as 
comprehensive, as might be expected, in government business relations. While they 
do contain much that is of value, the writer has supplemented this record with 
detailed interviews with businessmen and industrialists of the time and a careful 
examination of industrial journals and other sources of the time. Another powerful 
interest group, the Catholic Church, also presented difficulties. The hierarchy retained 
no minutes from this period of episcopal conferences. The Catholic press office was 
only set up in the early 1970s and so far as this writer can ascertain there is no 
archival record available to trace the development of the hierarchy’s position on
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economic and social issues. Research on the church’s position has consequently been 
confined to interviews and to a careful trawl through the main Catholic journals of 
the time. An especially useful interview was held with Archbishop Joseph Cassidy, 
who is considered an authority on the politics of the period. Archbishop Cassidy was 
able to shed much light on the position, or more importantly the lack of any such 
stance that the church had on economic issues.
A more fruitful source of research have been the private papers of policy players who 
were active at the time. Among these the Joseph Brennan papers, in the National 
Library, are most useful for the period 1948-1953. They are in fact a much under 
used source: Mary Daly in her 1993 work on Industrial development and Irish 
national identity has consulted them for the earlier period, but few others have used 
them recently. They offer valuable insights on Brennan’s relationship with politicians 
and other civil servants and on the workings of the Central Bank in this period. 
Patrick McGilligan’s papers in UCD are also useful for this period. While the 
McGilligan papers are a vast collection, they have, however, been in the public 
domain for nigh on twenty years and have frequently been consulted by researchers. - 
The Michael Hayes papers, also in UCD, throw interesting light on both Fianna 
Fail’s and Fine Gael’s attitude to Marshall aid in particular. Sean MacEntee’s papers, 
again in UCD, are a treasure trove for those writing on the development of the 
modern Irish state. They are full of insights into economic policy in the period. They 
recount his policy battles with Lemass from the early 1940s to the late 1950s and as 
such are crucial to this study. By contrast the William Norton papers in the Irish 
Labour History Society are a disappointing collection. They shed little light on
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Norton’s time as Minister for Industry and Commerce in the second inter-party 
government, and overall reveal little that is new on economic policy. They are better 
for Norton’s period as Minister for Social Welfare in the first inter-party government, 
but overall are not a substantial addition to the economic debate. Outside the political 
fence, Todd Andrews’ papers in UCD are a valuable collection reflecting the work 
of one of the key public servants of the era. Interestingly they show that Andrews, 
who was a committed statist, was a firm believer in the importance of agriculture for 
the national economy. Padraic O’Halpin’s papers recently deposited in UCD are also 
interesting in their portrayal of a Fianna Fail organiser close to Lemass, who pushed 
for a more active approach to economic management.
An exciting new avenue of research has emerged with the recent opening of the 
Fianna Fail party archives in their headquarters at Mount Street. The parliamentary 
party minutes, although very brief in places, offer fascinating insights into what 
dominated the political thinking of Ireland’s largest political party at the time. 
Moreover the minutes of the party committee, or national executive, reveal the 
thinking behind the party hierarchy at the time. The Fianna Fail archives are divided 
into a number of different sections. For the purposes of this thesis, very useful 
information is contained in the reports of various ard-feiseanna and in the documents 
on elections. The Fianna Fail records are a very valuable new source which have not 
previously been drawn on by researchers. Unfortunately the Fine Gael archives 
located in UCD, are not so comprehensive. They contain no minutes of parliamentary 
meetings after 1949 (because of a fire at party headquarters in the late 1950s). There
297
is some useful material on elections and some policy memoranda regarding these 
elections, but on the whole it is not a very invigorating collection.
The documents used in this thesis have been supplemented by interviews with 
individuals who were active at the time, as civil servants, trade unionists or as 
businessmen. All interviews bar two were taped and all, with the exception of a 
former senior civil servant in the Department of Industry and Commerce, were 
willing to be quoted. Some interviews obviously provided more information than 
others: while all interviewees, bar one, were willing to be quoted, some were more 
reluctant than others to discuss the period. In general the former civil servants 
broadly supported the account given in the official records, but they have been able 
to give a much clearer position of the way policy developed within departments and 
government as a whole than can be found in the documents. Those who were 
involved with the unions, farmers’ organisations and private enterprise have vividly 
brought to life the position of the respective economic interest groups in the period, 
and they cast much new light on conditions in the period. On many occasions, civil 
servants in particular have been able to explain what was the thinking behind certain 
documents. Moreover in the case of those non civil servants who were interviewed, 
one gets a valuable insight into what government decisions meant to those which were 
affected by them.
Other primary sources include government publications and newspapers and 
periodicals of the time. Again these help in a vivid way to augment the 
documentary record.
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